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BOOK REVIEWS
䡲 General

ical texts and related to the division of the cubit
into seven palms, each of four fingers. But the
close relation between these two methods of
measurement in practical terms is clear, and either one could have been used with ease by an
ancient builder.
Herz-Fischler states that “there simply is no
archaeological evidence for the above three rise
over run based theories” (p. 168). Here he is too
quick to dismiss the evidence presented by Flinders Petrie from a mastaba at Meidum (pp. 41–
42, 168). Outside the corners of the structure are
walls with traces of horizontal lines at cubit intervals and sloping lines marking the inclination
of the faces. Herz-Fischler points to the lack of
marks to indicate how the slope was constructed,
but he fails to consider how an identical slope
was constructed eight times around the structure
if such a horizontal measurement was not used.
Nor are the corners of the structure level; thus
the correct measurements must be calculated
relative to the depth. Mark Lehner, in his Complete Pyramids (Thames & Hudson, 1997), page
220, offers evidence from Giza that the builders
constructed the corners by measuring in a certain
distance from reference points outside the sides.
The pyramid drawing from Meroe based on a
rectangular grid (pp. 37–38) does not necessarily conflict with a rise and run theory and certainly shows that a proportional system was used
relating side length to height. I find this archaeological evidence for the use of rise over run
theories convincing, if limited, and it strongly
supports side-inclination based theories over
those relating to the arris.
The Meroe drawing cannot be taken as reliable evidence that the seked theory was not used
in Fourth Dynasty structures (p. 38), as it dates
to over 2,000 years after the Great Pyramid was
constructed and lies outside Egypt. As for the
question of whether a seked-based system or integers were used to construct the angle of the
sides, Herz-Fischler could have used the measured angles of sloping corridors and shafts inside the Great Pyramid that must have been constructed using similar techniques. Further, he
makes no attempt to apply these theories to the
slopes of other pyramids, although in some cases
he does consider examples presented by other
authors. Applying these theories more broadly
might lead to more decisive results. Before readers undertake to do so themselves, however, they
should be alerted that some of the measurements

Roger Herz-Fischler. The Shape of the Great
Pyramid. xii Ⳮ 293 pp., figs., tables, apps., bibl.,
index. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfried Laurier University Press, 2000. $29.95 (paper).
The existence of a mathematical theory determining the shape of the Great Pyramid is a longstanding assumption, and speculation on the
subject dates back to Herodotus. Roger HerzFischler’s study presents and discusses eleven
major theories and their proponents in the light
of archaeological and philosophical considerations. The historiographical aspect of the study
is very useful, as is the formulation and discussion of some of the problems. A brief sociological case study of the Pi-theory and the reasons
for its propagation and popularity in Britain is
particularly interesting. But although this book
offers much that will be of interest to professional and amateur historians of mathematics
and pyramid enthusiasts, it does not provide a
definitive conclusion to the 2,500-year-old debate.
Having dismissed all but three of the theories
and unable to decide among them, Herz-Fischler
reaches the rather extraordinary conclusion that
there may have been no true theoretical basis for
the angles of inclination that might have been
established “by eye” (p. 168). In settling for this
interpretation, however, he fails to consider how
the angle would have been replicated on the different sides of a pyramid or how angles of inclination would have been maintained or transferred to other pyramids of different sizes: for
example, Khufu’s three queens’ pyramids have
slopes virtually identical to those of the main
pyramid (see V. Maragioglio and C. Rinaldi,
L’architettura delle piramidi menfite IV [Centro
per le Antichità e la Storia dell’Arte del Vicino
Oriente-Roma, 1965], pp. 80, 86, 92).
The three theories among which Herz-Fischler
cannot decide are all proportion-based theories,
two relating to the angle of inclination and one
to the angle of the arris (all theories involving
complex mathematics were those Herz-Fischler
dismissed). This conclusion is significant in its
own right and relates to practical building considerations. Herz-Fischler is keen to distinguish
mathematically between integer proportional
systems and the seked theory (see note on p. 28),
a system attested in ancient Egyptian mathemat-
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given in Appendix 2 are out of date. Corrected
figures are: Abu Rawash, c. 52⬚ (Michel Vallogia, Au coeur d’une pyramid [Musée Romain de
Lausanne-Vidy, 2001], pp. 56–57); Bent Pyramid, 55⬚ 00⬘ 30⬙ (lower section), 43⬚ 01⬘ 30⬙
(upper) (Josef Dorner, “Form und Ausmaße der
Knickpyramide,” MDAIK, 1986, 42:43–58);
Red Pyramid, 44⬚ 44⬘ (Josef Dorner, “Neue Messungen an der Roten Pyramid,” in H. Guksch and
D. Polz, eds., Stationen: Beitrage zur Kulturgeschichte Ägyptens Rainer Stadelmann gewidmet
[P. von Zabern, 1998], pp. 23–29). In this last
example considerable variation (up to 43⬘) was
noted in the inclination of different stretches of
the same pyramid face, which suggests that an
angle of 45⬚ was intended. This observed variation is very significant considering how little of
the casing of the next pyramid constructed—the
Great Pyramid—is preserved (as we can see in
the photograph on the cover of the book).
Although I find Herz-Fischler’s conclusions
rather weak and some of his treatments of archaeological sources too dismissive, this volume
provides a useful introduction to the subject and
a clear formulation of the problems involved. It
is, then, a thought-provoking contribution to a
long-standing debate.
KATE SPENCE
Die Schrift des Ibrāhı̄m b. Sinān b. Tābit über
die Schatteninstrumente. Translated and annotated by Paul Luckey. Edited by Jan P. Hogendijk. (Islamic Mathematics and Astronomy,
101.) xvi Ⳮ 283 pp., illus., bibl. Frankfurt am
Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic
Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999.
This book is one volume in a series consisting
of reprints of writings on the history of science
in Muslim societies undertaken by the Institute
for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt
am Main, and edited by Fuat Sezgin. This particular volume presents Paul Luckey’s 1941 doctoral thesis on Ibrāhı̄m ibn Sinān’s treatise on
sundials, now published for the first time. It also
includes an introduction by the editor of the volume, Jan P. Hogendijk, that describes Luckey’s
life and scholarly career; a bibliography of
Luckey’s works; the Arabic editions of two texts
by al-Kindi (d. about 874), of ibn Sinān’s text
on the sundials, and of the beginning of a treatise
by al-Mahani (ninth century); Hogendijk’s
notes; Luckey’s curriculum vitae; diagrams prepared by Luckey as well as by Hogendijk; and
the (technically poorly executed) facsimile of

MS Istanbul, Aya Sofya 4832, fols. 66b–75b,
which contains ibn Sinān’s treatise.
Hogendijk offers this reprint of Luckey’s thesis as “a tribute to the man and his work” (p.
viii). This dedication reflects the opinion that, as
Hogendijk says, Luckey was one of the foremost
historians of Arabic-Islamic mathematics in the
twentieth century (p. vii). His thesis focused on
the mathematical and astronomical contents of
ibn Sinān’s treatise. Luckey embedded the technical analysis of ibn Sinān’s particular work in
brief surveys of the religious community ibn
Sinān belonged to—that of the so-called Sabaeans—of the medieval scholar’s life and
works, of his method of determining the area of
the segment of a parabola, and of the theories of
sundials espoused by ancient and medieval (Arabic) authors. Finally, he discusses two writings
by al-Kindi and some aspects of a text by alMahani, both of whom lived in the ninth century.
Luckey’s work is thus a good example of the
particular approach to the history of mathematics
that prevailed at the time he wrote.
His dissertation does, however, have a few pecularities. Luckey is concerned not only with
mathematical progress and sources but also with
the intellectual excellence of individuals and
groups (see, e.g., pp. 2, 3, 18, 22, 32–33, 80–
81). Like the author of his major source for the
chapter on the Sabaeans, Daniel Chwolsohn
(1858), Luckey is interested in the issue of their
race (p. 2). He applauds or chastises historical
actors or communities for their actions and speculates on their aspirations and emotions (pp. 2,
7, 31, 83). He introduces problems outside the
limited realm of his own subject but does not
engage in a deeper historical investigation in order to discuss or evaluate them (see, among other
passages his discussion of ibn Sinān’s preference
for the chord function over the sine, cosine, and
versed sine functions used by his two predecessors Thabit ibn Qurra and al-Battani [p. 45]).
These aspects of Luckey’s study raise an important question: Shouldn’t reprinted works
based on approaches to the historiography of science and mathematics that, by now, are themselves historical be accompanied by at least a
brief consideration of the author’s historiographical methodology? Such a consideration, of
course, may entail its own difficulties, as Hogendijk’s attempt to provide some context in fact
illustrates. In his biographical sketch of Luckey,
Hogendijk remarks on Luckey’s concern with
issues of race in his other papers and notes that
he published an article in the racist journal
Deutsche Mathematik. Although Hogendijk saw
the need to ask what these facts imply about
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Luckey’s political positions—that is, his attitude
toward the Nazi regime—Hogendijk did not ask
whether they represent beliefs that were widespread among the community of historians of
science and mathematics, not only in Germany
but also in other Western countries, during the
first half of the twentieth century. In Luckey’s
case, there may not be sufficient documentation
for an extensive investigation of his political
view. The publication of his thesis, however, reminds us that no good studies of the methodological as well as political stances of German
historians of science and mathematics are currently available.
Hogendijk’s work as an editor was complicated by the fact that Luckey’s thesis does not
include a critical edition of any of the four texts
he examines. Hogendijk discovered the Arabic
versions of two of them as prepared by Luckey
in his papers at the Oriental Seminar of the University of Tübingen, but he himself had to edit
the two remaining texts, among them ibn Sinān’s
treatise. In doing so, he was guided by Luckey’s
remarks on the philological peculiarities of this
text as manifested in MS Aya Sofya 4832 (pp.
75–78). Further, in ambiguous cases Hogendijk
reasonably decided to choose “a reading which
is consistent with Luckey’s translation” (p. 96).
He inserted in Luckey’s German translation a
few references to his notes as editor (these appear on p. 222) but without, unfortunately,
catching all the typographical, and other, errors.
Finally, he supplemented Luckey’s own reproductions of the diagrams, which are adaptations
to modern convention (pp. 96, 225–247); these
diagrams reconstruct the figures of the original
manuscript (pp. 96, 248–263).
As reasonable as Hogendijk’s approach to editing the Arabic text is—that is, maintaining
consistency with Luckey’s German translation—it creates some problems. I discuss these
problems in detail, with a list of corrections to
Hogendijk’s edition, in a review in Zeitschrift für
Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, in which I compare this edition with
the one published by Roshdi Rashed in 2000
(Roshdi Rashed and Hélène Bellosta, Ibrahim
ibn Sinan: Logique et géométrie au Xe siècle
[Leiden: Brill, 2000]). Rashed and Hogendijk
edited the text independently, without any
knowledge of each other’s work. Both editions
contain errors that could have been avoided had
the two editors consulted each other, so it is a
pity they did not collaborate on this project.
As Luckey’s dissertation deals with an important text on mathematical and astronomical
issues by an outstanding scholar of the tenth cen-
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tury, and as Hogendijk’s editing, despite the
problems I have mentioned, is basically sensible
and responsible, this reprint can only be considered a welcome addition to the substantial,
though far from satisfying, number of publications of original mathematical and astronomical
works by scholars of the medieval Muslim world
investigated by contemporary historians of science and mathematics.
SONJA BRENTJES
Colin A. Russell (Editor). Chemistry, Society,
and Environment: A New History of the British
Chemical Industry. xvi Ⳮ 372 pp., frontis., illus., figs., tables, indexes. Cambridge: Royal Society of Chemistry, 2000. £59.50.
In this book Colin Russell and his colleagues
tread a somewhat difficult path between apologia
for the British chemical industry and the historical account of its development. It is not an altogether comfortable journey, less from the point
of view of maintaining balance between apologetics and critique, a difficulty of which the authors are clearly aware, than from the need to
balance “general” history of the industry with the
“environmental” theme. Looking first at the former, the book represents a considerable achievement for the authors. They have marshaled a
very wide array of technical and other information in order to offer largely narrative accounts
of a wide range of industries. It is unlikely that
this degree of expertise could be brought together
in any other group, particularly since the death of
W. A. Campbell. The broad canvas that they
cover means that many of the themes and topics
are skated over quite briefly. Nevertheless there is
a good deal of technical detail and substantial,
though rather less, social and human detail. I did
find myself wondering who would read this study:
it attempts to be all things to all people, but risks
satisfying neither the specialist nor the general
reader, if the latter person exists. Overall, however, the authors have fulfilled effectively what I
take to have been their brief and can expect their
book to become a standard reference work.
I was less convinced by the environmental
theme. The very self-conscious evenhandedness
of the authors grew wearisome—in fact I began
to feel as if I was being talked down to in the
final chapter. Surely a reader of this book does
not need to be convinced that “modern life
would be impossible without the methods and
products of the chemical industry” (p. 348).
Similarly, there is little to be gained, in my opinion, from offering quasi-moral judgments on the
failures or otherwise of the chemical industry or
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Inspection of construction at Foyers in the early 1890s. Lord Kelvin is third from left (from Russell,
ed., Chemistry, Society, and Environment, p. 314).

from telling us in the manner of a school textbook that “chemists have endeavored to improve
the quality of water supply” (pp. 345–346).
Chemists, I suspect, have done what they were
told and paid to do. We know that the chemical
industry has been a polluter and has attempted
to recycle its waste products for economic and
political reasons. What is of interest are the technical and socioeconomic determinants of this.
We get a good deal of the former but rather little
of the latter. This is disappointing when one
knows that one of the authors, Sarah Wilmott,
has written a sophisticated analysis of one aspect
of this question, particularly emphasizing how
the industry employed chemical knowledge to
reconfigure the notion and legal positioning of
chemical pollution (in E. Homburg, A. S. Travis,
and H. G. Schröter, The Chemical Industry in
Europe, 1850–1914 [Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1998]). Of course it would be asking a lot to
extend this type of empirically grounded analysis across the divisions and issues associated
with the chemical industry.
This then is a worthy book of reference that
brings together good technical and synoptic accounts of many aspects of the British chemical
industry in one location. However, it employs a
cautious—if one were being brutal one might
say pedestrian—historiography, and I did not
feel that it broke new historical or conceptual
ground. But perhaps it was never intended to.
JAMES DONNELLY
Robert Fox; Anna Guagnini. Laboratories,
Workshops, and Sites: Concepts and Practices
of Research in Industrial Europe, 1800–1914. ii
Ⳮ 214 pp., illus., tables, index. Berkeley: Office

of the History of Science and Technology, University of California, 1999. $24 (paper).
In this monograph Robert Fox and Anna Guagnini aim to reinterpret the nature of “research”
and the relations of science and industry in Europe between 1800 and 1914. They compare and
contrast industrial developments in what they
call the “slow-lane” countries (Britain, France,
and Italy) with those in the “fast lane” (Germany
and the United States). They make their case by
examining four large issues.
The first is conceptions of applied research before 1870. Fox and Guagnini notably begin not
with the English industrial revolution but with a
discussion of how France’s state-supported savants and engineers in the revolutionary and Napoleonic eras helped bring science into the industrial realm, principally that of the chemical
industry. By the mid-nineteenth century, they argue, the British slowly, and the Germans
quickly, began to change their attitudes toward
applied science, while the French remained
largely at a standstill. Yet the main result of these
developments was not any dramatic impact of
science on industry but, rather, the diffusion of
a new rhetoric bearing the message that science
could be applied to aid national industry, although to do so it must, paradoxically, also retain
and advance its “pure” dimension.
Fox and Guagnini next outline the functions
of physics laboratories in Germany, France, and
Britain. They stress that these laboratories grew
part and parcel with the rise of new aspects of
teaching (especially the training of future secondary school teachers and technologists) and an
increased interest in research in the discipline.
They believe that the new teaching goals were
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probably the single most influential cause of the
rise of physics laboratories. Especially by the
1870s and 1880s, the ideals of academic physics
began to affect and were affected by applications
of physics (above all, electricity) in industry; this
development in turn initiated a never-ending debate about the “demands of utility” versus “disinterested inquiry” (p. 42).
Third, the authors analyze the rise of electrical
engineering as an academic discipline from the
1880s on. They discern two patterns: electrical
engineering was introduced either as an integral
part of the mechanical engineering curriculum or
as a one-year, advanced program based on a student’s previous training in mechanical or civil
engineering. They emphasize that teaching, not
research, remained the principal activity of academic electrical engineers until late in the century. They argue that the search for novelty in
electrical (as in mechanical) engineering occurred principally in the manufacturer’s workshop or on work sites.
Fourth and finally, Fox and Guagnini address
“the realities of industrial research.” Although
they fully recognize that many industrial research laboratories (above all in the United
States and Germany) were first conceived and
took embryonic form before World War I, they
think that to understand the nature and loci of
industrial research before 1918, scholars must
consider two broad interpretations: first, that
even in the nascent “research laboratories” in
Germany and the United States there was a
strong emphasis on “testing, quality control, and
investigations directed at the protection of patents, rather than a preoccupation with the development of new products and processes” (p. 149);
second, they assert that experimental work occurred largely on “the shop floor and the site by
technical staff engaged in day-to-day work of design, production, and installation” (p. 150).
Fox and Guagnini persuasively argue that assessment of developments in the slow-lane countries must be appreciated in terms of their demographies, politics, economies, and traditions
of higher education. Innovation, they demonstrate, appeared in a variety of contexts and
places in both fast-lane and slow-lane countries.
They maintain that our understanding of “research” must be expansive enough to include the
incremental sort that occurred in the workshops
and sites as well as the more theoretical sort that
(later) occurred in academic and industrial research laboratories. Their thoughtful monograph
should be carefully studied by all scholars concerned with the history of applied research and
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of the relations of science, technology, and the
economy in general.
DAVID CAHAN
Felix Driver. Geography Militant: Cultures of
Exploration and Empire. viii Ⳮ 258 pp., illus.,
figs., bibl., index. Oxford/Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. $29.95 (paper).
In this widely researched and well-written study,
Felix Driver investigates the relationship between geographical knowledge and the cultures
of exploration and imperialism in nineteenthand early twentieth-century Britain. The book’s
title—taken from an essay by Joseph Conrad
that was reprinted in the National Geographic in
1924—refers to the heroic era of exploration
that Conrad laments as passing at the close of
the nineteenth century. Driver traces the history
of this ideal of exploration and is especially interested in the hold it has had over modern understandings of geography.
Driver is one of several geographers and historians who have broadened the history of geography in recent years. In his estimation the traditional focus on the intellectual history of
geography as a discipline has come at the expense of other important manifestations of geography, among them the culture of fieldwork.
In a related vein, Driver also cautions against the
tendency among postcolonial scholars of colonialism to focus excessively on travel narratives.
Both of these emphases have led to a misleading
characterization of imperialism as having hegemonic motives and essential functions. Instead
of emphasizing the textual “end product” of
travel narratives, Driver investigates the lives
and practices of the explorers themselves. This
change of focus makes his a more complex and
subtle approach, which in turn highlights the
conflictual and contingent role of colonial discourse.
Because he wants to know how geography
functioned both as an idea and as a practice,
Driver places explorers at the center of analysis
and raises questions about how they built reputations, secured funding, and cultivated the myth
of the lone explorer that paradoxically depended
on recognition by others. Among the most interesting of Driver’s themes is the history of the
heroic ideal of exploration that evoked the missionary role of European scientific knowledge.
He repeatedly demonstrates that this ideal was
only half the story, for it was always contested
in practice. The work of Henry Morton Stanley
nicely illustrates this problem. By recovering the
controversy, criticism, and conflict surrounding
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Stanley’s explorations, Driver debunks the familiar story of Stanley as representing the ideal
of progress that we associate so closely with the
nineteenth-century culture of exploration. Substantial attention is given to Stanley’s own need
to position himself apart from armchair geographers and philanthropists who he felt detracted
from his reputation and work. What emerges is
a man whose reputation as explorer became as
important as the expeditions themselves.
Driver traces both the production and the consumption of geographical knowledge. The interest in the former leads him to the Royal Geographical Society (RGS), the largest scientific
society in London by 1870 and a critical institution for the collection of information from
around the world in the nineteenth century. One
of Driver’s great strengths is to demonstrate the
sheer diversity of what counted as “exploration”
or “geography” in this period. Instead of portraying the RGS as a monolithic structure with
a consistent ideological bent, he points out the
breadth of the society’s membership. As a result,
we see a culture of exploration that is full of
tension and contradiction, manifest in the mutual
suspicion of professional and popular geographers and the increasingly important distinction
between exploration and travel. Driver encourages us to think of the RGS as a “coalition of
interests” rather than as an organization with one
orchestrated position, an “information exchange
rather than a center of calculation” (pp. 36–37).
The range of material included in this book,
only a portion of which can be covered here, is
exceptional. Geography Militant is a welcome
contribution and will certainly spark a reconsideration of assumptions in a number of fields, including the history of science, cultural history,
and the history of imperialism.
SUSAN SCHULTEN
Christopher McGowan. The Dragon Seekers:
How an Extraordinary Circle of Fossilists Discovered the Dinosaurs and Paved the Way for
Darwin. xvi Ⳮ 254 pp., illus., bibl., index. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Publishing, 2001. $26,
Can $39.50.
Though it is an attractive popular book dealing
with some major episodes in the history of nineteenth-century vertebrate paleontology, The
Dragon Seekers fails to establish the connection
between Darwin and his predecessors promised
by its title. As scholarship, it is seriously deficient except when dealing with ichthyosaurs,
about which its Canadian author, a paleontologist, is thoroughly knowledgeable.

Of the several persons central to Christopher
McGowan’s topic, Mary Anning, William Conybeare, and Thomas Hawkins had little or no role
in the discovery of dinosaurs. All three of them
were instead devoted to ichthyosaurs and plesiosaurs; McGowan writes confidently and reliably about each of these impressive prehistoric
families. Despite his subtitle, the fossil reptile
depicted on McGowan’s title page is not a dinosaur but an ichthyosaur—and an excessively
“made up” one at that (see p. 138). He begins
and ends the book with Mary Anning and her
famously fossiliferous hometown. In the Blue
Lias cliffs of Lyme Regis, both ichthyosaurs and
plesiosaurs were found—but no dinosaurs.
Though Lyell, Agassiz, and Darwin appear as
dragon seekers also, none of them was associated importantly with saurians. Cuvier, a French
seeker of dragons and much else, is mentioned
only in passing.
The three dinosaur discoverers important to
McGowan’s book are William Buckland, Gideon Mantell, and Richard Owen (which is hardly
unexpected). A more energetic researcher than
some, McGowan actually visited the Kirkdale
and Paviland caves made famous by Buckland.
He provides up-to-date information about each
cave, as he does about other topics throughout
the text. Unfortunately, his exploration of the
available literature on Buckland, Mantell, and
Owen is less impressive. McGowan is clearly
unacquainted with major publications by all
three; their later thinking in particular is generally ignored. More broadly, McGowan has too
obviously written in haste. He never provides the
more coherent reading of Victorian vertebrate
paleontology and associated sciences that his audience-seeking thesis requires.
Persons familiar with early dinosaur discoveries will notice the absence from McGowan’s
book of many useful sources and studies. The
weak notes and “further reading” bibliography
that he provides are inadequate. Only direct quotations have been identified; all other matters of
substance, frequently controversial, are left to be
taken on faith. In some introductory remarks (p.
1), McGowan tells us that fossils have been
known since the time of classical Greece. They
have actually been found among the grave goods
of Neanderthals. Some persons, Greeks among
them, realized the significance of fossils (as records of past life) long before the latter eighteenth
century. McGowan even fails to acknowledge
that there were evolutionary theories before Vestiges (1844). He ignores James Secord’s recent
facsimile of the latter and is apparently unaware
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that a magnificent new edition of Darwin’s correspondence is appearing.
A number of factual mistakes are disconcerting. Cuvier’s seminal Recherches (1812) is dated
1799 (p. 6). No other foreign publication is considered, though there were several of importance. Mantell and Owen are described as physicians, which they were not; both were instead
surgeons, an occupation not involving university
education. Mantell joined the Geological Society
in 1818, not 1820. McGowan is significantly
misleading when he describes the financing of
Mantell’s first book (pp. 44–45) and the chronology of its writing. It appeared in May 1822,
not four months later (p. 48). The first chapter
of Mantell’s book was contributed by the Rev.
Henry Hoper, not Harper (p. 48). Mantell was
surgeon to three parishes, not just one (p. 49).
McGowan fails to realize that the name “Megalosaurus” had been published by James Parkinson in 1822 (p. 77). He also distorts the history
of Buckland’s famous 1824 paper on Megalosaurus by assuming that some later additions
were already in it at the time of presentation (pp.
77–78). Once again, however, he includes some
useful modern knowledge.
On page 87 MCGowan insists that Mantell and
Conybeare had not yet met, though they were
both present at the meeting of 20 February 1824
and had corresponded earlier. Mantell did not
receive Conybeare’s most recent letter “shortly
after” 10 February 1825 but on 24 November
1824 (p. 87). On page 89 Robert Trotter is not
fully identified, and his later generosity to Mantell is ignored. Though Lyell’s geological views
influenced Mantell’s, they would never be entirely congruent. Mantell was still very much a
catastrophist in 1832 (p. 93). On page 111
McGowan’s explanation of British money is erroneous. According to page 113, Mantell and
Benjamin Silliman never met. Yet they spent
several days together in 1851. In January 1837
Darwin was actually living at Cambridge (p.
160). On page 179 McGowan claims that “our
present preoccupation with dinosaurs dates back
less than three decades.” Finally, there is some
inadequate editing, as with “their’s” (p. 137) and
“Gooses” (p. 165). On page 229 a note from Lyell to Owen is quoted but not cited.
Though many of these lapses will be of no
consequence to the general reader, scholars
should be forewarned. This is not a book on
which one can rely, despite occasionally useful
points. It should not be recommended to students, for whom better sources are available. It
should not be taken as a model. Several wouldbe popularizations of the history of the earth sci-
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ences have appeared recently, none of them
based on sound historical arguments. The writing of defensible history is not so simple a task
as these facile popularizers would like the public
to believe.
DENNIS R. DEAN
Michael Ruse. The Evolution Wars: A Guide to
the Debates. Foreword by Edward O. Wilson.
xx Ⳮ 428 pp., illus., figs., index. Santa Barbara,
Calif./Denver: ABC-CLIO, 2000.
Beginning his fourth decade as one of the leading students of the evolution controversies, the
philosopher Michael Ruse is well known as a
gifted writer, able historian, and careful observer
of the many facets of the response to Darwin.
This latest contribution seeks to perform a different task from his earlier endeavors. Ruse has
designed this book to provide a succinct overview of the background of and response to Darwinism, focusing equally well on the history, religion, politics, and science involved. His goal is
to inform the lay reader of the substance behind
the continuing controversy, correcting errors and
clarifying often-misunderstood concepts. He
succeeds admirably in achieving this goal.
Ruse rounds up the usual suspects in his discussion of the development of Darwinian evolution. Examining the work of earlier naturalists,
he describes developmental ideas and lays the
foundation for the concept of evolution through
natural selection. His necessarily brief account
of Darwin’s own work nonetheless provides the
reader with a clear understanding of what Darwin did and did not argue in Origin of Species
and Descent of Man. Equally impressive,
though, Ruse discusses the major developments
in evolutionary theory that followed Darwin in
the same informative way. The impact of genetics and the varied roles of paleontology are well
covered, as are various theoretical developments. Ruse’s discussion of Sewall Wright’s
concept of the “adaptive landscape,” for example, is especially well done. He is no less effective in integrating recent developments into his
account of the present state of evolutionary
knowledge.
Ruse also provides the reader with a good
analysis of the various challenges to Darwinian
evolution, exploring the antievolutionists of the
1920s as well as the creation scientists who have
been active since the 1960s. He rightly emphasizes the current “intelligent design” campaign
as the latest manifestation of antievolution sentiment, but carefully presents these ideas as distinct from earlier ones. Ruse similarly analyzes
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the “punctuated equilibria” concept of Stephen
Jay Gould, pointing out weaknesses in this idea
and suggesting that Gould may be doing more
harm than good in educating the public on the
realities of organic evolution.
Ruse includes much that will aid the reader in
the pursuit of additional understanding of the
controversy. Each chapter includes a brief essay
discussing and evaluating standard sources. A
list of references, a chronology, and a glossary
add to the volume, as do nearly 100 pages of
documents that are included as a separate section. The writings of individuals as diverse as
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Thomas Henry Huxley,
and Pope John Paul II are complemented by
works of such noted scientists as Darwin, Gould,
Edward O. Wilson, and Richard Dawkins.
Ruse makes another important contribution in
his effective critique of the “science studies” focus that seems increasingly popular among historians of science. Rejecting the concept that science is merely another belief system, Ruse
stresses that the personal beliefs of scientists are
largely irrelevant to an evaluation of the science
they produce. Of even greater value, Ruse
stresses that scientists’ beliefs must, at any rate,
be evaluated on the basis of their own times, and
not on the basis of current perspectives or fashions. This observation should, of course, be obvious to historians, so it is somewhat embarrassing that a philosopher must come along and
remind us of this fact.
Ruse has provided a well-written and thoughtprovoking study of the evolution controversy in
its myriad forms. In his foreword, the sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson argues that The Evolution Wars would be his choice for the single volume to read by someone who had no knowledge
of the evolution controversy. Wilson’s evaluation cogently describes the value of this book.
GEORGE E. WEBB
Edward J. Larson. Evolution’s Workshop: God
and Science on the Galápagos Islands. xiv Ⳮ
320 pp., frontis., illus., index. New York: Basic
Books, 2001. $27.50, Can $41.50.
I first visited the Galápagos Islands in June 1998,
and little was as I expected. Rather than craggy
barrens covered with scrub, lush foliage beautified many islands. Rather than flourishing
coastal habitats, surface water temperatures were
well above normal, and throughout the archipelago dead or dying sea lions, sea birds, and marine iguanas littered the shores. All of this was
the result of increased rainfall and the disruption
of the normal upwelling in waters surrounding

the archipelago caused by the 1997–1998 El
Niño event. When I visited Galápagos again, in
February 1999, the islands were suffering one of
the driest periods on record, and terrestrial vegetation had died back; but the cool, nourishing
upwelling had resumed, and the marine environment was thriving.
A “study in contrasts” aptly describes the two
extremes in environmental conditions in the Galápagos Islands in 1998 and 1999 and, as Edward
Larson captures beautifully in this book, many
aspects of their history. Indeed, a theme that
emerges in Larson’s historical account of the
Galápagos is one of irony. Compare Herman
Melville’s characterization of the islands as “an
archipelago of aridities, without inhabitant, history, or hope of either in all time to come” (p.
7), with modern biologists’ and eco-tourists’
view of the Galápagos as “hallowed ground” and
“enchanting”; the view of Galápagos as a place
where one can so easily see Creation (e.g., Agassiz) with the view that is is a place where one
can so easily see evolution (e.g., Darwin); the
popular belief that Darwin used Galápagos
finches as the basis of his theory of natural selection with the reality that a complete picture of
Galápagos finch evolution didn’t emerge until it
was unveiled in 1947 by David Lack, who renamed “Galápagos finches” “Darwin’s finches”;
the treatment of Galápagos as a land of plenty
from which early sailors, buccaneers, and greedy
naturalists removed tens of thousands of tortoises with its current status as a land in which
a single tortoise named Lonesome George is an
icon for conservation worldwide; and its small
stature in terms of geographical size with its
monumental stature in terms of impact on the
history of biological science.
Expanding on the last contrast, Larson offers
the following insight from Robert Bowman: “No
area on Earth of comparable size has inspired
more fundamental changes in Man’s perspective
of himself and his environment than the Galápagos Islands” (p. 12). As such, the comprehensive history of the place provided by Larson is
well justified. It is also fascinating, and Larson
tells the tale well—concisely, occasionally with
wit, and always with inclusive documentation.
The text is divided into three parts, the first covering the period from the discovery of the New
World, including Galápagos in 1535, to Darwin’s legendary visit in 1835 and the subsequent
publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859;
the second, the explosion of interest in the archipelago by American and European naturalists
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and the third, the remarkable transformation
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of the Galápagos between World War II, during
which it served as a military base for the United
States, to the present. Following and cited in the
text are sixty-three pages of notes, a veritable
gold mine of references to classic and obscure
published material that demonstrate both how
thoroughly Larson researched the topic and how
persistently this small archipelago has pervaded
scientific, governmental, religious, and public
thought.
This book is more than a historical account of
scientific exploration in Galápagos; it is also a
dramatic story of the history of Galápagos in human thought. By incorporating thoughts and
findings of nearly every famous, infamous, and
forgettable player in Galápagos exploration in
roughly chronological order and in the context
of prevailing social or scientific mores, Larson
provides an extraordinary glimpse into human
nature. Regarding the evolution of human
thought in conceptualizing organic evolution,
Larson demonstrates that spiritual concerns or
other constraints prevent some individuals from
progressing intellectually, others eagerly abandon all tradition to embrace new concepts, and
still others find middle ground. As noted poignantly, no less than ironically, by Larson, creation science, not evolution, is taught in Galápagos schools, and this once-pristine archipelago
is now bustling with humans and the predictable
problems that accompany us. The history of Galápagos, both in terms of its ultimate fate and its
influence on human thought, is not finished. The
sequel to Evolution’s Workshop may be equally
intriguing.
CAROLE BALDWIN
Nico Stehr; Hans von Storch (Editors). Eduard
Brückner: The Sources and Consequences of
Climate Change and Climate Variability in Historical Times. Translations by Barbara Stehr
and Gordon Gamlin. x Ⳮ 338 pp., illus., figs.,
tables, bibl., index. Dordrecht/Boston/London:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. $167, £96,
NLG 275.
Eduard Brückner (1862–1927), professor of geography at Bern, Halle, and Vienna, editor of
Meteorologische Zeitschrift, and founder of Zeitschrift für Gletscherkunde, für Eiszeitforschung
und Geschichte des Klimas, focused his research
on climatological and glaciological themes,
broadly construed, with forays into hydrology
and oceanography. He is most widely known for
his observation that cool, damp conditions
seemed to alternate with warm, dry conditions
in approximately thirty-five year cycles, subse-
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quently called “Brückner cycles.” This was apparently a rediscovery of a similar weather cycle
long noted in the Netherlands and first remarked
upon by Sir Francis Bacon. Brückner popularized his ideas by attempting to correlate these
(real or imagined) fluctuations with sunspots,
economic conditions, migrations, lake levels,
and other cyclical phenomena worldwide.
This book includes eleven articles or chapters
in English translation that are broadly representative of Brückner’s writings on climate variations with one article each on hydrology and
oceanography. These include “Ground Water
and Typhus” (1887–1888); “Fluctuations of
Water Levels in the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea,
and the Baltic Sea Relative to Weather” (1888);
“How Constant Is Today’s Climate?” (1889);
three chapters from Climate Change Since 1700
(1890): “The Current Status of the Inquiry into
Climate Changes” (Ch. 1), “Periodization of Climatic Variations” (Ch. 8), and “The Significance
of Climatic Variations in Theory and Practice”
(Ch. 9); “On the Influence of the Snow Cover on
the Climate of the Alps” (1893); “Influence of
Climate Variability on Harvest and Grain Prices
in Europe” (1895); “Weather Prophets” (1896);
“An Inquiry about the 35-Year Periods of Climatic Variations” (1902); “On Climate Variability” (1909); “Climate Variability and Mass
Migration” (1912); and “The Settlement of the
United States as Controlled by Climate and Climatic Oscillations” (1915). Brückner’s interests in
glaciers, glacial ages, geomorphology, polar research, and cartography are not represented here.
The editors, Nico Stehr and Hans von Storch,
provide a brief introduction, including an outline
of Brückner’s influence on his contemporaries,
notably Julius Hann, and a plea that current researchers in the human dimensions of global
change take Brückner seriously because of what
they believe is an “analogy to the present state
of affairs” (p. 18), particularly the political and
economic consequences of climate variations on
human time scales (decades to centuries). The
book concludes with a thirteen-page bibliography of over 200 of Brückner’s publications.
Scattered typographical and other errors do not
seriously detract from the utility of the book or
the graceful translations by Barbara Stehr and
Gordon Gamlin. This tantalizing peek into a neglected body of literature on climate variations
in historical times should serve to keep Brückner’s legacy alive within the English-speaking
global change community and may entice scholars to reappraise his influence.
JAMES RODGER FLEMING
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Sherry L. Smith. Reimagining Indians: Native
Americans through Anglo Eyes, 1880–1940. xii
Ⳮ 273 pp., illus., index. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. $35.
The notion of the exotic Other gives writers
something against which to define themselves.
Sherry Smith deals with that process of self-definition in her study of a group of writers whose
subjects were American Indians. The group includes Charles Erskine Scott Wood, a military
officer involved in the pursuit of the Nez Perce;
George Bird Grinnell, Walter McClintock, and
Mary Roberts Rinehart, who studied northern
Plains tribes; Frank Bird Linderman, biographer
of the Crows Plenty-Coup and Pretty Shield;
Charles Fletcher Lummis, founder of the Southwest Museum in Los Angeles; George Wharton
James, a self-taught authority on southwestern
Indian cultures; and Mary Austin, Anna Ickes,
and Mabel Dodge Luhan, who romanticized
Pueblo cultures. Smith argues that all of these
authors, although from different backgrounds
and holding divergent views about Indians, presented Indians as individual human beings
whose cultures and beliefs were worthy of acceptance and even emulation. In a time when
federal policy was assimilationist and designed
to suppress Indian cultures, the works of these
authors delivered a different message.
The message was often prompted as much by
the fear of the effects of modernism and rampant
individualism on American society as it was by
respect for Indians. It was also prompted by sometimes deep-seated yearnings to find new sources
of personal identity. Mabel Dodge went so far as
to marry a Taos Indian, while Walter McClintock
claimed to have been adopted by the Blackfeet.
Most of these individuals became political activists, either directly (Linderman ran unsuccessfully for Congress; Ickes was a member of the
Illinois state legislature and was an active participant in her husband’s political career as secretary of the interior) or indirectly (Austin shared
her outspoken opinions with Commissioner of
Indian Affairs John Collier). Certainly in their
writings they promoted positive images of Indians and were advocates for the preservation of
Indian cultures.
Of the group, only Ickes had any formal training in ethnography. The others were self-taught
experts whose personal associations with Indians
informed their work. Participation in aspects of
Indian life undoubtedly influenced their presentation of Indians as human beings. Grinnell’s
work on Cheyenne culture is the most systematic
and detailed of any of the group.

This is not a book about Indians. Indeed, the
only Indian individual about whose life we hear
any detail is Tony Luhan, the Taos man who
married Mabel Dodge. Smith’s deft character
sketches of a group of writers whom she characterizes as “middlebrow purveyors of Indianness” do show, however, the roots of their fascination with Indians and their attempts to
counter the harsh federal policy of assimilation.
Their works, uneven in quality and sometimes
contradictory of each other, were often poorly
reviewed by eastern critics and sold poorly, but
some, like McClintock and Grinnell, through
publication and public lectures, reached fairly
wide audiences. As Smith notes in her conclusion, most of these works have been reissued in
new paperback editions, available to influence a
new generation of people who are interested in
the cultures of American Indian tribes. In many
cases, members of some tribes can salvage elements of their own cultures through these works.
Thoroughly researched and gracefully written,
Smith’s book is a strong contribution to a body
of literature that includes Philip Deloria’s Playing Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1998), Margaret Jacobs’s Engendered Encounters: Feminism and Pueblo Cultures (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1999), and Leah
Dilworth’s Imagining Indians in the Southwest:
Persistent Visions of a Primitive Past (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996),
books that tell us not about Indians but how responses to Indians reveal aspects of American
popular culture.
CLARA SUE KIDWELL
Thomas C. Jepsen. My Sisters Telegraphic:
Women in the Telegraph Office, 1846–1950. xii
Ⳮ 231 pp., illus., tables, bibl., index. Athens:
Ohio University Press, 2000. $49.95 (cloth);
$21.95 (paper).
Thomas C. Jepsen takes his place among the increasing number of historians who have drawn
attention to the often overlooked role that
women have played in technology-based industries. My Sisters Telegraphic documents the
work experiences of women telegraph operators,
mainly in the second half of the nineteenth century. The book describes the working conditions
women encountered in telegraph offices and the
ways in which they were represented in popular
culture. While he devotes most of his attention
to events in the United States, the author also
provides useful comparative data on women
telegraphers in Canada, Europe, and South
America.
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Jepsen vividly depicts daily life in the telegraph industry, drawing on trade journals, diaries, newspapers, corporate records, and popular
literature. There are chapters on the tasks and
routines of the telegraph office, the social background of female operators, and representations
of women telegraphers in fiction and cinema.
Working conditions could be grueling and dangerous; women who operated the telegraph in
railroad depots, for example, had to hand instructions up to the train crew as the trains went
speeding by. Jepsen considers “women’s issues,”
especially the question of equal pay, as well as
women’s participation in the labor movement.
The chapter on popular culture discusses films,
novels, and stories (including one by Henry
James) that were based on the adventures and romantic entanglements of telegraph women.
Telegraph work demanded considerable technical skill, since the operator had to master
Morse code, transmit messages at high speed,
and often maintain the telegraph equipment in
working condition. Women with these skills
were able to achieve independence in many
ways: high wages gave them (relative) financial
independence, the distribution of telegraph offices throughout the country offered geographic
mobility, and operators had a long-distance communications medium at their disposal. Women
who worked in small towns or railway stations
usually ran the office by themselves, while
women in large urban offices had the freedom of
the city in addition to the possibility of promotion. Women thus benefited greatly from their
association with this new technology, a point
Jepsen underscores by comparing telegraph operators with modern computer programmers,
who have also been able to translate technical
competence into rewarding employment. At the
same time, women faced discrimination from
employers and unions, and their skilled status
was undermined by the introduction around
1915 of the Teletype machine, which replaced
Morse code with typewritten input and output.
Jepsen argues that telegraph operators embodied a “modern” outlook because of their independence and embrace of new technology. “It is
[their] ability to step in and out of the social
bounds of their time that makes them seem so
contemporary to us” (p. 116). This point is not
entirely convincing: the women may seem to us
to have had a “modern” lifestyle, but the book
offers little evidence that they saw themselves as
being outside the mainstream. Indeed, Jepsen
notes that most female operators stayed in the
business for only a few years before leaving to
get married (p. 60).
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This book will be most useful to scholars interested in the intersection of technology and labor history. There is relatively little technical detail; instead, the author focuses on the social role
that science and technology play as symbols of
modernity and sources of economic power. Jepsen makes excellent use of his sources to provide
a wealth of detail about the work practices of
operators, much of it in the words of the women
themselves. My Sisters Telegraphic offers a
highly readable social history of women’s participation in what was once a high-tech industry.
JANET ABBATE
Daniel R. Headrick. When Information Came
of Age: Technologies of Knowledge in the Age
of Reason and Revolution, 1700–1850. x Ⳮ 246
pp., figs., bibl., index. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. $29.95.
The agenda informing this compact book has the
transparency of crystal. Against the widely repeated claim that the so-called Information Age
began with the invention of the transistor in
1947, a claim trumpeted both by the knowledgeable (Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson)
and the ignorant (Bill Gates), Daniel Headrick
seeks a more distant source for the informationsaturated environment in which we now live. He
sensibly points out that human demand for information is as old as humanity itself, and consequently we should not look to name any single
moment as the “dawn” of the Information Age.
Instead we should be attentive to historical periods during which the availability of information accelerates sharply. Often such moments are
associated with particular technical innovations,
such as the appearance of double-entry bookkeeping, printing, the telegraph, and, yes, the
computer. But Headrick wants to direct attention
away from particular machines and technologies
as accelerators of information and toward the
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a period during which a host of novel information
systems were introduced.
On this basis the book discusses a series of
developments in information systems under five
headings. The first, “Organizing Information,”
describes how Linnaeus and Lavoisier and Guyton de Morveau created new languages to process and communicate scientific information.
The creation of the metric system finds a niche
in this chapter as well. Headrick’s second heading, “Transforming Information,” discusses the
attempt by governments to collect statistics
about populations, culminating in the specification of a decennial census in the American Con-
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stitution and the repeated attempts by French
revolutionary regimes to conduct a census during the 1790s. The third heading, “Displaying
Information,” turns to innovations in mapmaking during the eighteenth century and the invention of graphical representation. Under the fourth
heading, “Storing Information,” Headrick describes eighteenth-century encyclopedias and
dictionaries, an overview that thankfully ranges
considerably more widely than Diderot’s Encyclopédie. Finally, the heading “Communicating
Information” discusses the development of
postal systems in various European countries
and North America, as well as the invention of
telegraphy. Of particular interest here is the extensive network of visual telegraphs established
in France during the 1790s and then elsewhere
in Europe.
This breadth of coverage is impressive and
suggests the comprehensiveness and significance of Headrick’s story, but it also betrays certain weaknesses. First, the treatment of topics is
highly uneven. The discussion of encyclopedias
and dictionaries, for example, is deep and well
informed by the primary sources. The treatment
of Linnaeus’s taxonomy, Lavoisier’s chemical
nomenclature, and the metric system is far more
superficial, as is the analysis of postal systems.
Second, this same breadth causes one to wonder
just what the phenomenon is that Headrick
means to describe. Such concerns are certainly
not diminished by the wholly unsatisfactory definition provided for the book’s central concept,
information. As the book defines it, information
is “the patterns of energy and matter that humans
understand” (p. 4). That somewhat underdetermines the object, I should say.
Disappointing too was the book’s failure to
engage very deeply with an explanation of why
these changes occurred. Leaving aside the question of whether all of the changes described really constitute changes in information systems
(whatever those might be), and also the question
of whether all of these eighteenth-century novelties could not be traced farther back in time, as
several surely could, we can still ask what
brought such developments together. A book of
such synthetic reach ought to be ideal for such
ruminations. As one might expect, Headrick
does attribute the rising demand for information
to the attempt by enlightened absolutist governments and later revolutionary regimes to develop
policies to stimulate economic growth, along
with the needs of actors in an increasingly complex and robust economic system. But all too
often the book simply asserts that because this
was the Age of Reason, the innovations occurred

because they were inherently more rational. Linnaeus’s nomenclature appealed to the “orderly
minds of mid-eighteenth-century rationalists”
(p. 25), while the physician William Farr’s statistical compilation of disease data for the English General Register Office gave “a more scientific basis to the classification of diseases” (p.
88), and so on.
THOMAS BROMAN
Randall A. Dodgen. Controlling the Dragon:
Confucian Engineers and the Yellow River in
Late Imperial China. x Ⳮ 245 pp., illus., apps.,
bibl., index. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2001. $29.95 (paper).
Because of its extremely heavy silt load and variable regime, control of the Yellow River’s
course over the alluvial, densely populated North
China Plain has been an intractable problem for
many centuries. In the thirteenth century the
Mongol dynasty used part of the river’s downstream section to create a transport route, “the
Grand Canal,” from the Yangtze River to the
capital of Beijing. The main solution to Yellow
River floods used to be diversion into flood channels of smaller rivers, but from the sixteenth century onward the Yellow River was confined to a
single channel. The steady rise of its river bed
created problems of drainage and dike maintenance. Its dual function as a floodway and a canal became increasingly difficult and costly to
maintain, and the system became more and more
complex and elaborate: some 800 kilometers of
dikes, spillways, floodgates, and locks. Because
of the Grand Canal’s vital function in supplying
the capital and garrisons in the north with tax
rice and commercial rice from the south, the
Ming and Qing dynasties were prepared to allocate great sums of money to keep the system
going. It finally broke down in the 1850s.
In a 1991 article in Late Imperial China,
Randall Dodgen concluded that the eventual
breakdown of the system was an inevitable consequence of its ever-increasing complexity and
not due to dynastic decline and bureaucratic failure, as most historians would have it. In Controlling the Dragon he has modified this position. Although in the 1820s and 1830s few
disruptions occurred, the government suffered
from a serious fiscal crisis. Local communities
became less able and willing to pay. The Daoguang Emperor showed distrust of skilled engineering officials and finally made some bad appointments. The Board of Works did not support
the river officials, and tensions between national
and local officials intensified. Thus, “fiscal, bu-
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reaucratic and technological problems weakened
the state’s commitment to Yellow River control.” The main focus of this charming and thoroughly researched book is on the role of the
“Confucian engineer” in the early nineteenth
century. By that seemingly contradictory term,
Dodgen refers to high officials of the provincial
Yellow River Conservancy, “hybrid literatitechnologists with no formal training in engineering.” He discusses their organizational, administrative, and financial concerns at length,
because these were their main tasks and historical sources concentrate on them. Much less attention is paid to the purely technical and hydraulic aspects of their work. In the absence of
proper sources, the question of these officials’
relationship with and reliance on technical staff
(whether their own or attached to local officials)
remains largely unanswered. Dodgen discusses
one of the “statecraft school” officials of the
early nineteenth century, the well-known compiler of the textbook for officials An Illustrated
Guide to River Engineering Tools Lin Qing, but
without going into his qualities as an author or
engineer. Lin Qing advocated more hydrological
training for officials in general, so that they could
become better judges of and more directly involved in the planning and implementation of
repair projects.
The story of the introduction of brick as a
building material in dike repairs (replacing stalks
and stone) by the high provincial river official
Li Yumei in 1835 gives a good insight into the
difficulties of innovation. When Li pushed for
universal adoption of this new material and the
Court agreed to the establishment of state-operated brick kilns, the vested interests of suppliers
of traditional materials were threatened. Other
officials stressed the technical, social, and economic risks of a change from proven practices,
and after due investigation Li’s proposal was
killed, though brick remained on the list of allowed materials. The larger question of the relative utility of bricks vis-à-vis other repair materials was neither tested nor resolved; their use
remained at the discretion of local authorities.
Two concrete examples are used to illustrate
the concerns and actions of national and local
river officials. The 1841 flood and siege of the
city of Kaifeng is a story of relief efforts and the
organizational and technical difficulties of repairs. The Zhongmou debacle depicts how delays, ineffectiveness, and cost cutting led to new
dike breaks and much higher repair costs than
initially foreseen. Dodgen concludes that the
Daoguang Emperor’s record of concern for the
Yellow River administration is mixed. His con-
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stant admonitions to keep costs down reduced
the level of preparedness against floods. The imperial state was commited to a minimal bureaucracy of generalists, and technical specialists did
not command much influence. Overseeing hydraulic construction work might bring one temporary glory and great financial reward (because
of handling very large budgets; without much
evidence, Dodgen states that corruption was not
a significant factor in this field) but equally great
risks of punishment if dike breaks occurred or
projects failed.
This book could have profited from more
maps and drawings. It shows little concern for
quantitative aspects of river control—for instance, the costs of materials and labor. Technical and practical aspects—such as tools, techniques, the organization of manpower, and the
transport of material—are discussed little if at
all. In a sense, Dodgen has himself adopted the
Confucian “generalist” approach to engineering.
Although this limits the scope of Controlling the
Dragon, it nevertheless remains a highly interesting and readable account of the administrative
concerns of late Qing river officials. Moreover,
Dodgen’s cogent analysis enriches our understanding of the limitations of the traditional Chinese bureaucracy and its eventual inability to
maintain the Yellow River transport system.
EDUARD B. VERMEER
Emily Abel. Hearts of Wisdom: American
Women Caring for Kin, 1840–1940. x Ⳮ 326
pp., index. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard
University Press, 2000.
It is virtually a cliché that care-giving was (is)
one of woman’s primary duties. However, we
often have little appreciation of the actual experience. Emily Abel induces a visceral understanding of this critical role, starting from the
first chapter of Hearts of Wisdom, with the life
of Emily Hawley Gillespie, a farmwoman in the
Midwest in the nineteenth century. Gillespie assisted neighbors and friends during childbirth
and sickness. She was herself recipient of such
help when ill and for the birth of her children.
Moreover, despite tense relationships with her
father and her sister, Gillespie cared for them
when the need arose. There was tension between
her and her daughter, Sarah. Despite the fact that
Sarah had a teaching position in another community, she returned to her mother’s house in
times of medical crises. As Emily’s health failed,
Sarah resigned in order to nurse her mother. This
story documents how care-giving dominated
many women’s lives. Emily, Sarah, and other
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women of the nineteenth century considered
care-giving a labor of love and, at the same, took
pride in their accomplishments.
Slowly, though, from the turn of the century
onward, physicians increasingly sought to assert
their growing professional status. They chafed at
lay care-givers who sometimes undercut and
even contradicted medical advice. The balance
of power between care-giving mothers and physicians shifted in the twentieth century for several reasons, not solely because of enhanced
medical authority built on new medical knowledge in areas such as bacteriology and new
medical practice, especially surgery. Changes in
domestic technology, developments in transportation and communications, and the spread of
hospitals, for example, all combined to affect
women’s family care-giving. In another extensive and telling vignette, Abel traces more than
thirty years of Martha Shaw Farnsworth’s life,
dramatically illustrating how care-giving and
medicine changed between 1890 and 1924. True,
as medical care moved from the home into the
hospital, women spent less time in direct care.
However, they did not relinquish their control
over medical situations, instead insisting on participating in medical decision-making for themselves and for others. In effect, their care-giving
role was redefined from one of personal care to
one of mediator between the patient and the
health-care provider.
The bulk of this study centers on the lives of
literate white women coping with physical illness. Recognizing this limitation, Abel investigates the lives of other women in other situations
that involve care-giving. One particularly fascinating chapter highlights immigrant women caring for family members diagnosed in the early
twentieth century with tuberculosis. They often
clashed with medical and charity workers. In another chapter, Abel shows the influence of the
Depression, using letters written to Eleanor and
Franklin D. Roosevelt by poor mothers negotiating health care for their families. Two other
chapters cogently discuss the mothers of children labeled feebleminded and epileptic and the
mothers of deaf children.
Emily Abel’s Hearts of Wisdom is a carefully
crafted study interweaving the history of American women and the history of medicine. The
richness of the sources she uses—the diaries and
the letters especially—adds a sense of immediacy and power to her analysis. Attuned to racial
and ethnic differences as well as regional and
socioeconomic distinctions, Hearts of Wisdom
demonstrates that female care-giving was both a
reflection of contemporary medical develop-

ments and independent of them. Women caring
for their families found (and still find) themselves balancing confidence in their own empathic knowledge with the authoritative knowledge of health-care professionals. By focusing
on the role of female care-giver, Abel has drawn
an insightful and evocative picture of women’s
changing roles during a period of dramatic transformations in medical care and the medical profession.
RIMA D. APPLE
Peter Lewis Allen. The Wages of Sin: Sex and
Disease, Past and Present. xxiii Ⳮ 202 pp.,
figs., table, bibl., index. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2000. $25.
In six chapters of uneven length, Peter Lewis
Allen, a former literature professor and public
policy activist, offers a highly readable romp
through two millennia of beliefs and attitudes
regarding sin, sex, and disease. In particular, Allen draws on religious, medical, and popular literature from different eras in order to exemplify
how particular “diseases”—lovesickness, leprosy, syphilis, bubonic plague, and masturbation—were causally connected with thoughts of
punishment for sinful behavior. He then extends
this theme into a lengthy chapter describing how
the same belief contributed to the chasm between
conservative and activist perspectives on AIDS
in the United States over the past two decades.
Allen, who is admittedly not a historian, picks
and chooses a “series of portraits of disease,”
offering little contextualization as he creates a
“tableau” of perspectives drawn from European
and American discourse throughout Christianity.
He flavors his chronological narrative with personal experiences drawn from his work in gay
health groups. The most significant personal experiences he intersperses stem from thoughts
about his one-time lover, now dead from complications associated with AIDS. He interjects
key episodes from this relationship into the book
to affirm that “in its fight about how to respond
to AIDS,” American society has reenacted a
“drama that had been written centuries before”
(p. xv).
Allen’s engaging writing stands much more
firmly as chronologically arranged comparative
literature than as historical scholarship. His
greatest historiographical faux pas lies in his
anachronistic writing about disease. For example, he introduces his chapter on medieval leprosy with a description of the pathological destruction caused by the leprosy bacterium. Then,
in selecting situations drawn from Herodotus
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through the sixteenth-century “contagionist” Girolamo Fracastoro, he erroneously assumes that
“leprosy” implied a singular, consistent disorder
throughout this long period. Similar concerns
arise regarding his coverage of syphilis. Such errors may have originated from his drawing too
exclusively from pre-1990 historical writings.
Works like Charles E. Rosenberg and Janet
Golden’s Framing Disease: Studies in Cultural
History (Rutgers, 1992) and Linda Merian’s edited volume The Secret Malady: Venereal Disease in Eighteenth-Century Britain and France
(Kentucky, 1996), and the voluminous literature
on the history of the body, would have provided
contextual concepts within which to place more
concrete views about the intersections between
diseases and culture. The author’s desire to flash
forward from particular historical periods to
AIDS in our society too often leads to weakly
substantiated connections between time periods.
Allen’s strengths lie in his ability to draw on
works of literature, especially popular literature.
His particular emphasis on French works reflects
his own background in medieval French literature. His arguments are also strong when comparing church and society in the medieval period. For example, his chapter on lovesickness
clearly delineates the persistent position of the
Church Fathers (and Hildegard, too) against
medics who regularly prescribed a “coital cure”
for the disorder, without specifying what partners to select, instead of welcoming disease as a
divine corrective.
Allen’s writing on plague, the shortest chapter
of the book, clearly depicts the once-common
view that this epidemic disaster was inflicted by
God as a punishment for mankind’s sinful nature. However, the omission of any discussion
of sex in a chapter of a work subtitled “Sex and
Disease, Past and Present,” is somewhat puzzling. Even more conspicuous is the author’s
failure to expand upon the 1530 poem regarding
the plight of the impious shepherd, Syphilis,
from whom the disease in question received its
name. Why would a literary scholar prone to
draw on popular writings not give more than a
single-sentence mention to this historically relevant poem?
Of the works Allen has drawn upon, he offers
a pleasant mix of primary and secondary accounts that, like all good literary criticism, gives
original sources a clear voice. Any work so selectively focused on a few diseases will leave
some readers wondering about others that might
have been perceived in terms of sex and sin.
Were such associations discussed in regard to
madness in the eighteenth century, tuberculosis
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in the nineteenth century, or the wide range of
twentieth-century STDs prior to AIDS? Why
was no mention made of leprosy in the twentieth-century context? Its AIDS-like stigma has
been historically contextualized in several
works, including Stephanie J. Castillo’s awardwinning 1992 documentary Simple Courage.
Similarly, one wonders why the author chose not
to drawn on standard medical history accounts
on AIDS, including Elizabeth Fee and Daniel M.
Fox’s edited volume AIDS: The Burden of History (California, 1988) and, perhaps more important for the Francophile Allen, Mirko D.
Grmek’s Histoire du SIDA: Début et origine
d’une pandémie actualle (Payot, 1989).
Apart from my historiographical criticisms,
The Wages of Sin is a most delightful popular
rendering of key relations between disease and
Christianity. Works like this are extremely useful in reminding the reading public in an articulate, informative, and entertaining manner that
they are part of humanity’s continuum that has
long sought connections between physical health
and moral living. Indeed, Allen’s apt description
of the underlying usefulness of history underscores the importance of his own writing: “We
value history because, whatever its distortions
and inaccuracies, it is a way of understanding
and giving value to our collective human experience and collective human memory” (p. 158).
PHILIP K. WILSON
R. Ian McCallum. Antimony in Medical History: An Account of the Medical Uses of Antimony and Its Compounds Since Early Times to
the Present. xviii Ⳮ 125 pp., illus., figs., apps.,
bibl., index. Edinburgh/Cambridge: Pentland
Press, 1999. £15.
Alchemists and medical practitioners were
drawn to antimony for roughly the same reason—its ability to expel impurities from metals
or human bodies. Long before the sixteenth century, when Agricola described the process, metallurgists employed compounds of the brittle,
flaky metal to separate silver and impurities from
gold. Alchemical allegory depicted antimony as
a gray wolf that devoured the king that he might
be resurrected, rising—purified—from the
flames of the wolf’s funeral pyre. This nearly
supernatural ability to remove impurities made
antimony crucial for alchemists. Medical theorists inferred a similar purifying power from the
dramatic physiological effects of antimonial
compounds, making antimony a staple in the
pharmacopoeia for centuries.
No mere emetic—antimony opens the sluices
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at both ends—antimony seemed to its staunchest
supporters a near-panacea. Sixteenth-century instructions for brewing an antimonial elixir promised that it “cures the plague, cancers, dullness
of wit . . . breaks the force of every poison; if
one drinks it once a week, it cures epilepsy” (pp.
65–66). By the eighteenth century, R. Ian
McCallum finds, “there were more compounds
of antimony than any other modern element in
the medical chemists’ repertoire” (p. 15). In
1750 the British physician John Huxham praised
the flexibility of antimony in wine, claiming that
“the dose can be varied so that, in the treatment
of pleurisies, you may puke, you may purge, and
you may sweat with it” (p. 74). In the twentieth
century antimonials have been employed in experimental HIV/AIDS treatments and continue
to be used in tropical medicine, notably in the
treatment of leishmaniasis.
McCallum has produced a perplexing though
interesting little book. Some books are brief because their authors have very little to say, others
because they present essays that are simply too
long to be mere journal articles but too focused
and succinct to fill a full-length monograph.
McCallum’s slim volume—at under 90 pages of
text—is neither. He has plenty to say: the book
is brimming with erudition, jammed with information about what has been written about medicinal antimony since the early modern period.
Some will no doubt welcome the table and appendix in the back of the book listing known
antimony preparations and the various antimony-bearing ores around the world.
On the other hand, the book has no clear organizing principle, no central thesis. Late in the
book, McCallum wonders at the “semi-religious
obsession” physicians have demonstrated regarding antimony and judges this obsession worthy of “further enquiry” (p. 97). Indeed, this
would have been a good starting point from
which to build a very valuable book. Instead,
McCallum leads his readers on what is essentially a guided tour of the interesting facts and
citations he has collected. This style is most notable in his chapter on antimony cups, which at
points reads like an auction catalogue. Many
passages rise above this sort of historian-asdocent narrative, notably his discussion of the
seventeenth-century “antimony war” between
conservative Galenists of Paris and their “forward looking” rivals at Montpellier, who advocated better iatrochemistry through antimony
(pp. 18–20). By and large, however, the book
provides little in the way of historical context
or analysis.
Although McCallum discusses antimony from

antiquity to the present, he devotes little attention to the fate of antimony in the “therapeutic
revolutions” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when medicine’s “semi-religious obsession” with depletives of all sorts was thrown into
high relief. It is also regrettable that McCallum,
who has had a long career as a specialist in occupational medicine, gives so little attention to
the occupational hazards of work with antimony.
These, of course, are complaints about what is
missing from the book. What is there makes for
a very readable introduction to an important subject.
CHRISTIAN WARREN
W. Michael Byrd; Linda A. Clayton. An American Health Dilemma: A Medical History of African Americans and the Problem of Race: Beginnings to 1900. Foreword by Robert J.
Blendon. xxviii Ⳮ 588 pp., illus., tables, bibl.,
index. New York/London: Routledge, 2000.
$35.
This work is the first volume of a projected twovolume examination of the black experience
with the practices and institutions of Western
medicine from its earliest beginnings to the end
of the twentieth century. As a reference source,
W. Michael Byrd and Linda Clayton’s history is
certainly valuable: its thirty-page bibliography
and nearly one hundred pages of notes offer a
rich field of information for anyone who wants
to know the “what” and “how” of the intersection of black history and Western medicine.
Still, after having read the book, I have more
questions—about the work itself: its purpose, its
intended audience, and the apparent lack of editing (the narrative is very repetitious, the authors often saying the same thing in several
different ways). Further, in a quest for completeness Byrd and Clayton tend to introduce material
that, for me, slows their story more than it advances what I believe is their central argument:
that difference has a way of becoming deviance,
which then produces long-term consequences for
those not a party to the original decision; that it
becomes institutional racism.
In their preface Byrd and Clayton explain how
the book came to be; in the introduction they
describe what it is intended to accomplish. Their
principal objective, they say, was “to perform a
history-based descriptive and structured analysis
of the U.S. health system from an African American perspective,” a point they will repeat elsewhere in a slightly different guise. Such an analysis is necessary, they argue, because although
the American public has become more aware of
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the national crisis in health care and of the need
for major reform of the health system, too many
commentators appear to have overlooked the
“older, more ominous, culturally driven health
crisis afflicting African American and other poor
populations” (p. xxiv). To some extent this crisis
“can be explained on the basis of a medicalsocial culture hundreds of years old that is
heavily laden and burdened by race and class
problems compounding continued social and economic deprivation.” This contention is followed
by a list of assumptions, beginning with “Poor
health status and outcomes for Blacks and the
poor are ‘normal’ and acceptable” and ending
with “Racially and ethnically divided health professions have factions that are often contentious,
conflicting, and contemptuous of each other.”
In the introduction, too, Byrd and Clayton describe both the topics the book will cover and
the many sources they consulted (some “new to
the health care literature,” some “ compiled, analyzed, and reinterpreted in an unprecedented
manner”) to substantiate their historical and
structured analysis. The materials included and
the need for close editing of the entire text leave
one wondering who will read this book and what
they might derive from it. Still, it is a thorough
effort from start to finish.
The book first undertakes “a history-based examination and evaluation of the U.S. health delivery system from an African American perspective.” Second, it reassesses “the relationship
between the medical profession and issues of
race and racism in Western culture and the
United States.” Third, it evaluates the impact of
race and racism as key variables that must be
factored into the complex equation necessary to
resolve the “American health dilemma.” Fourth,
the book offers “a series of explanatory hypotheses that clarify and help explain the results of the
ongoing relationships between race, the biomedical and other life sciences, health, and healthcare
delivery in the United States from their ancient
Afro-European beginnings” to 1900. (A forthcoming second volume is intended to cover the
period from 1900 to the present day.) The remainder of the book is divided into three sections:
background, “Race, Medicine, and Health in the
North American Colonies and the Early U.S. Republic,” and “Race, Medicine, and Health in the
United States from 1812 to 1900.”
The background section provides a reassessment of the relationship between race, biology,
and health in the United States and establishes
the groundwork for the remainder of the book—
though the information on the evolution of race,
science, and medicine in Western culture is per-
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haps more than the average reader can comfortably digest and assimilate. Part 2 and a portion
of Part 3 track the health-care experiences of
Blacks under slavery and their importance in the
evolution of a dual health system that will become more rigid with time. The balance of Part
3 reviews black health care and the evolution of
health policy and practice alongside the maturation of the medical profession after the collapse of the peculiar institution to the end of the
nineteenth century.
Although health care for black people did improve after the Civil War and Reconstruction,
African Americans and the poor in general still
experience a kind of differential access that has
been exacerbated by the fee-for-service system—that the system is not equal and is still
bedeviled by prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior left over from days gone by is a
given. The question that remains is, How do we
improve it? Clearly this book, despite its flaws,
is a step in the right direction. By providing a
historical overview of how things evolved to be
the way they are, the authors also provide insight
into how to correct existing conditions.
BILL KING
Randal L. Hall. William Louis Poteat: A Leader
of the Progressive-Era South. x Ⳮ 262 pp., illus., bibl., index. Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2000. $34.95.
William Louis Poteat (1856–1938), a North
Carolina intellectual of the Progressive Era,
gained a reputation as a leading liberal in southern higher education. This book, which was recognized by a prestigious National Endowment
for the Humanities publication grant, is useful
for historians of science because it illustrates
how scientific ideas, particularly Darwinism,
were diffused into a rural and isolated society.
From his student years to the end of his life,
Poteat was intimately connected with a Southern
Baptist college, Wake Forest. He matriculated at
Wake Forest and became a tutor there in 1878.
Although almost entirely self-taught in the sciences, he became a popular and respected professor of biology. As his knowledge of science
came from reading contemporary papers and
monographs rather than from traditional study,
he developed a perspective more modern than
that of most of his peers. He rose through the
ranks, ultimately becoming president of Wake
Forest in 1905.
Relatively early in his career, Poteat began the
work that earned him a place in southern history
by writing articles and giving lectures on the
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ways in which science and religion were related.
By the end of his first decade as a faculty member, he had become convinced of the importance
of Darwin’s theory of evolution and had decided
that it posed no threat to traditional Christianity.
In supporting this view, Poteat followed the lead
of mainstream European and Northern American
churches, which had no problem reconciling
evolution with the Book of Genesis and its description of creation occurring in seven days. After all, who knew what a day meant in the mind
of God? Many Southern Protestants, however,
rejected this position.
Randal Hall sees Poteat as an advocate of a
liberal social philosophy fully in accord with the
social gospel of the Progressive age. As a leading
proponent for change in his state, Poteat “personified North Carolina Progressivism” (p. 60),
and his defense of Darwin was of a piece with
his philosophy. But it is unclear whether Poteat’s
admiration for Darwin stemmed from an understanding of science or an obsession with eugenics, an obsession that in time came to dominate
his thinking.
Poteat vigorously used his position as president of the Southern Baptist Education Association to promote theories of eugenics. Although
Darwin did not actively promote racism, followers of his thought such as Poteat could easily
educe racist ideas from it. They could argue, for
example, that individuals should speed up the
process of producing superior humans by helping nature along through the process of selective
breeding. Concerned with the large number of
Americans who were institutionalized, and the
even greater number who were barely educated,
Poteat maintained that the government should
control the right to reproduce and sterilize the
unfit, including the “self-centered, the coarsefibered, and the discourteous” (p. 186). He
thought that civilization would crumble unless
such procedures were put in place, because there
would be an “overproduction of under-men” (p.
101). Indeed, following this same line of
thought, he opposed war because it foolishly
wasted “our best blood” (p. 185). He called for
federal legislation to govern marriage and divorce, requiring applicants to meet his moral requirements and to pass a rigorous medical examination. Even in conservative North Carolina,
these ideas provoked astonishment. A leading
Raleigh newspaper accused Poteat of wanting to
be the “boss of a human stock farm” (p. 186).
Although Randal Hall’s book is primarily a
biography of William Louis Poteat—and secondarily a history of Wake Forest as it evolved
from a tiny Baptist school into a major college—

it is also a study of the split personalities of
Southern Progressives. On the one hand, they
rejected rule by educated leaders; on the other,
they wanted government to control the most intimate aspects of life, such as reproduction. Poteat thought that all these things should be overseen by a “genteel Christian community led by
a liberal elite” (p. 167). The complexity and cognitive dissonance of Southern Progressives are
well illustrated in this book.
RUTH J. HAUG
Richard F. Wetzell. Inventing the Criminal: A
History of German Criminology, 1880–1945.
(Studies in Legal History.) xvi Ⳮ 348 pp., bibl.,
index. Chapel Hill/London: University of North
Carolina Press, 2000. $39.95.
Some two decades ago Robert Nye began investigating the emergence of criminology as a discipline. At first he wanted to write a book about
it, but he eventually thought better of the idea.
“It was soon evident to me, as it has been to
everyone else who has looked through the older
criminological literature,” he explained, “that
crime was seldom treated as an isolated phenomenon, even by those who were most eager to establish scientific criminology as an isolated discipline” (Crime, Madness, and Politics in
Modern France [Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984], p. xi). Undaunted by Nye’s words
of warning, Richard Wetzell has produced a
sweeping history of German criminology, one
that approaches “the history of crime and criminal justice from the perspective of intellectual
history and the history of science, rather than
social, legal-institutional, or political history” (p.
2). Wetzell, that is, attempts largely to isolate the
discourse of German criminology from its social,
institutional, and political contexts. Readers of
Isis may consider this an odd conception of this
discipline. Moreover, those seeking insight into
the questions and debates that preoccupy most
historians of science these days will search in
vain, because Inventing the Criminal generally
treats “science” itself as a given, as self-evident,
as explanans rather than explanandum.
That said, Inventing the Criminal represents
an undeniable contribution to the history of
criminology. Wetzell has marshaled an impressive array of primary source material in order to
tell his story, which stretches from the 1880s
through the Nazi regime. His approach, which
combines close readings of journal articles and
books with doses of archival material, tends to
center on prominent individuals. Anyone looking for a careful analysis of criminological dis-
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course, of individual thinkers and their writings,
will find it here.
Wetzell has picked through an astounding array of seemingly disparate source material and
shaped it into the coherent history of a “recognized scientific field” (p. 28). That history begins
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
with the German reception of Cesare Lombroso’s theory of the “born criminal.” During
this “early” period (that is, before WWI), Wetzell shows how German research on crime was
dominated by psychiatrists, who favored a criminal-biological approach. Wetzell, who finds a
trend of increasing methodological sophistication in criminal-biological research between
1918 and 1945, argues that German jurists and
psychiatrists, confronted with an increasingly
sophisticated and complex scientific field, were
forced to check some of their more extreme impulses. He is at pains to show that “normal”
criminological science persisted even under the
Nazi regime and that crude racist explanations
of crime “did not predominate in mainstream
criminal biology and criminology” (p. 230). The
claim that the sophistication of criminological
research actually prompted serious objections to
sterilization in Nazi Germany may be Wetzell’s
single most interesting point.
Of course it is precisely here, at the most compelling moments of the book, at the moments
where politics and science fuse, that the limitations of Wetzell’s stated approach become most
evident. Historians of criminology simply cannot, and should not try to, separate out the “scientific” from the “social, legal-institutional, or
political.” It is a mission impossible.
ANDRE WAKEFIELD
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Well before 1970 such scholars as Pierre Duhem,
Arthur Lovejoy, and Marjorie Hope Nicolson
had shown that mainline intellectuals for centuries have been writing about extraterrestrials.
Between 1982 and 1996, three scholars published detailed and fully referenced books documenting in detail the history of ideas of extraterrestrial life from antiquity to the late twentieth
century (Steven Dick, Plurality of Worlds: The
Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from
Democritus to Kant [Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982]; Michael J. Crowe,
The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750–1900:
The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from Kant to
Lowell [Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1986]; Karl S. Guthke The Last Frontier:
Imagining Other Worlds from the Copernican
Revolution to Modern Science Fiction [Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990]; Steven Dick,
The Biological Universe: The Twentieth-Century
Extraterrestrial Life Debate and the Limits of
Science [Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1996]). In the last few years at least a halfdozen authors have sought to repackage this exciting message for the literate public. The most
successful of these popularizations is Worlds
without End: The Historic Search for Extraterrestrial Life, the most recent book by Roger
Hennessey, a retired British schoolteacher and
administrator with strong interests in the history
of science and technology.
The strengths of Hennessey’s volume are numerous. He has read and understood both the
most authoritative scholarly work in this area
and also a significant portion of the vast primary
literature. He has surveyed in an engaging, ju-

Roger Hennessey. Worlds without End: The
Historic Search for Extraterrestrial Life. 160
pp., illus., bibl., index. Stroud, England: Tempus
Publishing Ltd., 1999. $29.99, £18.99.
As Roger Hennessey reminds us, “One of the
most famous openings in English literature informs readers that ‘in the last years of the nineteenth century . . . human affairs were being
watched keenly and closely by intelligences
greater than man’s yet as mortal as his own’”
(p. 90). So began H. G. Wells’s famous War of
the Worlds (1897), in which Martians invade the
Earth.
The general public seems scarcely aware that
discussions of extraterrestrial intelligent beings
began to appear centuries before 1897, not just
in fiction but also in serious writings by leading
scientists, philosophers, and religious authors.

The “traditional” view of the medieval cosmos—
perhaps invented in the nineteenth century?
( from Hennessey, Worlds without End, p. 22).
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dicious, and balanced manner materials from
antiquity to the present and embellished his narrative with seventy-two well-chosen illustrations. He has avoided sensationalism even when
writing about sensational controversies and eschewed partisanship even while describing individuals who in many cases were nothing if not
passionate in their convictions. He has shown
sensitivity to the complexities and to the range
of issues that arose in the history of this long and
continuing debate, which, although focused on
distant locales and on possibly nonexistent beings, is capable of revealing much about the nature of terrestrials. He has traced through more
than twenty centuries a debate that involved not
just scientific but also key religious and philosophical issues, presenting the debate in its full
cultural richness. The level of informational accuracy in his book is high (despite misdating the
so-called Great Moon Hoax to 1836 rather than
1835). Although his references are significantly
fewer in number and less specific than many
scholars might prefer, they are at least adequate
to assure specialists that he is not presenting as
his own the hard-won research results of others.
The overall format of the book is appealing, its
bibliography adequate, its index better than one
expects in popularizations.
Historians of science wishing to enhance a
survey course in the history of science with an
attractive text that will reveal to students a history filled with striking controversies and colorful figures as well as little-known facets of the
thought of many scientists of distinction may
wish to consider using this book.
MICHAEL CROWE
䡲 Antiquity
Serafina Cuomo. Pappus of Alexandria and the
Mathematics of Late Antiquity. (Cambridge
Classical Studies.) x Ⳮ 234 pp., figs., bibl., indexes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000. $59.95.
Greek mathematics is usually seen as having
reached its height in a “golden age” around
300 B.C., after which it declined, reaching a
rather sad stage in late antiquity. In this latter
period Pappus of Alexandria (ca. A.D. 300)
stands out as one of the last competent mathematicians, although even his Mathematical Collection has been valued by historians mainly for
its wealth of information on earlier mathematical
achievements. In her readable book, Serafina
Cuomo sets out to correct the conventional view
of mathematics in late antiquity: her general goal

is “to show that the mathematics of late antiquity
deserves a place both in the history of science
and in the history of antiquity” (p. 3). To that
end she focuses on (parts of) Pappus’s Collection, for which she attempts “to produce a historical analysis . . . and at the same time to explore its wider cultural contexts” (p. 3). Thus her
text is not intended primarily as a discussion of
the mathematics contained in the Collection; instead Cuomo looks into the historical circumstances in which Pappus produced this work and
the image he wanted to convey both of mathematics and of himself.
The first chapter presents some general background on the public’s perception of mathematics and its practitioners in late antiquity. Emphasizing evidence “apart from what we find in the
books of the famous mathematicians” (p. 9),
Cuomo looks at astrological treatises such as the
Mathesis by Julius Firmicus Maternus and considers the social and fiscal status of various
“technical” professions, such as those of land
surveyor, architect, and public administrator.
She uses Diocletian’s edict on wages and salaries
and examines the role of mathematics in education to show that, “far from being invisible or
confined to ivory towers” (p. 56), mathematics
was perceived as an integral part of life and regarded positively. All this material is very interesting, but how relevant is it? Cuomo’s broadening of the perspective to include more than just
the works of famous mathematicians is certainly
commendable. But should one equate the mere
skill of calculating with numbers, or even that of
applying some “higher” mathematics, with theoretical, philosophical, mathematical thought? Of
course, Cuomo is aware of this problem. Taking
it to be irrelevant for her purpose, she makes a
good point: claiming affiliation with mathematics to enhance one’s status, as those professional
practitioners would do, presupposes a positive
image of mathematics among the public (p. 10).
Nevertheless, such evidence would probably not
have swayed previous historians’ opinion of the
decline of mathematics in late antiquity.
Chapters 2–4 are devoted to Book 5 of the
Collection, which covers isoperimetric problems
and Platonic solids; Book 8, on mechanics; Book
3, on cube duplication; and Book 4, on special
curves and their classification. In Chapter 2
Cuomo argues that Pappus used the widely
known problems discussed in Book 5 to address
a general audience so as to promote mathematics
and show that “mathematicians are better qualified than philosophers . . . to talk about isoperimetry and the five Platonic bodies” (p. 58). At the
same time, pointing out the complementarity of
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mathematics and mechanics (in Book 8), Pappus
stresses the usefulness of mathematics in educational and material matters. In Chapter 4
Cuomo examines how Pappus, addressing experts, “marks out his territory within the mathematical field itself ” (p. 127).
In the final chapter Cuomo tries “to get a
clearer grasp of Pappus’ mathematical agenda”
(p. 169). She concludes that Pappus is not just a
compiler admiring the past; rather, he selected
his subjects and manipulated the mathematical
tradition to serve his own immediate goals in the
present.
This book contains an abundance of interesting historical material, although, regrettably,
the mathematical examples are only roughly
sketched. Cuomo shows that we can learn much
from looking at Pappus’s Collection in its own
right. Her book deserves careful study.
ALI BEHBOUD
John F. Healy. Pliny the Elder on Science and
Technology. xvi Ⳮ 467 pp., bibl., indexes. New
York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
$110.
In the last twenty years or so there has been a
renewed interest in Pliny the Elder, once an immensely popular author whose reputation began
to suffer after Renaissance scholars challenged
the accuracy of his work. The recent interest has
been interdisciplinary, producing contributions
from classical scholars, historians, scientists, and
technologists, sometimes working as a team.
What “interdisciplinary” has meant in practice is
a collaboration rather than a blend of disciplines.
What you see in Pliny is what your training
makes obvious.
John Healy’s book is a robust defense, indeed
promulgation, of the thesis that Pliny practiced
“science.” This thesis implies not only that science was a recognizable, and recognized, activity in antiquity but that “science” can tell us
more clearly than any other rubric what Pliny
was up to. Science can certainly tell us about
Pliny’s natural world, because it was very much
like our own, but it does not tell us anything
about Pliny’s enterprise. We may feel a sense of
intellectual satisfaction in knowing the formula
for the acetic acid in vinegar and the chemical
equation that represents its attack on calcareous
rocks, but Pliny’s story is about something else.
In this study Healy, a distinguished classical
scholar, has taken aboard a lot of science. He
provides us with valuable information about the
suitability of the Latin language for the development of technical terms and about its borrow-
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ings from Greek and other languages. After
Healy the classicist considers Pliny as a writer
and describes his life, sources, mode of work,
language, and style, Healy the scientist addresses
the topic of ancient science. Chapter 10 (a page
and a half) lays down the program, taken from
a modern (Canberra, 1993) classification of
fields of research. Healy takes the ten subdivisions of the “natural sciences, technologies and
engineering” as a structure for his investigation
into Pliny and for the format of the book. He
thus looks at Pliny’s thought in relation to chemistry, physics, earth sciences, engineering (including mines and metal), applied sciences, biology, and agriculture. A footnote tells us that
he has omitted any reference to medicine, pharmacology, and astronomy—a pity, as these subjects, with their own identities and practitioners,
come closer to science than most of what either
Pliny or Healy discusses. In the style of a modern
scientific textbook, Healy’s text is broken down
into numerous subsections to accommodate
modern categories. The chapters on minerals and
gems are alphabetical lists.
The combination of classical learning and scientific knowledge looks formidable and is certainly unusual. But the book is more an exercise
in applying science to classical studies than an
example of science illuminating history. The
confidence his scientific material gives Healy
leads to a certain historical insensitivity. I declare an interest here, for he badly misreads what
I have argued about “science” in antiquity. His
rigid use of modern—our—categories inevitably leads to instances in which he finds Pliny
confusing them or failing to separate them. Our
categories take on a life of their own in this exposition: the section on “electricity,” for example, is largely independent of Pliny. Its subsection 12.2.1c is on piezoelectricity, of which
“neither Pliny, nor other ancient authorities, appear to have been aware.” Gravity has to be
there, because it is part of modern physics, but
Pliny does not mention it.
There is no reason why classical scholars and
scientists should not be interested in Pliny and
find each other’s disciplines enlightening. But
the claim that Pliny was, as Healy says, making
“contributions” to our science is a historical one
and relates to Pliny’s purposes. No amount of
modern mathematical or chemical formulas will
tell us what was in Pliny’s mind, and he was
fairly clear, after all, on his purposes in writing
the Natural History. It’s back to “Science in Antiquity?” again.
ROGER FRENCH
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Malcolm Wilson. Aristotle’s Theory of the
Unity of Science. (Phoenix [Journal of the Classical Association of Canada], Suppl. 38.) x Ⳮ
271 pp., fig., bibl., index. Toronto/Buffalo/London: University of Toronto Press, 2000. $75,
£55.
The title of this book is a bit misleading. Although Malcolm Wilson does argue that Aristotle’s theory of science is more unified than is
usually thought to be the case, he also examines
Aristotle’s actual practice of science, particularly
biology but also physics, ethics, politics, and the
science of being qua being. Hence the central
problem of this book is how in practice as well
as in theory science is unified in the Aristotelian
corpus.
Wilson casts Aristotle’s theory of science
against the Platonic search for universal definitions, which leads to a suppression of differences
or ambiguities both among things and their definitions. “Aristotle,” Wilson observes, “sought
to redress the imbalance apparent in the Academic prejudice towards the universal” (p. 7).
He does so by restricting the demonstrative syllogism, which forms the core of any scientific
argument in two ways: terms must be related
through their definitions, and predicates must attach to a subject directly and universally (p. 8).
Consequently, each science has a subject, what
it is about, and “is the sum of the demonstrative
syllogisms that concern the same subject” (p. 9).
But defining science in this way creates the
problem that the sciences become too particularized, too isolated from one another. Here is Wilson’s larger question: How can the project of
science defined in the Posterior Analytics produce systematic knowledge in which the parts,
themselves identified with the various sciences,
are sufficiently integrated with one another to
form a unified whole? Wilson claims that “abstraction” can serve as a “stepping-stone” to
identifying three ways in which the sciences can
be seen as forming a (sufficiently) unified whole
(p. 10). In the process of abstraction, a more abstract science, usually a brand of mathematics,
“supplied principles and explanations for a fact
or conclusion found in a distinct and subordinate
natural science” (p. 9). Understanding abstraction allows us to identify three forms of “semiabstraction”—analogy, focality, and cumulation—that allow Aristotle to connect the
arguments and subjects of different sciences
(p. 10).
A brief analysis of abstraction (pp. 14–39)
sets the stage for Wilson’s larger project, a full
treatment of analogy, particularly in the writings

on biology (pp. 53–115), focality, first in the
biological works and then in the Metaphysics
(pp. 116–174)—this portion of the analysis is
followed by a brief consideration of, in the words
of the section title, “Mixed Uses of Analogy and
Focality” (pp. 175–206)—and finally cumulation, in a discussion that deals mainly with the
sciences of psychology and ethics (pp. 207–
235). The book concludes with two short commentaries, one entitled “The Place of Theology
in the Science of Being” (pp. 235–239), the
other “Conclusion: Analogy, Focality, and Cumulation” (pp. 239–242).
Wilson’s treatment of the practice of science
is sometimes surprisingly brief. The important
problem of speed of change (Physics 8.4), for
example, is analyzed in less than two pages (pp.
39–41). Further, Wilson, observing that the
technique of establishing superordinate and subordinate science “and its place in the APo [have]
been well studied by the secondary literature,”
states that he will not “treat it in the same depth
as the three other techniques” (pp. 9–10). Given
its foundational role in his analysis, this technique requires a full examination here. But there
is a more serious problem: subordination among
sciences also appears in the Nicomachean Ethics
1.1, a text Wilson never mentions. Here subordination rests not on mathematical abstraction
but on ends among things in the real world. Thus
Wilson does not provide a foundation strong
enough to support his argument.
HELEN LANG
Dennis Des Chene. Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. viii Ⳮ 220 pp.,
bibl., index. Ithaca, N.Y./London: Cornell University Press, 2000. $45.
Life’s Form is that rarest of books: an important
contribution to advanced scholarship on its subject that is thoroughly accessible to nonspecialists. It immerses its readers in the world of the
sixteenth- to seventeenth-century scientia de anima, within which, and out of which, emerges
Descartes’s decidedly non-Aristotelian conception of the body-soul relation that has haunted us
ever since. We are treated to lengthy, elegant
translations of the Latin texts of the leading Jesuit
philosophers of the period, principally Toletus,
Sudrez, Fonseca, Arriaga, and the Coimbrans, but
always accompanied in footnotes by the full Latin
text. These authors are portrayed as both intimately familiar with their source text, Aristotle’s
De Anima, but also highly sensitive to its key
problems: Aristotle’s insistence that the concept
of soul is applicable to those beings that partake
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only of the capacities of nutrition, and generation
reproduction, i.e. plants; his equivocal pronouncements on the relationship between life and soul;
the problems that emerge from his definition of
soul as form and first actuality of a living body
with organs; and his simultaneous insistence that
the soul is a unity and has parts. All of the authors
examined take these problems seriously and have
sustained arguments about how to resolve them.
When reading this volume one truly feels the importance of answering these problems for these
thinkers and the power of the intellects that are
grappling with them.
One of the most interesting features of Des
Chene’s narrative is his ability to put these “in
house” disagreements within a wider context.
René Descartes’s reaction to these debates is
shown persuasively to shape those decisive departures from orthodoxy that created a body/soul
dualism that was inconceivable to these Aristotelians. There were, of course, serious problems
in reconciling the text of Aristotle with Christian
doctrine (cf. Chapter 2, “Propositions to Be Held
by Faith”) but even here the reconciliations are
widely varying and often startlingly unorthodox.
The volume is organized into four parts. The
first, “Data for the Study of Souls,” provides the
reader with a background in both the Aristotelian
texts and the chief concerns of the commentators
to be discussed. The second, “Defining the
Soul,” traces the disputes around Aristotle’s definition of the soul canvassed above. “Powers and
Parts,” the book’s third part, sees these authors
facing the problem of how one “counts” the
soul’s capacities and how, in the end, one prevents the soul from simply being a name for this
set of capacities. This leads inevitably to the
questions dealt with in Des Chene’s final section,
entitled “Unity.” How does one preserve the
unity of the soul in the face of the radical differences between its various capacities? This
becomes especially pressing for a Jesuit commentator, who must allow for the potential immortality of the human soul within an Aristotelian framework that defines it as “substance
qua form of a natural body.” Without emphasizing it, there are constant reminders in every
chapter that the debate in the philosophy of mind
over the past century is decisively shaped by the
argument between these Christian Aristotelians
and their foes, especially Descartes.
JAMES G. LENNOX
Georges Declercq. Anno Domini: The Origins
of the Christian Era. 206 pp., app., bibl. Turnhout,
Belgium: Brepols Publishers, 2000. $35, €20.
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The use of the Christian (A.D.) or common
(C.E.) era is today taken for granted, but recent
“millennium” celebrations have focused attention on how we measure time. The starting point
of the era was not established without difficulty.
Georges Declercq has produced a timely exposition, starting with the scriptural evidence for
the events on which the dating is based and continuing to the eleventh century when the Christian Era as propounded by Dionysius Exiguus
was accepted throughout Western Europe.
The study is described as an “essay.” The
scope of the book has led to occasional generalization and simplification. Despite the claim on
the cover, specialists may find some of the author’s statements insufficiently substantiated,
while for nonspecialists the text may be intimidatingly dense.
Interest in chronology as a way of emphasizing the historicity of Christ grew as expectation
of his imminent return faded. It involved reconciling Christian chronology with Roman history and establishing the lunar and solar parameters for the Passion and Resurrection of Christ.
The book is particularly useful in that it deals in
detail with calendar developments in the Eastern
Church. Here the traditional date of the Resurrection was 25 March, not 27 March, as in the
West—something that had important repercussions in later calendar reform. Declercq gives a
succinct explanation of the different reckonings.
Particularly important for historians of science
is the adaptation of the world chronicle to computistical principles. Anianus (“Annianos” in
Declercq) appears to have produced the first 532year cycle. The Christian Era was known in the
East in the fifth century. In the West the Dionysian tables were innovatory because their
starting point was the Incarnation, not the Passion.
Declercq gives a useful summary of the paschal controversy, ground already well covered
by earlier writers. He describes in detail the
Christian Era that was the legacy of Dionysius
to the Western Church and ultimately to the
world. Declercq’s thesis, preceded by a lengthy
discussion of previous theories, is that the choice
of 532 as the beginning of what became known
as the Dionysian cycle was historical rather than
computistical, adducing this from Felix of Gillitanus. Dionysius must have been familiar with
the 532-year cycle of Victorius but did not understand the 28-year solar cycle. The Irish knew
the principles of the cycle, but Bede constructed
the first cycle on Dionysian lines.
Recent work has thrown doubt on the traditional dating of early Irish annals. A survey of
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the dissemination of the Dionysian reckoning
throughout the Christian West until its general
acceptance in the eleventh century will be useful
to those studying similar documents.
Establishing the date of the Incarnation was of
less practical value than finding a workable calendar. Problems with the Dionysian calculation
that were known from Bede’s time provoked the
first truly scientific writing of the Middle Ages.
A full discussion of the Dionysian “error” is beyond the book’s scope and, indeed, must await
Faith Wallis’s forthcoming edition of Gerland’s
treatise.
Some difficulties with this useful survey involve style rather than content and presumably
are due to the publisher rather than the author.
There is no index, and quotations are translated
and not backed by the original text. It is difficult
to refer back from the notes to the text, and the
bibliography is not entirely alphabetical. The
book appears to have been written originally in
French, but there is no reference to a translator:
the English is occasionally unidiomatic, but to
the point of irritation rather than incomprehensibility.
JENNIFER MORETON
Wolfhart Westendorf. Handbuch der altägyptischen Medizin. (Handbook of Oriental Studies,
Pt. 1: The Near and Middle East, 36.) xviii Ⳮ
853 pp., apps., bibls., indexes. 2 volumes. Leiden/Boston/Cologne: Brill, 1999. $188.
Of the many kinds of documents to have survived from ancient Egypt, only those concerning
mathematical problems or medicine have usually
been considered in studies of the history of science—probably because, unlike other Egyptian
texts, they deal with their subject in relatively
objective terms, an approach that has traditionally defined what is meant by “science.” Medical
texts are more numerous than the mathematical
documents. They are preserved on papyri and
ostraca dating from the Middle Kingdom (ca.
1900 B.C.) to the Roman Period (ca. A.D. 200);
the most extensive and important of them were
written during the New Kingdom and Ramesside
Period, about 1550 to 1250 B.C.
This corpus was published as a whole and extensively analyzed in a nine-volume series entitled Grundriß der Medizin der Alten Ägypter
(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1954–1973). This
series, the work of three successive authors, Hermann Grapow, Hildegard von Deines, and Wolfhart Westendorf, includes a hieroglyphic transcription of the texts together with translations,
dictionaries, and a grammar, as well as studies

of the documents themselves and what they reveal of ancient Egyptian medical knowledge and
practice. Westendorf’s recent publication is essentially a summary of this series. As such, it is
a valuable resource for Egyptologists and historians of science alike, both because the original
series is no longer generally available and because it incorporates advances in our knowledge
of the Egyptian language and culture over the
past quarter century.
A short discussion of the character of Egyptian medicine (“Between Religion, Magic, and
Science”) serves as the introduction to the work,
the body of which is divided into seven parts.
Part 1 (pp. 4–79) deals with the sources themselves and describes the history, contents, and
publication of each document; a translation is
also provided for some of the briefer texts. Although this section is essentially a catalogue, it
contains one of the rare instances in which Westendorf’s unparalleled knowledge of the genre
can be questioned. Westendorf describes Papyrus Edwin Smith as containing “numerous” instances of Old Egyptian forms and spellings (p.
16), thus perpetuating the notion that the document was originally composed during the Old
Kingdom. In fact, the grammar of the text is that
of early Middle Egyptian. Accordingly, although
it is the oldest of the surviving medical texts, it
is certainly no older than the very end of the Old
Kingdom and probably at least a century
younger.
In Part 2 (pp. 80–100) Westendorf examines
the genre of medical documents as a whole. He
divides the texts into several different categories:
instructions, prognoses, prescriptions, magic,
and miscellany. The third part (pp. 101–471)
contains an exhaustive analysis of the various
ailments discussed in the medical texts, and the
fourth (pp. 472–535) deals both with the role of
the physician in Egyptian society and, more extensively, with the methods and medicaments
used in the treatment of illnesses and injuries.
These two parts will be of particular interest to
physicians and scholars of the history of medicine, along with Part 5 (pp. 536–546), in which
Westendorf describes survivals of Egyptian
medicine in the Christian (Coptic) period and its
influence on Greek medicine.
Parts 6 and 7 are presented in the second volume, paginated sequentially with the first. Part 6
(pp. 547–748) contains a full translation of the
two most important medical texts, Papyrus Ebers
and Papyrus Edwin Smith. The final part is devoted to references and includes a bibliography,
lists of abbreviations and citations, and several
extensive indexes.
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Westendorf’s “handbook” is not only the latest contribution to the study of ancient Egyptian
medicine but also the most valuable to appear
since the publication of the series on which it is
based—and to which Westendorf himself contributed in no small part. As such it deserves a
place in the libraries of Egyptologists and historians of science alike.
JAMES P. ALLEN
David L. Lentz (Editor). Imperfect Balance:
Landscape Transformations in the Precolumbian Americas. (Historical Ecology Series.)
Foreword by William M. Denevan. xxiv Ⳮ 547
pp., illus., figs., apps., bibls., index. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2000. $65, £41.50
(cloth); $30, £19.50 (paper).
This substantial volume is dedicated to furthering an “ecological understanding of the pre-Columbian New World by creating evaluations of
prehuman vegetation and then offering discussions as to how humans became involved in local
ecosystems” (p. 3). These topics are timely,
since the last decade has seen a flowering of debate and reconsideration of previously held
views of pre-Columbian human environmental
impacts in the Americas. The book contributes
to those discussions by assembling examples of
the current state of knowledge of pre-Columbian
ecologies and of their human uses and modifications for a number of selected areas in the
Americas.
This somewhat eclectic book, edited by David
Lentz, presents empirical evidence of human use
of and change to local and regional ecologies in
ten chapters. Additional chapters are devoted to
useful inventories of pre-Columbian vegetation
patterns in North and Middle America and in the
lowland tropics and tropical Andes, although the
vegetation pattern theme is not uniformly addressed in the case studies. One chapter is devoted to climate change in the northern neotropics since the last Ice Age, yet this discussion
applies to only a small part of the hemisphere
discussed in the case studies.
The case study chapters mostly address agricultural modifications. These include entries on
pre-Columbian anthropocentric food webs that
are both general and specific to Mesoamerica;
late precontact agricultural landscapes in the
Valley of Mexico; the ancient water management systems for agriculture in central and
southern Mexico and Venezuela; environmental
impacts of ancient Maya deforestation and agricultural intensification in lowland areas of
northern Guatemala, Belize, and the southern
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Yucatán peninsula; pre-Columbian silviculture
and management of neotropical forests; preColumbian farming systems of the Mississippi
River Valley; environmental impacts of ancient
Hohokam irrigation and agriculture in the Sonoran desert; the built landscape in the Lake Titicaca basin; agricultural systems, modified landscapes, and cultural values in the pre-Inca and
Inca-era central Andes and Peruvian coast; and
impacts of pre-Columbian agriculture and other
land uses in riverine areas near the mouth of the
Amazon River.
Given its somewhat uneven case study approach and despite broader chapters on climate
change and prehuman vegetation patterns, this
book is not a systematic approach to or a comprehensive statement on pre-Columbian landscape (or even vegetation) transformation. It
does not address large regions of the Americas
or all time frames; nor does it address all forms
of modification (e.g., changes wrought by hunting-gathering societies or for other nonagricultural purposes are little considered). Nevertheless,
this book’s virtues outweigh its shortcomings, and

Raised field platforms planted alongside
potatoes in Peru (from Lentz, ed., Imperfect
Balance, p. 335).
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themes emerging from these studies address major ongoing debates over the nature and scale of
pre-Columbian environmental impacts. The first
is that large regions of the pre-Columbian Americas were transformed in some way before European contact—thus these regions, encompassing much of the most populated New World,
cannot be thought of as “pristine.” The second
is that the nature of changes wrought to these
regions are varied. Some were profound and
easily seen, others subtle and visible only to
expert eyes; some represented long-term, relatively “sustainable” modifications, while others
may have triggered degradation. Lastly, these
transformations occurred over a very long time
frame and regions that were heavily modified at
some time may not have appeared so on the eve
of European contact.
THOMAS M. WHITMORE
䡲 Middle Ages & Renaissance
Simon A. Gilson. Medieval Optics and Theories
of Light in the Works of Dante. (Studies in Italian
Literature, 8.) xiv Ⳮ 301 pp., app., bibl., indexes. Lewiston, N.Y./Queenston, Ont.: Edwin
Mellen Press, 2000. $99.95.
The somewhat deflating conclusion of Simon A.
Gilson’s meticulous examination of Dante’s incorporation of the science of optics and theories
of light is that the poet was considerably less well
read than we have been giving him credit for.
Gilson’s book is divided into two parts: the
first, dealing with the science of optics, contains
four chapters; the second, dealing with theories
of light, contains three. Each of these parts is
devoted to debunking a tendency in Dante scholarship to attribute to a particular scientific or
philosophical movement a marked influence on
his work. In the first part Gilson maintains that
Dante’s use of the science of optics does not—
as others, most forcefully and influentially Alessandro Parronchi, have argued—rely specifically on knowledge of the authors of the
perspectivae—detailed treatises on optics that
placed the influence of light rays at the origin of
terrestrial phenomena—that is, on such thinkers
as Alhazen, Roger Bacon, and Robert Grosseteste. Rather, Gilson contends that Dante could
easily have come by the requisite expertise concerning this science through contact with the
more popular and widely known doctrines of
such Arab interpreters of Aristotle as Avicenna
and Averroës and the commentaries of Albert the
Great and Thomas Aquinas. He demonstrates the
plausibility of this contention by way of a com-

parative analysis of the doctrines of the perspectivists and the Arab interpreters. This analysis is
followed by a chapter devoted to optics and vision in Dante’s earlier poetry.
The two following chapters cover, respectively, topics such as blinding, optical illusions,
and visual error in Dante’s Commedia and the
themes of reflection, mirrors, and meteorological
optics, also in the Commedia, a work that Gilson
specifies as having nevertheless gone beyond the
more limited sources of the earlier poetry. In the
third chapter Gilson’s analysis achieves a welcome degree of insight into the poet’s originality: here Gilson shows how Dante incorporates
the scientific knowledge of his day in order to
establish a set of limits that circumscribe human
action in the physical world but that must be
overcome in the course of the pilgrim’s journey
through his imaginative world. Such moments
provide a refreshing alternative to an otherwise
rather positivistic view of scientific knowledge
as a compendium of facts and sources one either
has or has not read. One cannot help but think
that researchers in the field of the history of science might be most interested in the imaginative
contributions of a specifically poetic knowledge,
especially in an age in which the distinction between “hard” and “soft” science was not accorded the kind of unquestioned respect it currently receives.
In the second part Gilson, continuing his debunking analysis, argues that the scholarship on
Dante and his use of theories of light has remained captivated by the notion of “the metaphysics of light.” This term, Gilson claims, has
been used to unify and oversimplify a rather diverse group of doctrines concerning the nature
of light and its relation to knowledge, vision,
God, and being. Against the grain of the traditional critical trend, Gilson maintains that
Dante’s thought has nothing in common with the
proper metaphysics of light of a Grosseteste—
who identifies light as the primary element of
being—and that Dante would have had relatively little contact with Neoplatonic theories of
emanation. Again, according to Gilson, in applying the imagery of light to his poetic themes,
Dante would have had readily available models
in the popular theological light imagery of his
time; his use of light in the description of the
Empyrean is, Gilson states, perhaps the best example of Dante’s relative independence from
any limited set of sources.
Whether Gilson’s informative examination of
Dante’s relative dependence on sources should
be understood as liberating the poet from the
anxiety of scientific influence remains, however,
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an open question. Whatever the extent or depth
of any enumeration of those sources, it is the
moment of creation that astonishes.
WILLIAM EGGINTON
Yung Sik Kim. The Natural Philosophy of Chu
Hsi, 1130–1200. (Memoirs of the American
Philosophical Society, 235.) xii Ⳮ 380 pp., figs.,
tables, app., bibl., index. Philadelphia: American
Philosophical Society, 2000. $30.
Yung Sik Kim’s new book is a welcome addition
to the large number of studies of the thought of
Chu Hsi, arguably the most important literati
thinker (i.e., Ru, often translated as “Confucian”)
in China since the Southern Song dynasty
(1127–1280). Chu’s ideas became orthodox empire-wide during the early Ming dynasty (1368–
1644), and during the Ming and Qing (1644–
1911) dynasties millions of candidates for the
imperial civil service examinations mastered the
“Learning of the Way” (Daoxue, often translated
as “Neo-Confucianism”) associated with Chu
and his followers. With the exception of the pioneering study by Yamada Keiji in 1978, nearly
all previous accounts of Chu’s ideas written by
students of Chinese philosophy have emphasized
the metaphysical, moral, and epistemological
concerns in Chu’s writings. Those more concerned with imperial dogma and state power in
China since 1400 have tended to paint Chu Hsi’s
“Learning of the Way” as a monolithic, authoritarian ideology that legitimated the Ming and
Qing dynasty rulers politically, socially, and culturally among gentry elites.
Kim acknowledges that the core of Chu Hsi’s
grand intellectual synthesis was focused on
moral and social philosophy, but in this book
Kim provides compelling information that Chu
was also concerned with natural knowledge
about the three levels of reality: heaven and
earth, the myriad things in the world, and the
human realm. Humans thus formed a triad with
heaven and earth as the most numinous living
thing because they were endowed with the psycho-physical stuff of ch’i that was most clear and
complete. Recognizing no boundary between the
physical and the spiritual, Chu Hsi equated human nature with the universe. The basic concepts
that informed Chu’s natural world were yinyang, the five evolutive phases, and the dualism
of li (universal and individuated rules) and ch’i
(embodied and concrete materiality).
Chu Hsi advocated a scholarly agenda that
would explain why things and events were as
they were. Through the “investigation of things,”
the heavenly principle that inscribed the ch’i of
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each object and event could be discovered. Normally historians of Chinese philosophy stress the
place of universal heavenly li in Chu’s thought,
but Kim makes a concerted effort not to overlook
the important place of ch’i as the aggregated collection of stuff in the universe, some dense and
falling like the earth, some airy and rising like
heaven. Indeed, as important as li was for Chu
Hsi’s moral philosophy, ch’i was the most important concept he employed to explain natural
phenomena, material changes, and earthly
events. With no discontinuity between matter
and life, or between materiality and mind, Chu’s
philosophy made no allowance for the Western
distinctions between the material and spiritual
spheres or between the physical and mental
realms.
It was precisely such views that troubled the
Jesuits such as Matteo Ricci who came to China
in the late sixteenth century. Ricci and his European cohort would be condemned in the early
eighteenth century by French Jansenists and
Spanish Franciscans for their overly accommodational compromises with traditional Chinese
religious practices such as ancestor worship,
which Ricci interpreted as a civil rite. Nonetheless, when Ricci studied Chu Hsi’s moral philosophy and natural thought, he was appalled at
its materialism and atheism, which he considered
the fault of Buddhism (“sect of idols”) and its
impact on Song literati such as Chu Hsi.
The “noninertness” of ch’i carried over from
the dynamic materiality of all things, including
the human mind, to the formless and unfathomable spirits and ghosts that existed in a border
area outside the natural realm between heaven
and human beings. The dispersion of ch’i upon
death could take many forms but, according to
Chu Hsi, in the end all such ch’i disaggregated,
leaving no ongoing or abiding spiritual form for
humans, plants, or animals. The ch’i of the ancestors could be prayed to because the materiality of their descendants was the same ch’i, but
even this continuity could not survive more
than a few generations. Again, the Jesuits were
shocked at this atheistic view of the human soul
and its eventual demise materially with no possible eternal life after death.
Accordingly, Kim’s careful study of what Chu
Hsi thought about the natural world makes it evident that most modern studies have elided an
essential aspect of traditional Chinese thought,
particularly the centrality of ch’i in the dynamic
processes of collection and dispersion that produce all things, whether living or inanimate. Students of Chinese philosophy have tended to prioritize those aspects of Chu Hsi’s views on
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universal li and its instantiated forms that are
more amenable to a Western, Judeo-ChristianIslamic reading drawn ultimately from the debate between Plato and Aristotle over the universal forms of particular things.
Modern presentations, in other words, have
failed to grasp why a generation of Jesuit scholars who spent their adulthood in China during
the seventeenth century found Chu Hsi’s views
alien and dangerous. Kim deserves credit for going against the tide of twentieth-century scholarly interpretation and restoring to Chu Hsi those
aspects of his natural philosophy that have been
conveniently repressed to make his views more
palatable. Rather than just the builder of the orthodox brick wall of traditional Chinese moralism, we can see that Chu Hsi’s natural philosphy
challenged any view of the world that assumed
theological differences between life and death,
mind and body, or the spiritual and physical.
BENJAMIN A. ELMAN
Steven P. Marrone. The Light of Thy Countenance: Science and Knowledge of God in the
Thirteenth Century. Volume 1: A Doctrine of Divine Illumination; Volume 2: God at the Core of
Cognition. (Studies in the History of Christian
Thought, 98.) [xiiⳭvi] Ⳮ 250 Ⳮ 611 pp., bibl.,
indexes. Leiden/Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2001.
Abbot Suger spoke for a long-standing imaginal
tradition when, in 1140, he engraved on the portal of Saint Denis: “The blind soul surges towards truth by means of what is material and,
seeing light, resurrects from its earlier submersion.” Steven Marrone’s new book follows
eleven medieval authors as they struggle to adapt
such metaphors of divine illumination, inherited
largely from Augustine, to an emerging ideal of
apodictic science inspired by Aristotle. Some of
Marrone’s protagonists are well known to historians of science (Grosseteste, Pecham) while
others are more obscure (Gilbert of Tournai,
William of Ware), some are major philosophical
figures (Bonaventure, John Duns Scotus) while
others are in every sense minores (Matthew of
Aquasperta, Vital du Four). The narrative Marrone weaves out of this uneven array of theology
masters is rich, dynamic, and rewarding. Taken
together, their careers span the period from the
early thirteenth century to the early fourteenth,
during which a neo-Augustinian school came,
saw, and (basically) yielded—forced to adapt to
expanding new criteria of scientificity. As Marrone demonstrates, however, core elements of
Augustinian illumination are transformed and

preserved. An authentic “Augustinian fire,” as he
puts it, survives intact through the long journey
from Abbot Suger’s stone portal to Duns Scotus’s
ethereal edifice of syllogisms, which in Marrone’s
view marks the culmination of four stages of progressive intellectual metamorphosis.
The first volume, subtitled A Doctrine of Divine Illumination, shows how an initially exploratory map of questions and affinities in the
early thirteenth century solidified into a self-conscious Augustinian theory of knowledge under
institutional and professional pressures. Marrone
in this volume breaks new ground in the historiography of late medieval “schools” by emphasizing the importance of underlying discursive
demands. Marrone shows how two opposing attractions—to logic and naturalist explanations
on the one hand, to the (dialogic) intimacy between human mind and God on the other—
drove the advance toward doctrinal clarity and
coherence, thus culminating in a “classic” Augustinian formulation.
Volume 2, subtitled God at the Core of Cognition, turns to the fortunes of this newly minted
Augustinianism as it transforms in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries under the
impact of a new critical temper. The detailed discussions of Henry of Ghent’s disciple Vital du
Four (nicely introduced on p. 268 as “an inveterate plagiarizer”) and of Scotus’s immediate
predecessor William of Ware give special value
to this second volume, as they greatly flesh out
the context in which Scotus’s subtilitates will
count as meaningful solutions. Overall, I have
just one major reservation: the important move,
especially among Franciscans, to substitute divine infinity for divine light is overlooked. The
key, here, lies in the notion of intensity, which
belongs simultaneously to measuring light and
measuring “perfection.” Since this exciting
move will bear epistemic fruit well beyond medieval scholasticism—think of Descartes—it
might indeed have been cited, even briefly discussed.
Marrone’s great contribution, however, is to
show convincingly that God remains “at the core
of cognition” in Duns Scotus’s prodigious balancing act, which thus retains and even enshrines
key Augustinian features (Ockham scholars
should pay special heed). By exploiting John
Murdoch’s seminal idea that analytical languages more than doctrine per se shaped the epistemic landscape of the scholastic age, Marrone
succeeds in stirring up new questions about the
medieval roots of modern science. What matters,
Maronne argues, is to understand better diachronic evidence of how knowledge is defended
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and displayed. In this regard, the gigantic step
that separates prescholastic literate discourse from
the highly formalized procedures of the late thirteenth century offers a unique window into more
fundamental and explosive questions about epistemic transformation and the rise of scientific
elites. Philosophers and historians of science will
find in these two volumes vital new perspectives
based on exceptionally refined scholarship.
ANNE A. DAVENPORT
Nigel Hiscock. The Wise Master Builder: Platonic Geometry in Plans of Medieval Abbeys and
Cathedrals. xviii Ⳮ 340 Ⳮ [108] pp., illus.,
figs., apps., bibl., index. Aldershot, England/
Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000. $99.95.
The main conclusion of Nigel Hiscock’s important but ill-arranged book is that the ground plans
of abbeys and cathedrals of the tenth and eleventh centuries incorporate Platonic wisdom—
hence the “wise” in the title catchwords, which
come from Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians
(1 Cor 3:10). There Paul likens himself to a sapiens architectus who lays the foundations on
which others erect the building. In three of the
four translations in The Complete Parallel Bible,
however, Paul does not declare himself wise but,
rather, “skilled” or “trained.” The discrepancy
makes an emblem for Hiscock’s investigation:
Did the architects deliberately express geometrical ratios significant in Platonic philosophy in
their designs or did they proceed by applying
their practical skill and training to the lie of the
land and the resources available? A subsidiary
question is also symbolized in Paul’s verse: Was
the designer a wise cleric who set the proportions
and left the heavy work to someone else?
Hiscock builds his answers in two ways. For
one, he delivers a chrestomathy of Platonic snippets known in the tenth century and a few telling
quotations from wise clerics—the latter concern
the expression of significant numbers in the
church fabric: a baptistery is octagonal because
of an association between creation and the number eight, and a church with a half-dozen altars
is complete because of the perfection of the number six. But, Hiscock emphasizes, numerology
does not account for floor plans, and to test the
wisdom of the designers he scrutinizes plans of
two dozen churches, especially those associated
with monastic reformers. He expresses his results in color-coded lines superposed on the
plans, some one hundred of which comprise a
valuable appendix.
An example will indicate the interest of the
findings and the riskiness of the business. The
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crossing of the transept at St. Michael’s Abbey,
Hildesheim, makes a square ABCD, proceeding
clockwise from A in the northeast corner. AD
and BC prolonged give the line of nave piers,
AB and DC prolonged that of the arms of the
transept. Lines drawn from B at angles of 54⬚
and 60⬚ with BC cut CD extended in E and F,
respectively, locating the end piers in the side
aisles. Now 60⬚, as the invariable angle of a
three-sided figure all of whose parts are equal,
carries a cornucopia of Platonic and Christian
symbolism. Also 54⬚, because derivable from a
pentagon, has the pregnant significance of the
figure five, which is the sum of the first male and
first female numbers. Repetition of the transept
square fixes the nave piers. Then lines between
piers, pillars, and pilasters make the special an-

St. Michael, Hildesheim, cathedral with all
alignments shown (from Hiscock, The Wise
Master Builder, plate 31).
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gles with the north-south and east-west lines of
the grid all over the plan.
How much of this construction is mere coincidence? Requiring the intervals between piers
in the same line to be equal, we have DE ⳱ FE
⳱ FD/2. And so it is: (tan54⬚ ⳮ 1)/(tan60⬚ ⳮ
1) ⳱ 0.51. Otherwise put, if angle FBC is 60⬚
and E divides FD equally, angle EBC must be
54⬚ without reference to a pentagon. Against
such arguments, Hiscock observes that his analysis has uncovered previously unknown relations between churches confirmed by documents
and that his technique, when applied to large
nineteenth-century buildings with repeated bays
such as the Crystal Palace, picks out relatively
few structurally significant elements.
Hiscock is senior lecturer on the design, theory, and history of architecture at Oxford
Brookes University and a master craftsman. His
scrupulously prepared color-coded drawings
contain much of interest and pleasure for a geometer. Has he definitively answered the old
vexed question whether the sapiens architectus
intended to express ancient wisdom in his plans?
If the architect thus proposed, did his builder
faithfully dispose? Paul again may give guidance. “The Lord knows the thoughts of the wise,
that they are futile” (1 Cor 3:21).
JOHN L. HEILBRON
Anthony Grafton. Leon Battista Alberti: Master Builder of the Italian Renaissance. xii Ⳮ 417
pp., frontis., illus., index. New York: Hill &
Wang, 2000. $35.
Anthony Grafton, like Jacob Burckhardt before
him, begins his appreciation of Leon Battista Alberti by reviewing how the fifteenth-century Italian author created a many-faceted identity
through willful self-fashioning. Grafton, however, offers the reader a much richer Bildungsroman than the older portrait and exposes many
forces undercutting the monolithic character of
Burckhardt’s Renaissance, the same forces that
may provide a key to the contrary and doubtridden persona frequenting Alberti’s writings.
Alberti’s ambitions and the leitmotifs of his life
from his youthful aspirations to their later glorious fulfillment are laid out in stunning detail.
Moving well beyond the unrelenting brightness of Burckhardt’s presentation, Grafton also
attempts to fuse what have become for scholars
the dramatic polarities of Alberti’s enigmatic
personality. An ambitious scholar and writer on
academic subjects, on the visual and practical
arts, Alberti was a lover of nature and a sensitive commentator on aesthetic, familial, and

cultural ideals. He was also given to irony, despair, and bitter isolation. Grafton makes a
strong case for Alberti’s dependence on an unwavering determination that compelled him to
assume many guises and foster numerous strategies to achieve his literary, social, and economic goals. As his friend Cristoforo Landino
once noted, Alberti was like a chameleon. In
Grafton’s hands, however, Alberti remains dazzlingly inventive and radically humanist, and
he endures as appropriately leonine and the
hero of his own tale.
With a predictable outpouring of references,
Grafton evokes Alberti’s social, political, and intellectual world and, reprising his earlier writings, develops several themes. These include Alberti’s literary erudition and the high price he
paid to achieve it; how Alberti applied the lessons of ancient sources to the problems of his
own world, and in so doing subverted those lessons to create something new; how the humanist
author developed special vocabularies for writing about such novel subjects as the visual arts,
instruments of measure, and other current technologies; and, perhaps most surprisingly for a
man given to bitterly mocking his contemporaries, how Alberti became involved in the creative
energy of early modern life with apparent enthusiasm and accomplished the astonishing feat for
a humanist of becoming a practicing architect.
Grafton finds Alberti’s confidence in a material culture driven by technology, theoretical
knowledge, and careful observation expressed
forcefully in the dedicatory letter of his essay On
Painting addressed to the builder Filippo Brunelleschi. Brunelleschi deserved to be praised
not for slavishly drinking from the fountain of
the ancients, but for the brilliance of his intelligence and the successful application of his
knowledge. Further, by requesting that the architect emend his essay, Alberti, the scholar, is
shown to have treated Brunelleschi, the builder,
as an equal and thereby to have elevated all technical knowledge. Alberti cleverly places himself
within the circle of the ingenious engineers who
were masters of practical knowledge based on
underlying principles and therefore at the forefront of an intellectual parade led by its most
renowned practitioner. One wonders, perhaps,
what Brunelleschi at the height of his fame might
have desired to learn from the audacious savant.
As Alberti masters how to make his way in
Florence and among the elegant courts of his
day, he is seen to revisit the themes of his youthful writings with ever-deepening insight. Grafton’s reflections on Alberti and Florence, though
generally convincing, have been greatly enriched
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by Luca Boschetto’s recent book devoted to that
subject (Leon Battista Alberti e Firenze [Olschki, 2000]). In addition, some of Grafton’s notions about the influence of On Painting as centered in courtly art seem to reach beyond the
evidence and the explicit directives found in Alberti’s writings.
The reader interested in Alberti’s involvement
in science and technology will still want to consult Joan Gadol’s Leon Battista Alberti: Universal Man of the Early Renaissance (University of
Chicago Press, 1969), and the lack of a general
bibliography will be an irritation to those who
like to follow an author’s research trail, the trekker in this case having to stumble through a
thicket of footnotes. Nonetheless, Grafton has
created a richly drawn portrait of Alberti.
Scholar and student alike will garner much that
is important about this immensely gifted and
mercurial man whose writings continue to influence our understanding of the beginnings of
early modernity.
JANE ANDREWS AIKEN
George Ripley. George Ripley’s Compound of
Alchymy (1591). Edited by Stanton J. Linden.
1x Ⳮ 138 pp., illus., index. Aldershot/Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2001. $59.95.
The fifteenth-century Augustinian canon and alchemist George Ripley is one of the most important figures in early English alchemy. As the
chief popularizer of the alchemical principles of
the pseudo-Lull, he initiated an influential school
of English alchemy that remained resilient to the
end of the seventeenth century. John Dee,
George Starkey, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton all read Ripley carefully, and Michael Maier
is said to have learned English just so that he
could read Ripley in the original tongue.
But Ripley has encountered the fate of many
alchemical writers: reliable biographical data
about him is scarce and nearly overwhelmed by
the accumulation of rumors and legends, and his
corpus is a farrago of genuine, adulterated, and
spurious works springing from several periods
and places. Naturally, this messy situation renders solid historical inquiry difficult, and so one
of the first tasks must be to produce more reliable
biographical and bibliographical foundations for
studies of Ripley and his influence.
The current volume, although published by
Ashgate, greatly resembles (in layout, content,
and intent) a further installment in the Garland
English Renaissance Hermeticism Series, of
which Stanton Linden was the general editor.
The bulk of the book is a reprint of the 1591
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London edition of Ripley’s Compound of Alchymy—his longest and most influential work—
a versification in rhyme royal on the making of
the philosophers’ stone. The reprinted text is preceded by an introduction and followed by explanatory notes, many of them making use of
Eirenaeus Philalethes’ (i.e., George Starkey’s)
Ripley Reviv’d, a lengthy commentary on the
Compound published in 1678, and of Elias Ashmole’s Theatrum chemicum britannicum, in
which the Compound was published with annotations in 1652.
The historian of science might well question
why the 1591 printed edition was chosen as the
primary text when there are at least nine fifteenth-century manuscripts of the Compound in
existence. Linden expresses his belief (p. xxxix)
in the superiority of Rabbard’s 1591 edition over
Ashmole’s 1652 edition—though he bases this
preference, somewhat curiously, on the modernity of the former’s spelling and punctuation—
but he does not note explicitly why Rabbard’s
text should be preferable to manuscripts written
during Ripley’s lifetime. This decision is presumably due, however, to the apparent connection of this book to the English Renaissance Hermeticism Series, and Linden’s greater interest in
the late sixteenth-century scene is clear in the
detailed account he provides of the production
of the 1591 edition. This treatment contrasts with
the relatively less critical interest shown toward
details on Ripley himself, for the biographical
section simply lists items about Ripley’s life as
summarized around 1900 (predominantly by
John Ferguson and the Dictionary of National
Biography) and includes some points that must
be incorrect (e.g., that Ripley was made chamberlain by Pope Innocent VIII in 1477; Innocent
VIII did not ascend to the See of Peter until
1484). Given Linden’s fine researches published
previously, this comes as a bit of a disappointment, although it must be recalled that even Ashmole had trouble getting details on Ripley three
hundred years ago.
Students of alchemy should welcome the appearance of a reprint of a primary source. Those
who are interested in Renaissance publications
of alchemical works and who approach Ripley
primarily as an English poet and literary figure
will benefit from the book. Questions of course
remain, and it is to be hoped that this volume
will attract more attention to further aspects of
the famous Canon of Bridlington and his work.
LAWRENCE M. PRINCIPE
D. Zecaire. Opuscule tres-eccellent de la vraye
philosophie naturelle des metaulx. Edited by Re-
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nan Crouvizier. Foreword by Jean-Claude
Margolin. (Textes et Travaux de Chrysopaeia,
6.) 208 pp., frontis., illus., bibls., index. Paris/
Milan: Arche, 1999. (Paper.)
The Opuscule written by Denis Zecaire in 1560
is one of the most famous testimonies to Renaissance alchemy. In addition to assessing the
medieval alchemical heritage, the work is especially noteworthy because of the firsthand description of the alchemist’s life it contains. As a
whole, it offers a lively picture of traditional alchemy, which in the following decades would be
deeply transformed by the impact of Paracelsian
doctrines.
Zecaire’s work went through several editions,
in French, Latin, and German, from 1567 until
the very end of the eighteenth century (see the
list on pp. 183–186), and the French text has
been reprinted twice, in 1977 and 1990. Yet the
present edition is the first to give the full text
from a manuscript probably written by the author
himself (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de
France, fr. 1089). Renan Crouvizier presents a
valuable introductory essay that describes the results of his thorough research. Indeed, although
an important outcome of Crouvizier’s work is
the restoration of passages lacking in the earlier
editions, the main interest of this book is in the
introduction, the careful biographical and sociological assessment of the author, and the overview of the sources and contents of his work.
Despite the display of biographical and historical data in the first part of the Opuscule, the
author’s identity is still unknown. Crouvizier
points to some features (the supposed Latin
name of Zecaire, Johannes Cerasius; his origin
from Guyenne; his social status as a landlord)
that might help us to ascertain who “Denis Zecaire” really was. Yet even this well-equipped
scholar must at present surrender before the “effacement social de Zecaire” (p. 55), leaving us
with only a faint hope that new sources may confirm the name “Johannes de Berle” proposed by
the eighteenth-century scholar Nicholas LengletDufresnoy—or that a different name, confirming
the features so carefully outlined, may emerge
from archival records.
Analysis of the autobiographical account in
the Opuscule leads Crouvizier to affirm that Zecaire and his work are to be included in the “dossier des rapports entre protestantiste et alchimie”
(p. 43), therefore assigning it to the same intellectual milieu where Paracelsus was to find an
audience. This conclusion is strengthened by the
connection of the Opuscule with another alchemical work linked to French Paracelsianism, the

Traité attributed to Bernard Le Trévisan, printed
with Zecaire’s Opuscule in the 1567 edition.
However, the alchemical sources referred to
in the second book of the Opuscule are clearly
those of a pre-Paracelsian alchemist, who accepted the traditional theory of “mercurius solus”—that is, the doctrine according to which
metals are formed by one substance, mercury or
quicksilver, whose fiery aspect manifests itself
as “sulphur” in the formation of metals and in
the alchemical opus. Only the transmutation of
metals is considered; there is no hint of the alchemical distillation of alcohol. While the main
source of the Opuscule seems to be Bernard Le
Trévisan, the most-quoted author is Petrus Bonus, and Zecaire clearly considers the doctrines
of the Latin “Geber” and pseudo-Lull—the most
important medieval alchemical authors—as mutually consistent.
The third part of the work is a suggestive allegory of the alchemical process, ending with instructions for using the “grant roy” or “divine
oeuvre”—that is, the alchemical elixir—to
transmute base metals, to make pearls and gems,
and to heal the human body. Nothing new is developed from pseudo-Lullian alchemy; but the
interest shown by the Paracelsian Gerhard Dorn
in Zecaire, whose work he translated into Latin
in 1583, confirms that the French author can be
placed in the intellectual stream leading from alchemy to “chemical philosophy.”
MICHELA PEREIRA
䡲 Early Modern (Seventeenth and
Eighteenth Century)
Jed Z. Buchwald; I. Bernard Cohen (Editors).
Isaac Newton’s Natural Philosophy. (Dibner Institute Studies in the History of Science and
Technology.) xx Ⳮ 354 pp., illus., figs., tables,
index. Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press,
2001. $45.
This collection belongs to a distinguished series
and contains a number of outstanding essays.
Some of the essays, notably those by Alan Shapiro, Michael Nauenberg, and George Smith, expand on work published in The Foundations of
Newtonian Scholarship, edited by Richard H.
Dalitz and Nauenberg (Singapore, 2000), which
can be seen as a companion volume.
Jed Buchwald and I. Bernard Cohen identify
two strands of contemporary Newtonian research. The first, “Motivations and Methods,”
opens with an essay by Maurizo Mamiani on the
sources for the Regulae Philosophandi in Book
3 of Newton’s Principia. Relying on his previ-
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ous critical edition of Newton’s Treatise on the
Apocalypse, Mamiani shows that “Robert Sanderson’s [1631] Logicae Artis Compendium is
the primary source of Newton’s rules” (p. 4).
Thus circa 1672 Newton adapted Sanderson’s
laws first to biblical exegesis and later to the investigation of nature. Cohen compares Newton’s
Opticks with Huygens’s Traité de la lumière,
shedding light on the history of their editions.
Shapiro’s study on diffraction presents a detailed
analysis of Newton’s experimental investigations, with particular emphasis on quantitative
methods. Shapiro argues that not only Robert
Hooke’s role but also “Newton’s inability to
conclude the part [of the Opticks] on diffraction
was a principal reason” for the delay of its publication until 1704 (p. 47). Mordechai Feingold
outlines a picture of the Royal Society where, a
few years after its foundation, two factions
emerge, the naturalists and the mathematicians.
His interpretation provides a convincing key for
interpreting events at the society in Newton’s
time and beyond.
The second strand, “Celestial Dynamics and
Rational Mechanics,” opens with an essay by
Bruce Brackenridge on the interplay among
Newton’s three different ways to represent
curves, which he calls the “polygonal, parabolic,
and the curvature methods.” Essays by Nauenberg and Curtis Wilson provide starkly contrasting perspectives on Newton’s investigations on
lunar motion in relation to those of later mathematicians. According to Nauenberg, the perturbation method developed by Newton in the
Portsmouth papers is remarkable and “corresponds” to later methods developed by Leonhard
Euler and George W. Hill: “The evidence presented here indicates that [Newton] could have
succeeded in his quest to evaluate correctly
higher-order terms to the motion of the lunar apogee had he continued to pursue his method
more carefully, particular[ly] in regard to the dependence on the orbit’s eccentricity” (p. 215).
By contrast, Wilson emphasizes the differences
between Newton’s and later contributions. A
crucial section in his essay addresses the same
problem that is at the center of Nauenberg’s
work but reaches opposite conclusions. The section is titled “Why It Is Unlikely that Newton
Would Ever Have Solved the Problem of the
Moon’s Apsidal Motion Correctly” (p. 168). In
his remarkable study, Wilson identifies several
important differences between Newton and his
successors, such as the shift from geometrical to
analytic methods. The problem of the apsidal
motion can only be solved in a “blind, iterative”
algorithmic fashion, one Newton did not prefer.
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Moreover, Wilson argues that whereas the solutions by Leonhard and Johann Albrecht Euler
and by Hill “started from differential equations
that stated exactly the conditions of the problem”
and allowed a close check of the approximations
adopted, “Newton’s calculative procedure . . .
provides no internal check on the accuracy of
[his] assumptions or of his results” (p. 153). Although both Nauenberg and Wilson employ
modern notation, Wilson is more careful in conveying the sense of Newton’s style and original
way of proceeding. Michel Blay’s fine essay
identifies the main aim of Newton’s Principia as
determining how one can “achieve mathematical
rigor in the transition from the discontinuous to
the continuous” (pp. 225–226). Traditionally
historians have identified the laws of motion, especially the second law, as the intellectual cornerstone of Newton’s masterpiece. Blay’s conclusion, however, is that “the real driving force
of Newton’s dynamics, the coherence of the
Principia, resides in the lemmas of Section 1”
(p. 243).
George Smith’s essay on Book 2 of the Principia is probably the most original and innovative contribution to this volume and one of the
most important studies of Newton’s work. It will
become a classic in the field. Smith, a philosopher and engineer by profession, has the technical skills and the historicophilosophical sophistication to deal with the complex issues of
motion in resisting media and to analyze Newton’s problematic experiments and theories.
Book 2 has traditionally been little studied and
bracketed off as a rather cumbersome and unfortunate aside in Newton’s oeuvre. Smith’s
work sheds new light on it and at the same time
shows the profound links with better-known aspects of Newton’s research. A useful appendix
to his essay contains a translation of those passages on fluid resistance from the first edition
(1687) that were replaced or removed in the later
editions. Finally, an essay by the late Sam Westfall analyzes the background to the mathematization of nature in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, focusing on four technologies: water
management, military engineering, navigation,
and cartography. Westfall’s conclusion relates to
his interest in patronage and argues that the advances in seventeenth-century mathematics are
“perhaps partly” due to a “greater demand for
mathematical expertise than any previous society ever had” (p. 336). His article is accompanied by an eloge by Cohen.
I very much hope that a paperback edition will
make this important volume available to a wider
audience.
DOMENICO BERTOLONI MELI
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Giancarlo Nonnoi. Saggi Galileiani: Atomi, immagini e ideologia. (Collana Agorà, 11.) 238
pp., illus., index. Cagliari, Italy: AM&D Edizioni, 2000.
In 1635 a Latin translation was published of Galileo’s Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems (1632), which had occasioned his condemnation by the Inquisition in 1633. The Latin
translation bore the title Systema Cosmicum. It
had been organized by Elia Diodati (1576–
1661), a Protestant of Italian origin born in Geneva and living in Paris, where he was a Parliament lawyer. Diodati, a confidante of Galileo,
had gone into action after receiving a letter that
may be regarded as Galileo’s intellectual testament, written the same day (15 January 1633)
his legal testament was registered and he decided
to journey from Florence to Rome to stand trial.
Galileo’s letter stated that “from reliable sources
I hear the Jesuit Fathers have managed to convince some very important persons that my book
is execrable and more harmful to the Holy
Church than the writings of Luther and Calvin.”
The translator was Mathias Bernegger (1582–
1640), the Austrian-born Protestant rector of the
University of Strasbourg, who taught history and
political science but had a background in mathematics. The publisher was the influential Dutch
firm of the Elseviers, based in Leiden but with
branches in several cities. The place of publication was Strasbourg, which at that time was (as
it had been for centuries) a free city within the
Holy Roman Empire. The book had two appendixes: a five-page selection from Kepler’s introduction to his Astronomia Nova (1609), arguing
that Scripture carries no weight in natural philosophy; and a Latin translation of Paolo Foscarini’s 1615 booklet (30 pages) that had been
condemned and banned by the Decree of the Index of 5 March 1616 for arguing that the earth’s
motion is compatible with Scripture. The book’s
frontispiece reproduced the one from the original
edition—that of Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Copernicus engaged in conversation—but with the figure of Copernicus looking much younger than
the original. And the title page carried two epigraphs: a Greek quotation from the Platonist philosopher Alcinous meaning “One must be mentally free if one wants to become a philosopher”
and a Latin quotation from Seneca meaning “It
is especially among philosophers that one must
have equal liberty.”
A year later (1636), there appeared also in
Strasbourg with the Elseviers and edited by Bernegger the first publication ever of Galileo’s
“Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina,” which

he had written in 1615. It had both the Italian
text and a Latin translation by Diodati and bore
the revealing title Nov-antiqua Sanctissimorum
Patrum et Probatorum Theologorum Doctrina
de Sacrae Scripturae Testimoniis, in Conclusionibuis mere Naturalibus, Quae Sensata Experientia et Necessariis Demonstrationibus Evinci Possunt. It had a preface in which Diodati praised
Galileo’s astronomical accomplishments, blamed
his trial on jealous rivals, and justified the depth
and purity of his piety and religiousness. Diodati
used the pseudonym Robertus Robertinus, which
corresponded to the name of a Prussian poet
named Robert Roberthin (1600–1648).
These are some of the factual details in Nonnoi’s book. Other chapters deal, in a similar vein,
with the ambiguities of Galileo’s atomism; with
icons, models, and symbols in Galileo’s Copernican propaganda; and with the image of Galileo
in the astronomical writings of John Wilkins
(1614–1672).
Such details are fascinating and important for
understanding Galileo’s work and its aftermath,
and so Nonnoi’s book is useful for contributing
such necessary spadework—in particular, the
bibliographical documentation is especially
valuable and the analysis of the pictures found
in the works discussed shows considerable originality. Regrettably, Nonnoi does not integrate
such details into an overarching thesis that might
elaborate their significance; thus, the work of assimilating them remains to be done.
MAURICE A. FINOCCHIARO
Dennis Des Chene. Spirits and Clocks: Machine
and Organism in Descartes. xvi Ⳮ 181 pp., illus., bibl., index. Ithaca, N.Y./London: Cornell
University Press, 2001.
Spirits and Clocks is the third in a series of magnificent books in which Dennis Des Chene explores the relationship between late Scholastic
(particularly Jesuit) philosophy and Cartesian
thought. The other two books are Physiologia:
Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and
Cartesian Thought (Cornell University Press,
1996) and Life’s Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul (Cornell University Press,
2000). Together, these three books situate Descartes’s thinking in one important aspect of the
intellectual context within which it developed.
The result is a superbly nuanced study of a
thinker whose brilliance has often dazzled his
modern commentators so much that they have
forgotten he was addressing a philosophical tradition out of which many of his own concepts
and arguments derived.
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In the present book Des Chene considers Descartes’s physiological ideas, as presented in
Traité de l’homme. He argues that Descartes’s
“rejection of the vegetative and sensitive souls
invented by his predecessors was no less momentous for the science of life than the rejection
of forms, powers, and ends was for physics. It
was of a piece with his program in physics, executed with the same motives and resting on the
same principles” (p. xi). Spirits and Clocks is a
careful, historically informed conceptual analysis of Descartes’s notorious doctrine of the bête
machine. Considering this idea in context highlights both the traditional and innovative features
of Descartes’s physiological thought. This book
makes a significant contribution to the historiography of early modern natural philosophy by
demonstrating both the continuities and discontinuities between the mechanical philosophy and
Aristotelian natural philosophy.
In the individual chapters Des Chene examines a few detailed examples of physiological
questions that he considers particularly significant. These include the explanation of self-motion, where machines come from, and the role of
functional and teleological ideas in Descartes’s
physiology. Other important topics include sensation and perception, intentionality, and the
unity of the body. In examining each of these
issues, Des Chene first describes the explanations favored by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Scholastic philosophers. He then provides a
detailed analysis of Descartes’s position and
shows the precise differences and similarities between Descartes’s thought and that of his contemporary Aristotelians. Both aspects of his discussion enrich our historical understanding. Des
Chene is one of only a handful of scholars who
have given serious attention to late Aristotelian
natural philosophy in recent years, and his account in Spirits and Clocks is both informative
and useful. Similarly, Traité de l’homme has received less scholarly attention than the Discourse on Method and the Meditations, so the
present study is a welcome addition to the literature.
Des Chene deploys an impressive array of
scholarly skills and knowledge of Descartes’s intellectual context as well as analytic precision.
The result is an important and original reading
of an aspect of Cartesianism that has not received as much attention as Descartes’s physics,
metaphysics, and epistemology. This book not
only illuminates Descartes’s theories but also
delineates the conceptual commitments of the
mechanical philosophy and the details of its differences from the late Scholasticism that it re-
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placed. It serves as an excellent model for a
contextualized history of early modern natural
philosophy.
MARGARET J. OSLER
Antonio Clericuzio. Elements, Principles, and
Corpuscles: A Study of Atomism and Chemistry
in the Seventeenth Century. (International Archives of the History of Ideas, 171.) xii Ⳮ 223
pp., index. Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 2000. $89.
This book addresses two related generalizations
that persist in the history of seventeenth-century
chemistry, both of which are crucial to the canonical narrative of the scientific revolution. The
first is that the experimental program of Robert
Boyle led him to abandon the Aristotelian and
Paracelsian chemical theories of his predecessors
and adopt a reductionist, materialist matter theory from the French mechanical philosophers
Pierre Gassendi and René Descartes, forever
changing the nature of chemical theory and paving the way for the modernization of chemistry
during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The second is that the theories of Gassendi
and Descartes were unequivocally “mechanical”
and reflect the reemergence and supervention of
classical atomism over alchemical and vitalist
ontologies. Both of these generalizations have
been successfully challenged in the past fifteen
years. The present book collects and explicates
these findings, while focusing on Robert Boyle
and the legacy of his matter theory for late seventeenth-century European chemistry. In the
end, Antonio Clericuzio shows that Cartesian
mechanical philosophy did not have a decisive
impact on the matter theory of the chemists who
held onto chemical principles and qualities even
as they adopted various forms of Boyle’s corpuscular hypothesis.
In an able historiographical overview, Clericuzio shows how Boyle was thrust into the mainstream of revolutionary science by Thomas
Kuhn, Marie Boas, and A. R. Hall, who depended on an eighteenth-century construction of
Boyle that suited the needs of the experimentalism and materialism of Enlightenment science
but hardly reflected the thinking of Boyle and
his contemporaries, as is evident in the texts
cited here. In fact, Boyle did not rigorously apply
mechanical philosophy to his chemistry and
medicine, as he did to his physics, and he fashioned his corpuscularist matter theory from the
active seminal principles of the Paracelsians and
Helmontians as well as the atoms of Epicurean
theory and the minima naturalia of medieval Ar-
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istotelian alchemy. William Newman and Lawrence Principe have recently argued the importance of the medieval alchemists’ materialism
for seventeenth-century chemistry, and Newman
has credited J. B. Van Helmont and Daniel Sennert with forging medieval corpuscular minima
into the corpuscles adopted by Boyle, but here
Clericuzio argues that corpuscles were hardly
evident in sixteenth-century alchemy, that Van
Helmont’s theory was not truly corpuscular, and
that Sennert’s corpuscles still possessed Aristotelian forms. This matter awaits resolution.
One of the strengths of this book is Clericuzio’s treatment of the pre-Boylean developments
within chemical theory, documenting that corpuscularism did not emerge from the classical
atomism of the French mechanists but evolved
from various considerations of alchemical and
Paracelsian theory, combined with Aristotelian
natural philosophy. In the first place, the idea of
semina, which Boyle explained as corpuscles endowed with generative power and specific developmental programming, was clearly present
in chemical philosophy from Paracelsus and Petrus Severinus to Van Helmont, whose influence
on Boyle and his contemporaries is now well
established. Moreover, a materialized version of
semina already existed in the medical theory of
Girolamo Fracastoro, who adapted the idea from
Lucretius. As well, semina were being corpuscularized and materialized in the early part of the
century, as reflected in treatises by Nicholas Hill.
One cannot expect a book of such wide-ranging scholarship to reflect all of the recent literature in the field, but the author’s failure to engage
Barbara Beigun Kaplan’s study of Boyle (Divulging of Useful Truths in Physick: The Medical
Agenda of Robert Boyle [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1993]) is unfortunate, both because her work speaks directly to the perspectives on Boyle that are treated here and because
points on which their accounts differ need clarification. In sum, Clericuzio’s book presents a
much-needed rectification of the entrenched Enlightenment view of Boyle and the development
of corpuscular chemistry but is not the last word
on Boyle’s relationship to his predecessors’
ideas on matter.
JOLE SHACKELFORD
Zakiya Hanafi. The Monster in the Machine:
Magic, Medicine, and the Marvelous in the Time
of the Scientific Revolution. xiv Ⳮ 272 pp., illus.,
bibl., index. Durham, N.C./London: Duke University Press, 2000. $59.95 (cloth); $20.95 (paper).

This book poses an interesting and important
question: What happens to the “sacred” version
of the monstrous in the “secularized” world of
the Scientific Revolution? The “monster” of the
title is defined as “what we are not,” and its conceptualization is explored in the context of late
sixteenth-century to mid-eighteenth-century Italy. Aware that, previous to the period she discusses, the monster was not wholly “sacred,” Zakiya Hanafi first delineates three well-known
traditions of monsters: those of natural philosophy (the monster as fact of nature), divination
(the monster as prodigy), and wonders of nature
(the monster as curiosity or miracle). New attitudes toward the monstrous that Hanafi calls the
descriptive mode and the manipulative mode are
said to emerge from the mid-sixteenth century
(Ch. 2). Her discussion of the emergence of the
former mode is related to the story of a dissection
and description of a double-bodied infant in the
private garden of the Rucellai family of Florence
in 1556. The manipulative mode is demonstrated
with regard to the production of living monsters
(by crossbreeding, for example) proposed by
Giambattista Della Porta in the second book of
his Magia naturalis (1589).
Hanafi’s third chapter presents the central hypothesis on which the rest of the book will turn:
that the monster and the fear and horror associated with it migrated from the sacred (portentous
monstrous births, demons, etc.) into the machine. She presents the intriguing idea that one
of the continuities of the construction of monstrosities in Western culture is “that which is inanimate yet moves of its own accord” (p. 54).
But references to “the machine” and the “Scientific Revolution” in the title of the book are
rather misleading, for her examples are drawn
from the narrower realm of automatons and organically produced hybrids, speaking statues,
and distorting mirrors. She does not deal with
the question of whether these mechanical and
artificially produced monsters necessarily signified a general belief that the machine itself was
monstrous.
Following her assumption that machine-like
and monstrous are synonymous in this period,
the fourth chapter argues that the consequence
of a machine-like interpretation of the human
body was its inhabitation by the monstrous as
well. Deviations from the proper shapes and ratios in body parts—once a primary characteristic
of the monstrous races—is now a revelation of
bestiality and monstrosity in all human beings,
according to Della Porta and other writers on
physiognomy. Pursuing the medical theme,
Chapter 5 explores monstrosity in the body and
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the body politic through an examination of the
physiological theories of Giambattista Vico. The
final chapter shifts the focus onto monstrous language, examining debates on the proper use of
literary figures.
Throughout this book Hanafi adopts a methodological principle of “seeing the connections”
rather than “making explanations” (p. x) that diffuses the scholarly value of her insights and interesting examples by presenting the material
simply as metaphors to meditate on the postmodern condition. Many of the sources brought
together in individual chapters (and, indeed, the
chapters themselves) seem incompletely related
to each other, particularly in the absence of generalizing explanations and a discussion of what
is meant by such key terms as “secular,” “sacred,”
and “the machine.” Tenuously linked sources are
thus placed in unilluminating (because unexplored) relationships, such as the odd conjunction
of Marsilio Ficino’s description of talisman making with Della Porta’s of animal crossbreeding,
and peculiar omissions occur, for instance, the absence of any consideration of the golem tradition.
In short, this book might itself be said to possess
the jumbled limbs and motley order of its monstrous subject matter, which unfortunately mitigates against its interest for the specialist and its
usefulness for the general reader.
SOPHIE PAGE
Georgius Everhardus Rumphius. The Ambonese Curiosity Cabinet. Edited, translated, and
annotated by E. M. Beekman. cxii Ⳮ 567 pp.,
frontis., illus., figs., bibl., index. New Haven,
Conn./London: Yale University Press, 1999. $45.
The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) was one
of the most aggressive and successful trading enterprises in the seventeenth-century world. In the
Indian Ocean it elbowed the Portuguese out of
major ports, dominated the lucrative spice trade,
and ruthlessly punished the natives if they refused to cooperate. Like the English East India
Company, which would soon become a fierce
rival, the VOC was a formidable commercial,
military, and imperial complex in the expanding
maritime world. In recent years historians of science have begun to examine how this growing
maritime trade in the early modern period contributed to the development of natural history.
Specimens and observations brought back from
the tropics and other exotic lands had an enormous impact on the European understanding of
the natural world. Scientific voyages and explorations were relatively few before the middle of
the eighteenth century. It was the network of
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maritime trade that supplied most of the scientific data about the rest of the world. More than
anyone else, employees of the Dutch and English
maritime enterprises collected the specimens and
observations that fed the scientific communities
in their home countries. Many of these largely
forgotten individuals were accomplished naturalists whose experience and knowledge earned
them respect among the scientific elite in Europe.
The activities of Georgius Rumphius nicely
illustrate the conjunction of science and maritime trade. After a peripatetic military career,
Rumphius joined the VOC and in 1652 sailed
to the Dutch East Indies, where he would spend
the rest of his life. He didn’t go to the East with
the purpose of investigating natural history,
but the strange creatures in this exotic land
caught his attention, and he began studying natural history, collecting specimens, and writing
about them. It was a labor of love. Not even
blindness could stop his research; in fact, he produced most of his voluminous writings on the
natural history of Ambon, or Amboina, a small
island northeast of Java, after he lost his eyesight. But it would be an oversimplification to
see Rumphius as a lonesome genius marooned
in a remote island struggling to produce brilliant
work that only posterity would come to appreciate. In the Dutch East Indies during this period,
several employees of the VOC were dedicated
naturalists, including the noted Hendrik van
Reede, and they exchanged ideas and information with him. Rumphius also maintained an active correspondence with the scientific establishment in Europe and was elected to a prestigious
scientific academy.
Rumphius’s major work was an illustrated
herbal that described about 1,200 plants found
in Ambon and the nearby areas. The Ambonese
Curiosity Cabinet, however, focuses not on
plants but on crustaceans, shells, minerals, and
other items that are grouped into three categories: “Soft Shellfish,” “Hard Shellfish,” and
“Minerals, Stones, and Other Rare Things.”
Each of the volume’s 170 chapters examines one
or more natural objects, often with accompanying illustrations. The descriptions are usually
vivid and convey a sense of wonder at exotic
natural objects. The text also contains rich ethnographic records of the maritime world of
Southeast Asia. Rumphius drew heavily on the
indigenous lore of the natural world and frequently cited information collected from Chinese traders and immigrants. Combing through
the text, one comes across many telling examples of how a seventeenth-century naturalist pursued research in the social and cultural environ-
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ment of a colonial entrepot. The translator, a
distinguished scholar of Dutch colonial literature, has added a long introduction detailing
Rumphius’s life and work. The text itself is amply annotated.
FA-TI FAN
Barbara M. Benedict. Curiosity: A Cultural
History of Early Modern Inquiry. x Ⳮ 321 pp.,
frontis., illus., index. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2001. $45.
In recent years historians of science have come
to an increasing appreciation of the role played
by such moral and affective categories as “trust,”
“wonder,” “pedantry,” and “self-discipline” in
the knowledge-making enterprises of the early
modern period. Barbara Benedict’s book on curiosity is a most welcome contribution to the literature devoted to such topics. In a lively and
entertaining work, Benedict sets out to “analyse
literary representations of the way curious people, including scientists, authors, performers,

and readers, were engaged in practicing and producing curiosity itself ” (p. 1). The author modestly states at the outset that the work is not, and
does not claim to be, a history of science, and
indeed as a whole the essay perhaps falls short
of the more ambitious promise of the subtitle—
“a cultural history of early modern inquiry.” Yet
it deals with a subject that is nonetheless of profound importance for historians of seventeenthand eighteenth-century science.
Of particular significance is the way in which
the book demonstrates how curiosity and its representations served to demarcate the boundaries
of legitimate topics of knowledge and modes of
enquiry. The discourse about curiosity thus
served to inform central epistemological questions of the period: Is it appropriate to seek all
knowledge on all topics, and is it to be sought
by all people? If there are areas of knowledge
that are illicit, what are they and why are they
proscribed? What are the proper methods for the
various spheres of knowledge? Benedict carefully articulates the role played by the discourse

“The Bottle Conjuror” (from Benedict, Curiosity, p. 165).
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of curiosity in the sanctioning of some projects
and the censuring of others. To take one of the
many telling examples found in the book, the
protagonist of Thomas Shadwell’s Virtuoso
(1676) is presented as epitomizing the curious impulse, here manifested as a puzzlingly earnest
quest for useless knowledge and a strange fascination with base and undignified natural objects.
The odd proclivities of this character demonstrate
in a forceful way how the new natural philosophy
could be regarded as merely an outlet for the intellectual vice of curiosity—and how far the new
knowledge-making enterprises fell short of social
approval amongst those whose approbation
mattered most. The familiar seventeenth-century
rhetoric of the “usefulness of natural philosophy” was thus in part a response to accusations
of curiosity leveled against experimental philosophers. Benedict observes that “early modern literary culture struggled to mold curiosity into
forms that would preserve public values” (p. 68).
Apologists for the scientific activities of the
Royal Society, in keeping with this goal, sought
to depict the quest for natural knowledge as a
legitimate expression of a curiosity that had been
appropriately disciplined and directed in ways
that would contribute to the common good.
The book also traces the varying fortunes of
curiosity, nicely delineating the reciprocal relations between subjective and objective, between
the curious sensibility and curiosities, between
wonder and wonders. At times it might have
been helpful for the author to have transgressed
the self-imposed limitation of examining literary
representations and to have considered some formal accounts of curiosity as they occur in contemporary works of moral psychology in which
this human propensity is carefully described and
precisely located among the other affections.
Without more direct information about the contemporary taxonomy of the affections curiosity
too easily shades into wonder, credulity, greed,
avarice, and acquisitiveness. In short, the relations of curiosity with its neighboring affections—the subtle transformations of which constituted an integral part of the changing status of
curiosity—could perhaps have been more finely
drawn. This, however, is a minor issue. Benedict
has written a good book on an important topic,
not least for historians of science because it
clearly shows how the eventual establishment of
the social respectability of curious individuals
and objects was an essential phase in the legitimation of natural history and natural philosophy.
PETER HARRISON
Claire Richter Sherman. Writing on Hands:
Memory and Knowledge in Early Modern Eu-
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rope. Edited by Claire Richter Sherman and
Peter M. Lukehart. With contributions by
Brian P. Copenhaver, Martin Kemp, Sachiko
Kusukawa, and Susan Forscher Weiss. 278
pp., illus., bibl., indexes. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2001. $35 (paper).
This book is an expanded catalogue of an exhibit
of mid-fifteenth- through seventeenth-century
drawings, woodcuts, engravings, and etchings
emphasizing hands as objects of study, as teaching tools, and as reflections of the human being.
In addition, it contains an extended introduction
by the curator of the exhibit, Claire Richter Sherman, and four essays by other contributors on
pertinent topics: the hand as an instrument of the
intellect, manual reckoning, music, and chiromancy (palmistry). These essays, which precede
the catalogue itself, are only loosely connected
to the exhibit, but each deals with its subject
clearly and crisply.
In his composition on the hand as a means of
expression, Martin Kemp traces the legacy of ancient thought as reflected in the various anatomical drawings from Leonardo through the detailed Bidloo prints. Kemp concludes that the
hand remains “a prime mechanism for personal
expression—for the manifestation of individual
character and identity.” In the following essay
Sachiko Kusukawa provides a succinct sketch of
finger numeration, noting that a system alluded
to by ancient authors was fully described by the
Venerable Bede in the eighth century. Bede also
wrote of a method of using the hand as a mnemonic aid in determining the proper date for Easter and other movable feasts. Finger counting remained popular throughout the Middle Ages but
gradually fell into disuse in the West by the sixteenth century and was merely quaint by the
eighteenth. Kusukawa does not, unfortunately,
suggest a reason for the decline, but the spread
of computation with Arabic numerals was surely
a major factor.
Next, Susan Forscher Weiss discusses the use
of the hand in teaching music theory and scales.
Although there are some indications of this practice in antiquity, variations on a system developed in the eleventh century by Guido of Arezzo
were used to teach music through the sixteenth
century. Finally, Brain P. Copenhaver discusses
the history of the pseudoscience chiromancy
(palmistry). Already in existence in antiquity,
palmistry, and other forms of divination, flourished despite the prohibitions of the church. Copenhaver concludes with a witty discussion of
the hard times on which palmistry has fallen recently in California.

122

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 93 : 1 (2002)

As for the catalogue, it consists of eighty-three
monochrome illustrations, each with an extensive commentary about the artist, the subject,
and the reason the item was included in the exhibit. These descriptions are frequently fascinating short essays in themselves, enticing the
reader to investigate further. The organization is
thematic rather than chronological, with six divisions (which do not directly correspond to the
preceding essays): “Reading the Writing on
Hands,” “Handiwork of the Creator,” “Messengers of the World,” “Knowledge on Hand,”
“Whole World in the Hand,” and “Guiding
Hands.” The faults are minor. Although the
themes of the divisions themselves are clearly
described in Sherman’s introduction, several of
the illustrations seem to have only a general association with the stated theme. A few are filled
with details too small to be legible in the necessary reduction of plates to fit the book. Most
of the illustrations, however, are excellent examples of the main subject of the exhibit and are
fascinating studies in their own right.
Generally, this volume is a valuable work for
anyone interested in the history of the hand in
science and the arts. The four prefatory essays
are particularly instructive, and the prints are reproduced clearly, with elaborate descriptions of
their historical context and their meaning. Accordingly, this book is much more than merely
a catalogue; it is an important work in its own
right. Throughout, the substantial references to
other works indicate directions for further study.
One only regrets that the exhibit itself was
shown in only two venues.
RICHARD S. WILLIAMS

Francisco Hernández. The Mexican Treasury:
The Writings of Dr. Francisco Hernández. Edited by Simon Varey. Translated by Rafael
Chabrán, Cynthia L. Chamberlain, and
Simon Varey. xxii Ⳮ 281 pp., frontis., illus.,
index. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 2000. $65.
Simon Varey; Rafael Chabrán; Dora B. Weiner (Editors). Searching for the Secrets of Nature: The Life and Works of Dr. Francisco Hernández. xviii Ⳮ 229 pp., frontis., illus., index.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
2000. $60.
Mauricio Nieto Olarte. Remedios para el imperio: Historia natural y la apropriación del
Nuevo Mondo. 280 pp., illus. Bogotá: Instituto
Colombiano de Antropologı́a e Historia, 2000.

History and historians have not been kind to
Francisco Hernández. Hernández was a sixteenth-century physician steeped in classical
learning whom Philip II sent to the New World
to study new exotic plants for the royal pharmacy. A typical humanist who befriended such
luminaries as Benito Arias Montano and Francisco Valles, Hernández went well beyond Philip
II’s request and put together a mammoth natural
history of New Spain that took seven years (from
1570 to 1577) to complete and included descriptions of some 3,000 new species of plants (compared to some 350 inventoried by Theophrastus,
500 by Dioscorides, and 600 by Islamic botanists). The financially strapped Philip II ordered
the court physician Nardo Antonio Recchi to
come up with a synthesis of Hernández’s elevenvolume illustrated natural history. The Academy
of Lincei published Recchi’s shortened version
in Rome some seventy years later, with glosses
and commentaries. To make things worse, in
1671 Hernández’s eleven volumes burned up in
a great fire at the library of El Escorial. Fortunately, however, many copies of Hernández’s
manuscript had long been circulating in Mexico,
Spain, Holland, and Britain, and they surfaced
periodically, particularly in works by Gregorio
López (ca. 1583/publ. 1678), Juan Barrios
(1607), Francisco Ximénez (1615), Johannes de
Laet (1625, 1630, 1633), Georg Margraf (1648),
Juan Eusebio Nieremberg (1635), Robert Lovell
(1659), Henry Stubbe (1662), Hans Sloane
(1707–1725), James Newton (1752), and James
Petiver (1715). This maddening history of Hernández’s manuscripts has not been well understood, nor has the scholarship on his life and
works been historically sensitive. Hailed from
the eighteenth-century onward as the epitome of
modernity in Spain and Mexico, a model for local scientists to emulate, Hernández has systematically been read out of context.
This situation has, fortunately, begun to
change. Thanks to the patient work of scholars
such as José M. López Piñero, José Pardo Tomás, Rafael Chabrán, Simon Varey, and Jesús
Bustamente, we are now beginning to understand
the complex history of the dissemination (and survival) of Hernández’s manuscripts in Europe and
the New World and the humanist culture in Spain
that made his work possible. The two handsome
volumes published by Stanford go a long way toward making this new scholarship available to
English-speaking audiences.
The Mexican Treasury offers readers a
thoughtful selection of some of Hernández’s
writings. It includes pieces drawn from his extant manuscripts as well as selections from several of the authors who in the course of the sev-
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enteenth and eighteenth centuries copied his
writings. Although the selection privileges Hernández’s natural history, it also includes a translation of his correspondence with Philip II and
Arias Montano, his will, his Christian Doctrine
(a pedagogical poem he wrote while in Mexico
summarizing the tenets of Catholic theology),
and excerpts from his treatise on Mexican antiquities. Although these selections clearly encourage contextual readings of his work, they do not
go far enough. We know, for example, that Hernández translated and glossed Aristotle, Pliny
the Elder, and Pseudo-Dionysus. He also wrote
essays on Stoic philosophy. Samples of these
writings should have been included as well.
The accompanying volume, Searching for the
Secrets of Nature, seeks to put Hernández in his
appropriate historical context. Several essays in
this collection are particularly insightful. Peter
O’Malley Pierson presents Philip II not as an
obscurantist monarch but as a patron of natural
philosophers whose generosity was always limited by a bankrupt treasury. Rafael Chabrán locates Hernández in the philological and experimental traditions of Spanish humanism that
thrived at the Universities of Alcalá de Henares
and Valencia. Hernández found in Nahuatl etymologies and taxonomies an alternative to the
botanical classifications of Dioscorides. He also
sought to confirm the medical virtues of plants
through clinical trials. Guenter B. Risse offers
an enlightening study of sixteenth-century Mexican hospitals, where local shamans introduced
Hernández to Nahua botanical knowledge and
where Hernández carried out his clinical research. Essays by Lopez Piñero and Pardo Tomás and by Chabrán and Varey painstakingly
reconstruct the history of the dissemination of
Hernández’s manuscripts in Mexico, Spain, Britain, and the Netherlands. Finally, Jaime Vilchis
highlights the importance of understanding Hernández’s Neoplatonic and Stoic writings to comprehend why he went to Mexico in the first place.
Although Hernández still remains a poorly understood figure, these two volumes help dissipate
the fog enveloping his life and work.
The publications on Hernández are a trickle
when compared to the numerous new studies on
eighteenth-century Spanish botanical expeditions. Mauricio Nieto Olarte’s Remedios para el
imperio is one example of this new literature.
Building on the scholarship of Francisco Puerto
Sarmiento, Nieto Olarte describes the control exercised by the guild of apothecaries of Madrid
over the largest expeditions in eighteenth-century Spanish America, namely, those that went
to Mexico, Colombia, and Peru. Unlike the
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Swedes, who, as Lisbet Koerner has persuasively
shown, sought economic autarchy through a plan
spearheaded by Linnaeus and his disciples of import substitution, Spaniards sought to break
Dutch and British monopolies of valuable medicinal plants and to keep their own (e.g., the
cinchona tree). Drawing on the insights of Bruno
Latour, Nieto Olarte also seeks to show how naturalists and apothecaries, using the visual techniques encouraged by the new Linnaean taxonomy, colonized the pharmaceutical knowledge
of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, transferring it to their metropolitan headquarters. Creole naturalists of the national period blindly followed the same colonialist strategies of their
Spanish predecessors. Nieto Olarte’s book, then,
is welcome as a good synthesis of recent scholarship on Spanish botanical research in the New
World during the Enlightenment.
JORGE CAÑIZARES-ESGUERRA
Molly McClain. Beaufort: The Duke and His
Duchess, 1657–1715. xviii Ⳮ 262 pp., illus.,
bibl., index. New Haven, Conn./London: Yale
University Press, 2001. $35.
In a study based on archival research and imaginative reconstruction, Molly McClain tries to
prove that the political and personal activities of
Henry Somerset, third marquis of Worcester and
first duke of Beaufort (1629–1700), and his
wife, Mary Capel Somerset (1630–1715), demonstrate the transformation of the aristocracy in
the Restoration period. Her work seems to embrace the thesis of Theodore K. Rabb in The
Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe
(Oxford, 1975) about the “crisis of the seventeenth century” and its resolution in confidence
and stability later in the century, but in this case,
as in many others, McClain fails to present the
evidence and analysis necessary for such an assertion.
According to McClain, the duke of Beaufort
became a rationalist in his pursuit of certainty,
while the duchess turned to empiricism (and religion) for her peace of mind. The Copernican
landscape of their estate at Badminton in Gloucestershire was the expression of Beaufort’s
quest to order the world. His wife collected a
vast number of plants and seeds, housed in a
greenhouse at Badminton, and patronized some
of the most important naturalists and botanists
of her age, including Sir Henry Sloane. With
their help, she assembled a twelve-volume herbarium, which was used by John Ray in his botanic taxonomy.
Mary Somerset, who suffered from periodic
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bouts of depression, found in plants the expression of God’s providence and, according to
McClain, was led through contemplation of the
physical world to the experience of God’s grace.
Unfortunately, rather than linking this argument
with the many modern works that have sought
to understand the relationship of science and religion in the late seventeenth century, McClain
uses Scripture and unsupported speculation to
bolster her argument.
If McClain had developed these themes, contextualized them, supported them with more evidence, and enhanced them with reference to the
secondary literature, this book might have
proved of interest to historians of science. Instead, it is largely devoted to detailed political
and local history. Her discussion is historiographically anachronistic, echoing an earlier
generation of scholars who rarely considered social and cultural questions.
A large part of the problem with the book is its
meager footnote citations and an extremely limited bibliography. One can only hope that this is
an expression of the writer’s lack of experience
rather than a dictate of Yale University Press. If
the book was intended for a popular audience,
these omissions would be understandable; but
presumably that is not the expected constituency.
Or perhaps it is. McClain has a curious tendency to introduce the rhetoric of romance novels into her discussion. What are we to make of
statements like the following: “Their marriage
was held together by a strong sexual passion
which their letters hint at, but never reveal. We
can only imagine what it must have been like for
them to spend their nights in a dark bedchamber
hung with tapestries and warmed only by a fire”
(p. 27)? Probably most historians would not like
to dwell on this question, and they would be better off avoiding the duke and duchess of Beaufort, and their expositor, entirely.
LISA T. SARASOHN
Peter N. Miller. Peiresc’s Europe: Learning
and Virtue in the Seventeenth Century. xv Ⳮ 234
pp., frontis., illus., fig., index. New Haven, Conn./
London: Yale University Press, 2000. $40.
In his 1641 biography of Nicolaus-Claude Fabri
de Peiresc (1580–1637), Pierre Gassendi declared that all learned men acknowledged that
the most noble Peiresc “had seized the glory of
kings” (The Mirrour of True Nobility: Being the
Life of the Renowned Nicolaus Claudius Fabricius Lord of Peiresc, trans. W. Rand [Humphrey
Moseley, 1657]). For Gassendi and his circle
of savants, Peiresc, in his public life a member

of the Parlement of Provence, was the pattern of
beneficence and learning, heroic in his virtue, his
magnificent mind, and his care for scholars and
scholarship. Peter N. Miller, in his profound and
riveting study of what might be called the Peirescian moment of European intellectual life,
asks why this grand figure, the hero of his age,
was subsequently almost entirely forgotten—or
at best considered the model pedant.
Peiresc was an antiquarian who investigated
the physical remains of the past with delight and
perspicacity. He felt that the past offered lessons
to the present and that the constitution of the
contemporary state could not be understood
without a comparative and comprehensive survey of former times and places. Through a farflung network of correspondents and friends Peiresc collected his observations, although most of
his resulting work remained unpublished. Peiresc, Miller observes, was engaged not only in a
prodigious intellectual feat but in a moral discipline teaching “the virtues of constancy, conversation, friendship and beneficence” (p. 11).
Among Peiresc’s friends were Galileo, Hugo
Grotius, Peter Paul Rubens, Marin Mersenne,
Italian humanists, Catholic prelates, Protestants,
and Jews. He subscribed, according to Miller, to
an irenic religiosity in which reason revealed basic religious truths that could be accommodated
to all other belief systems. Miller credits neoStoicism as the animating force behind this religious minimalism that flourished briefly in the
middle of the sectarian excesses of the Wars of
Religion. Broadly speaking, Stoicism taught and
confirmed the virtues of constancy, duty, generosity, and friendship and provided the moral
economy for a learned and tolerant civil society.
Miller uses Peiresc as a touchstone for his
time but also as the point of departure for discussing the thought of others, both before and
after Peiresc, who held similar beliefs and pursued similar interests. It is only here that Miller’s
analysis falters. Disembodied minds require
some social context, and Miller’s traditional intellectual history does not provide enough.
This limited approach is particularly true of
his analysis of friendship, gratitude, and ingratitude—terms with important seventeenth-century social meanings as well as Stoic connotations. Peiresc was not simply a disinterested
Maecenas of learning; he was also the center of
a patronage network bringing him honor and
power within the intellectual community.
Neo-Stoicism as a category also needs to be
problematized, a fact Miller acknowledges in his
footnotes but rarely addresses in the text. Other
ancient traditions informed the thought of the
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early seventeenth century, most notably skepticism and Epicureanism—which was rehabilitated by Gassendi at the same time he wrote his
Life of Peiresc. The most recent historiography
of these movements is largely absent from
Miller’s study. Thus his analysis would have
benefited from a broader investigation of both
the social and the intellectual context of the Peirescian world.
Nevertheless, one can only be awed by Miller’s
vast if somewhat idiosyncratic erudition. His mastery of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
neo-Stoic sources is immense and his integration
of echoes of these themes into later centuries is
provocative. His conclusion that the polymath
Peiresc could seem only a pedant to Enlightenment figures who idolized the practitioners of the
New Science, or who valued the polite gentleman
over the learned scholar, is perhaps too sweeping.
Nonetheless, Miller shares the attributes of his
seventeenth-century subject: learning, curiosity,
and the ability to penetrate and befriend the minds
of those both past and present.
LISA T. SARASOHN
Paul Wood (Editor). The Scottish Enlightenment: Essays in Reinterpretation. (Rochester
Studies in Philosophy, 1.) xii Ⳮ 399 pp., illus.,
tables, index. Rochester, N.Y./Woodbridge, U.K.:
University of Rochester Press, 2000. $75.
Ten of the twelve essays in this fine collection
treat subjects that are relevant to any reasonably
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the
history of science. The first four essays are either
completely or largely historiographical. Each explores the extent to which the natural sciences
have been, or should be, seen as central to the
Scottish Enlightenment. As all four provide extended descriptive historiographies, there is extensive repetition here, but as the four also offer radically different answers, they are worth reading.
In the first essay Paul Wood argues that Dugald Stewart created an imaginary picture of the
Scottish Enlightenment that has influenced almost all subsequent interpretations of the movement. These interpretations have promoted the
idea that there was a coherent “Scottish school”
of philosophy of which David Hume and Francis
Hutcheson were the cofounders; that the Scottish
school emphasized moral philosophy and social
theory; and that it included figures from Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Aberdeen. Wood claims
that Stewart downplayed the relationship between natural knowledge and social theory, except for some minor methodological commonalities, for several reasons. In part, he desperately
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wanted to maintain the mind-body dualism that
characterized the Scottish school. In addition, his
main statement on the Scottish Enlightenment
appeared as an essay on the history of the progress of metaphysics and morals that was paired
with John Leslie’s essay on the progress of the
natural sciences in the supplement to the fourth
edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and he
was simply responding to the limits of his assignment. Regardless of his motives, one major
consequence of Stewart’s approach has been the
exclusion of the natural sciences from a central
role in most subsequent interpretations of the
Scottish Enlightenment not written by historians
of science—an exclusion Wood laments.
The second essay, by John Robertson, seems,
on one level, almost designed to prove Wood’s
main point, for it explicitly denies natural science a significant role. For Robertson, moral philosophy, history, and, above all, political economy are at the core of Scottish concerns. He
departs from Stewart, however, by insisting on
a fundamental opposition between Hume and
Hutcheson and by arguing that the Scottish Enlightenment would be better understood as part
of a broader European Enlightenment, with less
patriotic fervor about Scots exceptionalism.
Richard Sher’s essay on what book history can
tell us about science and medicine in the Scottish
Enlightenment is remarkably insightful and illuminating; it left me waiting with great anticipation for his book-length study on the subject.
Although Sher rejects Roger Emerson’s claims
that the natural sciences were the driving force
for the Enlightenment in Scotland, he insists that
science and medicine were important. He then
goes on to suggest a series of fascinating ways
in which characteristics of the book trade both
shaped and can illuminate the place of science.
Among the other essays likely to interest historians of science are those by Anita Guerrini,
John Wright, and Fiona MacDonald. These authors explore aspects of medical theory and
medical care in very different but very illuminating ways. (MacDonald’s empirical analysis of
admissions’ patient care at the Glasgow Town’s
Hospital Infirmary from 1733 to 1800 departs
most from the traditional history of ideas pattern
that dominates many of the other essays.)
One other related set of essays consists of
pieces by James Moore, Christopher Berry, and
Alexander Broadie, all of which focus on aspects
of the theorized relationship between science and
religion. Here, the major theme is the difference
in emphases between those who followed the ancient materialists in seeing fear as the primary
motive in the origins of religion and those who
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emphasized some version of the design argument.
This volume provides a good introduction to
the current state of interpretations of the Scottish
Enlightenment, and its special emphasis on the
place of science among eighteenth-century Scottish intellectuals should make it attractive to
many readers of Isis.
RICHARD OLSON
䡲 Modern (Nineteenth Century to 1950)
Charles W. Curtis. Pioneers of Representation
Theory: Frobenius, Burnside, Schur, and Brauer.
(History of Mathematics, 15.) xvi Ⳮ 287 pp., illus., apps., bibl., index. Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society, 1999. $49.
Charles W. Curtis is a prominent mathematician
who has made important contributions to the
field of representation theory. His textbooks in
this field (written in collaboration with the late
Irving Reiner, to whose memory the present
book is dedicated) have been classics for a long
time. In Pioneers of Representation Theory he
has set out to present the historical development
of the main ideas of the discipline, from the work
of Georg Ferdinand Frobenius in the 1890s up
to 1960. In addition to Frobenius, the book focuses mainly on three other “pioneers”: William
Burnside, Issai Schur, and Richard Brauer.
Curtis states that his interest in the history of
representation theory arose gradually, and jointly
with that of Reiner, in the process of writing their
textbooks. Thus, a main aim of the book is to
show how the pioneers reached their important
results while using only the mathematics then
available to them. In order to do so, Curtis presents successive and thorough accounts of the
works in which the new and seminal ideas of the
pioneers were introduced and then developed. At
the same time, however, he simplifies some of
the original arguments by translating them into
modern terminology.
In an attempt to make the book appealing and
accessible to a wider circle of potential readers,
some of the necessary mathematics is explained.
Thus Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the
basic ideas and problems of nineteenth-century
algebra and number theory; later on, as the need
arises, additional mathematical sections addressed to nonexperts are included. Of course,
even this very clear presentation will be accessible only to readers with at least a graduate-level
knowledge of algebra.
Curtis also attempts to provide some historical
context. He is particularly concerned to clarify the

main problems that the work of each of the mathematicians discussed here was originally meant to
resolve. In a book of this kind (i.e., a technically
detailed historical overview of a particular mathematical discipline) this is surely one of the major
benefits that the reader may expect to obtain.
There are biographical sketches of the major
figures involved, as well as additional information about other participants. Some illuminating
documents are quoted, and Curtis supplies brief
accounts of the mathematical traditions within
which each of the pioneers was educated and
worked. He acknowledges, however, that Pioneers of Representation Theory has only a limited claim as a work of historical research. He
thus provides references to more historically oriented work that interested readers can consult.
In particular, he mentions several articles by
Thomas Hawkins; it should be stressed that
much of Hawkins’s work has recently been published in book form: Emergence of the Theory
of Lie Groups: An Essay in the History of Mathematics, 1869–1926 (Springer, 2000). Curtis’s
and Hawkins’s books complement each other in
many important ways, and each should appeal to
readers of the other.
Charles Curtis has written an impressive, authoritative, and well-informed book on a difficult subject. Mathematicians and historians of
twentieth-century mathematics with the relevant background will find it difficult but rewarding reading. Along the way, historiographical questions may arise. To what extent is it
possible to translate, as Curtis does, the original
proofs of the pioneers into more modern terminology and yet remain faithful to the
sources? In most cases, however, it will require
the technical expertise of the author himself to
answer questions like this one properly. We can
only hope that the firm starting point this book
provides will lead Curtis to further historical
research in this and related fields.
LEO CORRY
William Rowan Hamilton. Mathematical Papers of Sir William Rowan Hamilton. Volume 4:
Geometry, Analysis, Astronomy, Probability and
Finite Differences, Miscellaneous. Edited by
Brendan Scaife. (Cunningham Memoir, 16.) x
Ⳮ 842 pp., frontis., figs., bibl., indexes. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press,
2000. $150.
William Rowan Hamilton was not a tidy mathematician. When he had to host a formal dinner
party at the observatory, it took him two days to
clean up the dining room, and he achieved that
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only by stuffing his papers into bags and baskets
and shoving them under the beds. He did try to
reform. He kept much of his mathematical work
in notebooks of all sizes, which he started from
both ends, writing on only the right-hand page
so that writing from the other direction appeared
upside down on the left page. But then he would
relapse and write on any blank spot that he could
find. In 1924 the Royal Irish Academy set out to
publish Hamilton’s mathematical papers in four
large volumes, which meant putting them into
some kind of order. The first volume, on optics,
appeared in 1931; the second, on mechanics, appeared in 1940; the third, on algebra, appeared
in 1967; and now, after seventy-five years, we
have the fourth and final volume, edited by Brendan Scaife. The academy is to be congratulated
on having completed the publication of its most
famous member’s mathematical works.
This latest volume consists mostly of previously published but hard to find papers, including a few miscellaneous items of biographical
interest, but it begins with three important unpublished manuscripts. The first item is Part
Third of Hamilton’s Theory of Systems of Rays.
Part First of the Systems of Rays, which he published in 1827 and which first revealed his mathematical genius, contained a table describing the
contents of all three parts, but the second two
parts never appeared. Instead Hamilton published three lengthy Supplements. John L.
Synge, one of the editors of the first volume of
the Mathematical Papers, published Part Second, but no one could find Part Third because
Hamilton never finished it to his satisfaction and
therefore left it stirred in among his great mass
of loose papers where it was difficult to identify.
It is on extraordinary systems, a subject that he
developed much further in his Third Supplement
(1832) where he predicted the phenomenon of
conical refraction in biaxial crystals.
The other two manuscripts are three very long
“letters,” two to Augustus De Morgan on definite
integrals and differential equations and one to
Andrew Hart on anharmonic coordinates. These
three letters written between 1858 and 1860, toward the end of Hamilton’s life, make up almost
four hundred pages of the printed text! At the
time he wrote these letters Hamilton was trying
to finish his Elements of Quaternions, which
kept expanding beyond his control and was causing him serious financial difficulty. His desperate
efforts to nail down his legacy caused him to
spin out page after page of heavy mathematical
calculation, much of which never came to a conclusion. The Elements of Quaternions was still
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incomplete at his death and was published posthumously in two volumes by his son.
The rest of Volume 4 of the Mathematical Papers consists of published articles on geometry,
analysis, astronomy, probability, and miscellaneous subjects. The volume closes with a chronological list of Hamilton’s works, an index to
this fourth volume, and a combined index to all
four volumes. Scaife has done a good job of editing. He identifies all persons mentioned and
adds helpful notes on the provenance of the manuscripts. He has not, however, attempted to repeat the long introductions and analytical appendixes that appear in the previous three volumes.
The reader will be on his or her own in what is
often a sea of mathematical confusion.
Probably of greatest interest to potential purchasers of this volume is a CD inside the back
cover that includes all four volumes, so by buying this one volume one has access to the entire
set. The CD is an omen of things to come. This
is probably one of the last efforts to publish the
collected works of an important mathematician
in a beautiful hardcover edition. It is a fitting
tribute to an extraordinary man and a great mathematician.
THOMAS L. HANKINS
Bruce Collier; James MacLachlan. Charles
Babbage and the Engines of Perfection. 123 pp.,
illus., figs., tables, apps., bibl., index. New York/
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. $11.95
(paper).
Oxford University Press proudly announces:
“Now, for the first time, Oxford offers the general public a series of readable accessible biographies of great scientists.” Included among the
chosen great men (and two women) is Charles
Babbage, described on the back cover of this
book as “a dazzling genius with vision extending
far beyond the limitations of the Victorian age.”
Well, I’m not quite sure what this means, and
unfortunately our understanding of Babbage and
his historical context is not greatly illuminated
by this short book.
Bruce Collier and James MacLachlan have
produced an uncritical biography of Babbage
that glorifies him as “the Grandfather of the
modern computer” rather than shedding new
light on his work within the context of nineteenth-century England. Partly, no doubt, this is
due to the remit of this Oxford series and its
targeted audience. It is good that history of science and technology is being taken to a wider
audience, but unfortunately very little is made of
the work many historians have already done. The
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book, however, does do a useful and lucid job
of describing the aims and workings of both the
Difference and Analytical Engines, and it has
helpful sidebars describing some of the technical
aspects necessary to understanding Babbage’s
objectives and resources.
Overall, however, historians may find the eulogizing and whiggish approach of this book a
little irritating. The authors are prone to a number of ungrounded remarks, such as the allegation that the government was misguided to pay
nearly £300,000 for Marc Brunel to build a tunnel under the Thames, in comparison to the
“stingy” amount given to Babbage to build his
Difference Engine (p. 49). To make judgments
about past events from the concerns of the present is not particularly fruitful. It was not at all
clear to contemporaries that Babbage’s engine
was worth investing in or, indeed, was possible
within the technological parameters then available. As such, perhaps a more interesting question would be: How did Babbage manage to get
as much public money as he did in the first
place? The authors would have been far more
helpful had they actually related industrial Britain to the work of Babbage.
Throughout this book readers will be constantly reminded of Babbage’s prophetic genius.
For example, on page 63 we learn that he devised
a scheme to replace the transport of mail by road
with a system of elevated wires carrying letters
in a metal container between London and Bristol. This inspires the authors to remark: “Babbage would certainly have been overjoyed by
e-mail, by which electronic symbols are transported all over the world in the blink of an eye.”
Could it be that Babbage was also the great
grandfather of electronic mail? On page 65 we
learn that he was also the originator of the idea
of having “black boxes” used to record information in case of train or aircraft crashes, while
a few pages later the authors reflect: “imagine
how much Ada [Lovelace] and Charles would
have loved word processing, spreadsheets, and
databases!” Some people will no doubt delight
in such speculations, and who am I to sour the
story? As such this is a useful introduction to
twentieth-century Babbage.
WILLIAM J. ASHWORTH
Septimus H. Paul. Nuclear Rivals: AngloAmerican Atomic Relations, 1941–1952. x Ⳮ
266 pp., bibl., index. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000. $42.50.
The United States probably would not have gambled $2 billion on its Manhattan Project in World

War II without the “MAUD Committee” report
by British scientists in the summer of 1941,
which concluded that only pounds—not tons—
of fissionable material might yield a nuclear explosion. And once the project was under way,
friendly but secretive wartime agreements by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill laid plans for the two
allies to collaborate on nuclear weapons development and decisions.
Why, then, is Britain best remembered for giving the Manhattan Project its first spy and its first
dissenter? In popular history, the British delegation to Los Alamos included Klaus Fuchs, who
passed American bomb designs to the Soviet Union, and Joseph Rotblat, who quit when he saw
that his work would not be used defensively
against Germany but offensively against Japan.
(Fuchs confessed to spying in 1950. Rotblat
shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995.) In fact,
there was much more activity in American-British
atomic relations, an engaging story explained in
rich detail by Septimus H. Paul, a history professor at the College of Lake County in Grayslake,
Illinois. Paul blends exhaustive and wide-ranging
research in a clear, coherent style, punctuating his
account with dry wit and historical insight.
Unfortunately for historians of science, there
is little technical detail in Paul’s account of these
fateful years. We never learn just what scientific
contributions Britain’s MAUD Committee
members and Los Alamos visitors made, nor do
we appreciate the independent allied research by
the British and French in Canada during the war.
Paul does note that by withholding information
the United States left its allies with no choice but
to develop different nuclear reactors: Canada’s
heavy-water and Britain’s gas-cooled designs.
But Paul’s admirable achievement is to untangle
the many complex diplomatic, bureaucratic, and
political intrigues that shaped atomic science.
Paul explains how the personal bond between
Roosevelt and Churchill yielded secret agreements at Quebec in 1943 and at Hyde Park in
1944, yet neither of their successors (Harry S
Truman or Clement Attlee) learned about those
pacts until months after taking office in 1945.
Equally fascinating is Paul’s account of the bureaucratic intrigues behind the president and
prime minister—engineered in Great Britain by
Lord Cherwell, Churchill’s science advisor, and
in the United States by science administrators
Vannevar Bush and James Conant, by the Manhattan Project’s military leader, General Leslie
R. Groves, and by Lewis L. Strauss, an aggressively anti-Soviet member of the Atomic Energy
Commission. Legislative politics also played a
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fractious role. In London, Churchill (as opposition leader against Attlee) strained to reassert
British influence; in Washington, Senator Brien
McMahon created and dominated the joint committee on atomic energy, striving with Senators
Bourke Hickenlooper and Arthur Vandenberg to
protect U.S. nuclear secrets from all foreigners.
Still, incentives to cooperate persisted throughout the 1940s and 1950s, with the United States
coveting Britain’s uranium stockpile as if it were
an “atomic colony” (p. 147) and Britain craving
technical information and international prestige.
But it was the spies who ultimately doomed real
collaboration, making the U.K. an untrustworthy
ally until there were no more secrets to protect. In
1950–1951, scandals surrounded Fuchs’s arrest
and Bruno Pontecorvo’s defection to Moscow.
Paul argues that while U.S. and U.K. cooperation
barely survived these ruptures, trust was lost finally when Guy Burgess from the British Embassy in Washington and Donald Maclean, head
of the American Department at the Foreign Office, also defected to Moscow. Only after the
United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom all had independently developed nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons did the U.S. Congress
amend the Atomic Energy Act in 1958 to grant
the president legal authority to exchange information on atomic and hydrogen bombs, at last
allowing full Anglo-American atomic cooperation.
WILLIAM LANOUETTE
Ruth H. Howes; Caroline L. Herzenberg.
Their Day in the Sun: Women of the Manhattan
Project. (Labor and Social Change.) Foreword
by Ellen C. Weaver. viii Ⳮ 264 pp., illus.,
apps., bibl., index. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. $34.50.
This book reminds us in yet another context that
women’s contributions to science can be rendered invisible by “the historical record.” The
Manhattan Project, the supersecret midcentury
United States research, development, and production enterprise that produced the nuclear
bomb, was a massive undertaking, at one time
employing 130,000 persons. About 10 percent
were women, yet official histories made no mention of female scientists or engineers.
Sleuthing by the physicists Ruth Howes and
Caroline Herzenberg has documented Manhattan
Project contributions by more than three hundred
women. Howes and Herzenberg begin with a few
well-known European women pioneers in nuclear science (“The Founding Mothers”: Marie
Curie, Mileva Marić, Irène Joliot-Curie, Ida Nod-
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dack, and Lise Meitner), none Americans and
none available for the U.S. bomb effort. They then
recount the history of the Manhattan Project via
biographical vignettes of women, organized in
chapters: “The Physicists,” “The Chemists,”
“Mathematicians and Calculators,” “Biologists
and Medical Scientists,” “The Technicians,” and
“Other Women of the Manhattan Project.”
It appears that few of these women knew each
other. In her foreword, Ellen Weaver writes:
“When I read the personal reminiscences of the
men who were nuclear pioneers, I’m struck by
the importance they place on their friends and
associates, and on the often intense interaction
among them, which could lead to major insights
in both theory and practice of science. And I’m
a bit jealous. By and large, women did not share
in that give-and-take.”
Not only was there little networking among
women scientists and technicians in the early
1940s while the bomb was being developed, but
there was little opportunity for them to share
their experiences later. Only a very small percentage of these women were able to continue
their professional careers. The many barriers to
women as professional scientists and engineers,
temporarily lowered owing to the manpower
shortages of wartime, were raised after the war.
There did not develop a community of women,
engaged in teaching and research, with roots in
the Manhattan Project.
A web page is being developed to gather and
provide further information about the women scientific workers of the Manhattan Project. Howes
and Herzenberg are setting up an on-line archive
there, hoping that others who have information
about the women scientific workers of the
Manhattan Project will contact them via the web
page (www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Lab/
9137/Manhattan_Project_women.html) or by
email (rhowes@bsu.edu or herzenbc@anl.gov).
The magnitude of their endeavor to learn
about these women was illustrated vividly to me
while writing this review. I attended the memorial service for my aunt, Mary Matilda Morrison
Pendleton (1908–2000), and heard in her eulogy
that “she worked as a nurse at the Hanford project, near Richland, Washington, where the government was secretly making atomic bombs. She
would work shift work, two weeks of day shift,
two weeks of swing shift, two weeks of graveyard shift, then she would get seven days off.
She wore a badge every day that was checked
after each day’s work to see how much she had
been radiated.” Although I thought that I knew
her well, my aunt’s role in the Manhattan Project
had been unknown to me.
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The women of the Manhattan Project are finally gaining visibility. For example, Nancy
Cook Steeper’s book-length biography of Dorothy Scarritt McKibbon (“the gatekeeper to Los
Alamos”) is being published by the Los Alamos
Historical Society. Howes and Herzenberg have
provided ideas and starting points for many additional biographical projects. Perhaps the greatest long-term value of their book is the impetus
that it will give to further research.
The book is well written, easy to read, and
attractively printed. An appendix, listing the
women and their roles, and a thorough index
combine to make this an easily used reference
work. There is also an informative sixteen-page
chronology that focuses on the crucial period
from 1938 through 1945.
GEORGE FLECK
Patricia S. Whitesell. A Creation of His Own:
Tappan’s Detroit Observatory. xx Ⳮ 236 pp.,
frontis., illus., figs., apps., bibl., index. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. $48,
£37.50 (cloth); $24.95, £18.95 (paper).
Histories of observatories are generally celebratory and narrowly focused, useful primarily for
the data they include, such as staff lists, and of
limited interest. There are exceptions, where the
authors have used the history of the observatory
to illuminate larger themes in the history of science and place the observatory’s history in a
larger context. For American astronomy, the
work of Mary Ann James on the Dudley Observatory and Donald Osterbrock on Yerkes and
Lick comes immediately to mind. In addition,
the authors of this second type of observatory
history bring unequaled knowledge of the archival records to bear in their analysis.
The Detroit Observatory of the University of
Michigan was one of the most important American astronomical observatories during the third
quarter of the nineteenth century. Under its first
two directors, Franz F. E. Brünnow and James
Craig Watson, the observatory was an essential
conduit in the transfer of German astronomical
techniques to the United States. After Watson’s
departure in 1879, it was quickly eclipsed by a
new generation of observatories. In 1980 Howard Plotkin discussed the role of Brünnow and
Henry Philip Tappan, the first president of the
University of Michigan (1852–1863), in this
transfer in an article in Annals of Science. Patricia Whitesell, the director of the observatory and
a specialist in historic preservation, has written
a celebratory volume that both expands upon
Plotkin’s work by providing additional details

and commemorates the recent physical restoration of the building. Written in anticipation of
the sesquicentennial of the completion of the observatory in 2004, A Creation of His Own is a
celebration of the vision of Tappan, who was
truly the father of the observatory. Whitesell,
like Plotkin, places the transfer of German astronomical techniques to the United States within a
larger context of increasing American intellectual appreciation for things German, especially
Tappan’s desire to model American higher education after that of Prussia.
Whitesell’s contributions are those typical of
the celebratory history of an observatory. She
provides very useful appendixes, uncovers details, and corrects earlier errors regarding the history of the observatory. Of particular interest are
the photographs she has included. Some of them
are historical, while others document the restoration of the observatory. Many are published for
the first time. Very few observatory histories can
boast photographs of this quality and quantity.
On the negative side, Whitesell has included
more detail than most readers will want about
such individuals as the artist who produced an
1855 painting of the observatory, the architect of
the observatory, and the maker of the telescope.
Readers should also be aware that Whitesell has
made errors in describing historical events outside
the campus of the University of Michigan. They
are minor, but annoying. For example, on page
150, in discussing the Dudley Observatory, she
confuses the board of trustees, who opposed B.
A. Gould, with the Scientific Council, which supported him.
I am not a fan of the book’s organization.
Whitesell has ordered the chapters in a way that
makes following the story rather difficult. For
example, the chapter on the contributions of
Watson, the second director of the Detroit Observatory, precedes the two chapters that discuss
the departures of Brünnow, the first director and
Watson’s teacher, and Tappan from the university (Brünnow resigned shortly after Tappan’s
firing). The chapter on the physical renovations
of the observatory and attempts to relocate it is
also out of place, preceding the chapter on Watson. The chronology that Whitesell includes as
an appendix is absolutely necessary to follow the
history of the observatory.
All in all, despite some problems, this is a useful book.
MARC ROTHENBERG
Tom Standage. The Neptune File: A Story of
Astronomical Rivalry and the Pioneers of Planet
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Hunting. xiv Ⳮ 240 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index.
New York: Walker & Company, 2000. $24.
In 1995 Walker & Company published a small
book authored by the professional writer Dava
Sobel entitled Longitude: The Story of a Lone
Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time. Not only did the book sell exceptionally well; it also spawned a three-hour
film, Longitude, starring Jeremy Irons and Michael Gambon, and a new, lavishly illustrated
work, The Illustrated Longitude, by Sobel and
Harvard’s William J. H. Andrewes. It is difficult
to think of another book in the history of science
that has attained comparable success. Yet it
seems that history of science journals have taken
scant notice of the book; my efforts to locate
reviews of Sobel’s volume in history of science
journals have turned up only a single review, that
being in Italian. This is all the more distressing
because the book and film present a very controversial view of Astronomer Royal Nevil Maskelyne. This is not the place to examine Sobel’s
recipe for success, but it seems relevant background in reviewing a book also written by a
professional journalist, also published by
Walker, and fairly comparable in format to Sobel’s.
The history of science is rich in fascinating
stories that could delight a variety of readers.
The story of the search for longitude in the eighteenth century is certainly one of these; the dramatic quest to discover Neptune in the mid nineteenth century is another. Put overly briefly, the
latter is the story of the frustrated efforts of a
young, personally diffident but intellectually
bold Cambridge graduate, John Couch Adams,
to convince either the director of the Cambridge
Observatory or England’s Astronomer Royal to
look for a planet that Adams’s calculations had
told him must be located at a specific position.
It is also the story of the brilliant and arrogant
Urbain J. J. Leverrier, who had independently
completed comparable calculations and who
beat Adams to the discovery by persuading not
one of his French colleagues but an astronomer
at the Berlin Observatory to launch a search,
which within a few hours had located Neptune.
It is also the story of the immense controversy
that followed and that has in the last few years
been given a new twist with the recovery of key
documents carried off to Chile from the Royal
Greenwich Observatory.
Tom Standage, science correspondent for the
Economist and author of The Victorian Internet,
has taken up the challenge of retelling the Neptune story, which had previously been treated in
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dozens of articles and in book-length studies by
John Pringle Nichol, Albert Glodin, Morton
Grosser, and Patrick Moore. Moreover, Standage
presents the Neptune narrative as the centerpiece
in a story that stretches from William Herschel’s
discovery of Uranus to the discovery of Pluto in
1930 and even to the spectroscopic detection in
the last few years of dozens of extra–solar system planets. Standage’s clear and engaging prose
is based on extensive reading in English and
French sources, some manuscript work, and interviews with a number of the discoverers of
extra–solar system planets. Although the book
is bereft of footnotes, an annotated bibliography
at its end partially fulfills their function. Numerous illustrations appear, but these tend to be
rather dark and small.
Although the book is generally reliable, some
significant errors appear. For example, whereas
Standage reports (p. 6) that William Herschel
did not see Uranus alter in size, Herschel observed its diameter nearly double in the two
months after his first observation of it. It is John,
not William, Herschel (p. 171) who is buried in
Westminster Abbey. Benjamin Peirce’s last
name is misspelled (p. 157), as is Christiaan
Huygens’s first name (p. 182), and it is incorrect
to say that Huygens “considered it was unlikely
that there was life elsewhere in the solar system”
(p. 183). Also, because Lowell Observatory director Vesto Slipher played such a major (arguably the key) role in the discovery of the planet
Pluto by creating and directing the research program that enabled a recent high school graduate,
Clyde Tombaugh, to be the first to recognize the
planet on a photographic plate, it seems inappropriate that Standage makes no mention of Slipher
in recounting (pp. 175–182) the discovery of
Pluto.
Overall this is a highly engaging story, well
told and based on good sources. One would hope
that it may follow Longitude into film, at least a
documentary, and that other authors and publishers will recognize the market for such exciting stories from the history of science.
MICHAEL J. CROWE
John E. Lesch (Editor). The German Chemical
Industry in the Twentieth Century. (Chemists
and Chemistry, 18.) viiiⳭ472 pp., illus., figs.,
tables, index. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000. $176, £109, NLG 30.
“Farben Made Plans Prior to Sudeten Grab”;
“Farben Aid to Nazis Listed; 53 U.S. Associates
Named”; “Double-faced Men: Remarks on the
Trial of I. G. Farben”; “Farben Forced Standard
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Oil to Help Nazis’ War Machine”; “Farben
Called Vital Adjunct of World War”; “I. G. Farben Industrie: Dissolving the German Chemical
Combine”—thus ran headlines in major British
and American newspapers during 1947 as the
behemoth I. G. Farben stood accused of complicity in war crimes and of waging Hitler’s war.
Yet only three decades earlier, in the midst of
World War I, Farben’s principal constituents—
AGFA, BASF, Bayer, and Hoechst—were the
foremost international exemplars of high-tech
industry, held up by Allied scientists as models
to be emulated in both war and peace. And from
the 1950s on, the reincarnated firms once again
occupied leading positions in the league of international manufacturers of chemicals.
The modern German chemical industry
emerged in the 1860s with the creation of companies devoted to the production of coal-tar dyestuffs; by the 1880s these companies had established industrial research laboratories and
international marketing organizations. This
much, at least, is known to generations of students of history of science from John J. Beer’s
seminal study The Emergence of the German
Dye Industry (1959). Other scholars will be familiar with the industry through Joseph Borkin’s
Crime and Punishment of I. G. Farben (1978).
These studies, however, present just two of the
many facets of one of the most remarkable of
science-based industries. Since 1990 or so, new
material has become available: we now have a
fairly complete history of nineteenth-century
events, as well as a number of fine studies dealing with the I. G. Farben era and the aftermath
in Germany. The German Chemical Industry in
the Twentieth Century, a collection of papers
presented at a conference of the same name held
at the University of California, Berkeley, in
1997, represents the first attempt to provide an
overview of how the German chemical industry
operated throughout the twentieth century. The
contributions focus in particular on the connections between academics and industrialists, Farben’s influence in foreign, and especially nonEuropean countries, and how the company came
to terms with the Nazi era. The book is divided
into three parts: the first deals with research and
technological innovation, the second with international connections and comparative perspectives, and the third with the industry since 1945.
The two introductory chapters provide a context
for the thirteen essays by the scholars in science,
technology, and business who participated in the
conference.
The essays do not in any way pretend to constitute a broad or comprehensive history. In-

stead, they examine, often in great detail and taking advantage of recently available sources,
some of the many complex issues connected
with the history of the chemical industry in Germany. Among these issues are the relationships
between leading academic and industrial chemists, industrial subsidies for academic chemistry,
the place of “free scientific research” in industry,
synthetic fuels, the impact upon and within the
important U.S. and Japanese markets, the influence on the organization of British and other
German industries, the decline in East Germany
under Soviet domination, the technological gap
that had to be filled as a result of the slow
changeover from coal to oil, and the place of the
present-day German chemical industry in the
world arena. Foremost, however, is the connection between state and industry. Although two
chapters examine the relations between Jews and
non-Jews, none of the papers discusses what the
expulsion of non-Aryans in the 1930s meant to
the chemical industry. In closing, Raymond
Stokes suggests further topics for research, including the effect of the industry on the environment, and draws attention to the fact that, as
shown elsewhere by Peter J. T. Morris, even during the Nazi era the German firms remained
highly innovative.
ANTHONY S. TRAVIS
Christine Hertler. Morphologische Methoden
in der Evolutionsforschung. (Studien zur Theorie der Biologie, 5.) 364 pp., illus., figs., tables,
bibl., index. Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und
Bildung, 2001. DM 48.
Christine Hertler has produced an extended work
on the role of morphology in evolutionary thinking. Her book was originally her dissertation at
the University of Frankfurt am Main, Germany.
German dissertations have a tendency to be extremely detailed and systematized works, and
Hertler’s book is no exception. The whole book
is divided into sections, subsections, and subsubsections, thus cumulating letters and numbers
that are a little overwhelming, more confusing
than helpful, and quite difficult to follow with all
those B.4.2.1s, etc.
Hertler starts with a lengthy introduction that
considers “the methods of morphology” and
“morphology and evolution.” Then we find a
section dedicated to “materials and methods”
(with several subsections). Then Hertler moves
to “results of systematic and historical reconstructions,” a very lengthy part with the customary subdivisions that deals with all possible aspects of morphology and evolutionary theories,
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including such diverse elements as Archaeopteryx, drosophila, and skeletal models. The next
section, “Comparative Anatomy and Evolution,”
introduces Darwin and some of the major figures
in the history of morphology and evolution. Thus
we have first the contemporary developments of
evolutionary morphology and then its historical
origins.
This order of things is followed within this
very section, so that Darwin is discussed before
Georges Cuvier and Etienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire, something rather unsettling for historians.
Luckily enough, Carl Gegenbaur, the key figure
in evolutionary morphology, and Anton Dohrn
come after Darwin. Ernst Haeckel is there as well
but is rather peripheral and mainly relevant for
his collaboration with Gegenbaur. The final section, “Discussion,” restores historical order and
starts with Darwin and Darwinismus and ends
with modern morphology leading to an interpretation of evolutionary morphology.
Hertler is a biologist and it shows—her main
concern is the status of today’s morphology, and
she approaches the morphologists of the past analytically rather than historically. The best result
of her professional approach is her constant use
of precise examples to illustrate the general
problems treated in her book, as scientists are
not content with general statements.
Hertler’s knowledge of morphology is undoubtedly phenomenal, to say the least, but it is
doubtful how profitable her book can be to historians of science except for the mass of details
and specific information. Rather than a book on
the history of science, her work is an example of
“theoretical biology.” From a historical perspective, one notices that she focuses on German
morphology as if morphology were a uniquely
German methodology; thus Richard Owen and
T. H. Huxley are not there, but Owen was essential for Darwin’s view of morphology and
Huxley central in the debates around evolutionary morphology. Also Edwin Ray Lankester is
overlooked.
The bibliography is good but far from being
as exhaustive as one would expect of such a
work. William Coleman’s classic article on Gegenbaur’s evolutionary revision of the type concept is not quoted, and Garland Allen’s and Jane
Maienschein’s publications on the history of
morphology are absent. Dietrich Starck, somehow an intellectual heir of Gegenbaur, is duly
cited but only for some of his scientific production, while there is no mention of his masterly
papers in the history of morphology. There is a
subject index but no name index.
MARIO A. DI GREGORIO
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Franklin W. Stahl (Editor). We Can Sleep
Later: Alfred D. Hershey and the Origins of Molecular Biology. xii Ⳮ 359 pp., illus., figs., tables, indexes. Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.: Cold
Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2000.
We Can Sleep Later celebrates Alfred Hershey’s
personality, friendships, and scientific accomplishments. Hershey, a molecular biologist and
ten-year director of the genetics research unit of
the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratories, died in
1997; the essays in this book are adapted from a
commemorative service held shortly after his
death. Twenty-two of Hershey’s scientific colleagues, including Franklin Stahl (the editor),
James D. Watson, Gunther Stent, John Cairns,
and Seymour Benzer, present their memories of
Hershey as a collaborator, mentor, and editor.
The final third of the book reproduces several of
Hershey’s articles on bacteriophage genetics, including his report on the “Waring blender” experiment (1952) that confirmed DNA’s role as
the material substance of heredity. Readers will
also find Hershey’s yearly reports from the genetics unit and a few philosophical essays on the
nature of viruses.
Scientists remember Hershey for his role in
the “phage group,” a research community consisting of Hershey, Salvador Luria, Max Delbrück, and their followers and defined by their
shared interests in bacteriophage k as an experimental tool. The three leaders (unfortunately referred to by the essayists as the “saint,” the
“priest,” and the “pope”) shared the Nobel Prize
in 1969 for their insights into genetic replication
and the structure of viruses. Although the phage
group’s achievements have attracted much attention among historians of biology, Hershey initially received the least fanfare. Never a fan of
scientific conferences or self-promotion, Hershey found his “Hershey heaven” by establishing
consistent, reproducible experimental systems.
Bacteriophage k, once known among molecular
geneticists as “naked DNA,” became just such a
system in his capable hands. Hershey’s role in
editing the first book-length guide to phage in
1971 ensured the model’s continued usefulness
and spread Hershey’s reputation as a talented editor. His guidelines to authors, reprinted in the
text, confirm his dedication to the clear, concise
expression of ideas.
The essays depict a quiet man, fascinated by
experimental method, whose wide-ranging interests seem to have escaped some of his wellmeaning friends. When Hershey retired in 1972
at the age of 63, his decision to focus on gardening, music, computers, and sailing baffled
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some of his colleagues. Sadly, many of the essayists—whose recollections generally end in
1971, or worse, with unanswered invitations to
discuss phage in the garden—still lack an appreciation for Hershey’s desire to live outside the
laboratory. Rather than a tribute to the complete
man, We Can Sleep Later is a testament to the
staying power of the “phage school” in practitioners’ origin stories of molecular biology. It is
no coincidence that the book’s subtitle, Alfred
D. Hershey and the Origins of Molecular Biology, echoes that of the Festshrift for Max Delbrück, Phage and the Origins of Molecular Biology, edited by Cairns, Stent, and Watson (Cold
Spring Harbor, 1966). Biochemists such as Arthur Kornberg have blamed their supposed declining status on that book’s portrayal of phage
geneticists as the central figures of early molecular biology. They will undoubtedly lodge similar complaints against We Can Sleep Later. But
practitioners perhaps ask too much if they expect
good history to come from memorial works. We
Can Sleep Later is not good history, but historians will find it useful nonetheless for its firstperson accounts and as an illustration of commemorative practices. Molecular biologists will
enjoy the fond memories of one of their own.
AUDRA J. WOLFE
Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy. Sex the Measure of
All Things: A Life of Alfred C. Kinsey. xiv Ⳮ
513 pp., illus., apps., bibl., index. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2000. $39.95.
The role of Alfred Kinsey, America’s most influential sexologist, in the cultural revolution of
sex and gender during the past fifty years remains as unquestionable as it has been controversial. This admiring biography argues that
Kinsey also qualifies as an authentic great man
of science in the tradition of Darwin. Kinsey’s
expert authority was recently challenged by
James Jones, who claimed in his 1997 biography
that Kinsey’s terrible personal secrets—homosexuality and masochism—plagued his life and
ruined his science. Jonathan Gathorne-Hardy
sets out to repair Kinsey’s reputation by defending him against this “Kenneth Starr school of
biography” (p. viii). The author seeks to rescue
Kinsey’s achievement from the stigmatizing
charge that it was flawed because it subordinated
science to subjectivity.
Gathorne-Hardy emphasizes Kinsey’s methodological creativity and his interviewing genius. During his early career, when he worked
on gall wasps, Kinsey’s science developed as a
practice of scrupulous collection, observation,

and documentation. Even in graduate school, he
was dubbed “get a million Kinsey,” and his belief in sheer quantity—as well as quantification—was just as apparent when he turned his
attention to human sexuality. In 1938 Kinsey
taught a course on marriage at Indiana University, where he spent his entire working life. Limited to married or engaged students and faculty,
the course covered reproductive physiology,
contraception, and a host of other sexual topics
in explicit detail. Kinsey also used the course to
gather data about his students’ sex lives. The
thousands of sexual histories collected at the Institute for Sex Research in later years—7,985 by
Kinsey alone—attest to his scientific commitment to behavior as the only legitimate basis for
a science of sex.
The behavioral unit of analysis chosen by Kinsey was the orgasm—or “outlet,” as Kinsey
called it. Because it was countable, the theory
went, it was objective. Kinsey’s ethic of measurement resulted in interviews involving at least
350 standard questions, whose answers were recorded in a custom code designed to fit on a single sheet of paper divided into 287 squares.
Among the ironies of Kinsey’s method was the
fact that his sex histories measured linguistic
rather than sexual behavior. What Kinsey actually compiled was a huge cache of stories, not
direct observations of sexual behavior. (Kinsey
did try to approach sexual behavior directly
through film and photography, but self-reported
histories remained his primary data base.) Kinsey, who gathered more sexual stories than any
other person alive, systematically aimed to eradicate all quirks and complexities in order to produce a statistical portrait of population-wide
behavior. Meanings might be historically important, but numbers, not narratives, would yield
truth. The easy use of “human males” and “human females” in the titles of Kinsey’s famous
reports suggests how universal his scientific
claims were—and also how devoid of temporal
and cultural particularity.
The resulting conception of human sexual nature is probably best represented in Kinsey’s sixpoint scale, where behavioral possibilities
ranged from exclusively homosexual at one pole
to exclusively heterosexual at the other. Diversity emerged as the premier fact about sexual
behavior. While this placed men and women uncomfortably close to their primate cousins on an
evolutionary map, making human sexual exceptionalism objectively unsustainable, it also produced a reformist sensibility that rooted its demand for toleration in the powerful evidence of
natural facts. It is difficult to overstate how
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shocking Kinsey’s picture of polymorphous sexuality was in a culture devoted to either/or binaries and prone to harsh judgments about deviation from norms. Kinsey’s contribution was
to point out the gap between ideology (sexual
culture) and behavior (sexual nature). That lots
of people did lots of things at odds with professed sexual morality was, for some, a welcome
relief and call to revolution. For others, it was a
reason to hate Kinsey and blame him for changes
in the realm of gender and sexuality already well
under way by midcentury.
No biographies can save scientific heroes from
the fatal charge that their methods and findings
were bound up in their lives, or they would not
be biographies worth reading. This attests to the
stubborn endurance of the psychoanalytic paradigm. Kinsey despised Freud for passing off philosophy (a term of derision in Kinsey’s vocabulary) as science. Yet because of the conventions
of post-Freudian biography, Gathorne-Hardy
must explore exactly those dimensions of Kinsey’s life and character that Freud embraced but
that Kinsey himself would never have admitted
into the precincts of science. His childhood illnesses and struggles with an overbearing father,
his rage against religion, fondness for music,
charismatic yet autocratic style, and his own anguished sexuality are keys to puzzling out not
only a life in science, but a life.
Gathorne-Hardy can hardly ignore evidence
that Kinsey’s own sexual appetites were diverse—“bisexual” is this author’s preferred designation—or that his enterprise in sex research
involved experimentation: the mostly married
male members of Kinsey’s team were expected
to engage in sexual activities with one another
and one another’s wives. Kinsey’s wife Clara
(“Mac”) was a confidant and supporter from the
start. Their loving marriage was also an open
marriage. Mac was a participant-observer in the
world of sex research. She had a series of affairs
with Kinsey’s colleagues and even changed the
bedsheets during energetic sessions of sexual
cinematography that took place in the attic of
their home. Yet the Kinseys also shielded their
children from their own unorthodox sexual practices.
This biography concludes by suggesting that
Kinsey died tragically in 1957, convinced that
his enemies had the upper hand. Kinsey was
wrong. The diversity he championed has become
a theoretical staple in the human and life sciences as well as a practical goal in social policies
related to gender, race, and sexuality. However
unfinished it may be, it is difficult to imagine
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Kinsey’s revolution being reversed in either science or society.
ELLEN HERMAN
Cathy Boeckmann. A Question of Character:
Scientific Racism and the Genres of American
Fiction, 1892–1912. viii Ⳮ 238 pp., bibl., index.
Tuscaloosa/London: University of Alabama
Press, 2000. $39.95.
During the late nineteenth century, science and
fiction intertwined in complex ways well beyond
Jules Verne’s voyages and H. G. Wells’s tales
of time travel and a war between worlds. Developing in the United States after the Civil War,
literary realism directly reflected the scientific
temperament of the times—the Enlightenment
belief that science was leading the inevitable
way to a secular millennium. Founded on admiration for science and scientific method, realism was the artistic parallel to the careful observation and recording of data that the new
social scientists saw as the way to “Truth” about
human nature and behavior. In a famous essay
entitled “The Experimental Novel” (1880), Émile Zola argued that “the novelist is equally [with
the scientist] an observer and an experimentalist”
dedicated to uncovering the deterministic laws
governing human life. Focusing on this fundamental interrelationship between nineteenthcentury science and nineteenth-century fiction, A
Question of Character explores in thoughtful
and complex ways the interaction between late
nineteenth-century scientific theories of race and
American fiction of the time.
In the first section of her book, Cathy Boeckmann traces scientific theories about race from
their emergence as part of the “American
School” of physical anthropology based on Samuel G. Morton’s Crania Americana (1839),
which argued for polygenesis rather than monogenesis of races, through Josiah Nott and G. R.
Gliddon’s The Types of Mankind (1854), which
strongly supported the theory of a hierarchy of
separate races, to the later, post-Darwinian arguments that racial inferiority corresponded to
different stages of evolution rather than to separate origins. Especially influential was the neoLamarckian concept of acquired cultural traits
forming identified developmental stages along a
continuum from “savagery” to “barbarism” to
“civilization,” as explained by Lewis Henry
Morgan in Ancient Society (1877). Philip A.
Bruce’s The Plantation Negro as a Freeman
(1889), for example, insisted that under the uplifting influences of slavery African Americans
had been experiencing a slow cultural evolution
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but that in the postwar era of freedom they were
devolving rapidly back into savagery. As the arguments over racial difference grew more complex and the problem of the mixed-race character
loomed larger, there was an interesting shift
away from emphasis on simple physical markers
of difference to essentialist markers that endure
despite any racial mixing that may blur physical
differences. These essential markers are traits of
character that differ from race to race, often with
each group of different national origin considered to be a distinct “race.” Thus the individual
Irishman’s or German’s—as well as the individual African’s—mental and moral character was
seen simply as the manifestation of an inherent
and unchanging racial character. By the late
nineteenth century, it was generally believed that
various racial characters had now been scientifically established, thus providing “a positive basis for legislation, politics and education, as applied to a given ethnic group,” according to
Daniel Brinton in an 1895 article quoted by
Boeckmann.
In the second section of her book Boeckmann
examines six novels published between 1892
and 1912 by Thomas Dixon, Jr., Mark Twain,
William Dean Howells, Charles Waddell Chesnutt, and James Weldon Johnson. Dixon’s novels The Leopard’s Spots (1902) and The Clansman (1905) are examples of sentimental
romantic fiction dominant in the first half of
nineteenth-century America, a style of writing
that uses the physical appearance of characters
in a novel to represent their inner mental and
moral worth—in short, appearance reveals
“character.” Dixon relies on the physical description of black characters to reveal their dangerous, bestial, inherently racial “character,”
thus embodying that basic scientific belief of the
time in his best-selling novels and projecting it
into the American cultural consciousness, an accomplishment greatly enhanced by D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation, the 1915 film version
of The Clansman. (The one factual error I noted
in Boeckmann’s otherwise well-documented
work is her statement that Griffith’s film was
based on The Leopard’s Spots). The other four
writers, following the conventions of the newer
realist fiction, complicate the simple equation of
outer appearance and inner character, especially
in the intricate representation of the emerging nature/nurture argument in Twain’s Pudd’nhead
Wilson (1896).
Given the belief in scientifically determined
racial “character” as a basis for political, legislative, and educational action, these novels can
be seen as sites of struggle over the issue of race

at that time. Boeckmann’s analyses of these
works are subtle and theoretically sophisticated
and help us see the complex interaction between
science, artistic expression, and social policy.
JAMES KINNEY
Goldie Morgentaler. Dickens and Heredity:
When Like Begets Like. xvi Ⳮ 221 pp., index.
New York: St. Martin’s Press/London: MacMillan Press, 2000.
The opening chapter of this work is a comprehensive “Historical Overview of the Hereditary
Puzzle.” Goldie Morgentaler’s analysis of theories of heredity before Mendel will interest students of biological science. She admits that “resurrecting such theories without contamination
from subsequent knowledge often requires an
imaginative leap.” Very true. There have been
such profound advances in the science of genetics since that time, with the avalanche of discoveries during the past half century, that much of
the previous thought now falls in the realm of
philosophical fantasy.
These early concepts were those to which
Charles Dickens was exposed for most of his
life. His literary reaction to them is exhaustively
analyzed in the subsequent two parts of the book.
The first of these is entitled “Heredity and the
Individual,” and the second is “The Public Face
of Heredity.” The latter includes interesting discussion of class and race, with analyses of the
last three novels. These indicate that Dickens’s
views on heredity changed during his later life,
perhaps influenced by Darwin, whose work he
had read . . . and vice versa.
The author is to be admired for her detailed
knowledge of Dickens’s works and his characters. For a reviewer who has been steeped in evidence-based medicine and science for most of
his career, it seems that much of the speculation
regarding heredity in the nineteenth century is
tenuous and far-fetched. While Dickens engaged
the topic of heredity many times, he appears to
have followed the general trend of that era by
showing little consistency in his views. This is
not surprising in light of the paucity of scientific
evidence at that time.
While the title implies a study of Dickens and
heredity, the substance covers a much wider
field, with ventures into ethics, morality, religion, psychology, philosophy, sociology, and
more. The appended notes tell of assiduous research and concentration. To the pragmatic
reader it sometimes appears that Morgentaler
makes observations and draws conclusions that
are more profound than Dickens himself might
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The “Deformito-mania” from Punch, 1848 (from O’Connor, Raw Material, p. 149).

have achieved, or admitted. This is, of course, a
common diversion in revisionist studies of wellknown authors and other celebrities.
It is inevitable that the perennial question of
the relative strength of nature and nurture must
have prominence in this study. In his earlier novels Dickens implied support for the notion that
goodness and virtue were heritable traits allied
to beauty and good physical appearance. Morgentaler returns repeatedly to this question in
many aspects. In her final chapter she points out
that Dickens’s views changed, paradoxically, after The Origin of Species was published, toward
the end of his life. He then gave less weight to
the influence of heredity. She has, perhaps,
missed an opportunity of recording that Dickens
noticed hereditary factors in alcoholism and longevity. In the case of Jenny Wren’s family, Mr.
Cleaver was “like his own father, a weak
wretched trembling creature, falling to pieces,
never sober” (Our Mutual Friend). The Wardle
family in Pickwick Papers showed familial longevity in that “only one member hasn’t lived to
eighty-five, and he was beheaded by one of the
Henrys.”
The relationship of some of the discussion to
heredity is profound, often remote, even cryptic.
To those who are hybrids of a scientific historian
and an obsessive Dickens aficionado, this work
will be absorbing. Unfortunately for the author
and the publisher, such hybrids are probably
rare—but I hope not extinct. To the pure scientist this work might be an uphill exercise. The
production of the book is faultless.
J. E. COSNETT
Erin O’Connor. Raw Material: Producing Pathology in Victorian Culture. (Body, Commod-

ity, Text: Studies of Objectifying Practice.) xi Ⳮ
273 pp., illus., bibl., index. Durham, N.C./London: Duke University Press, 2000. $54.95
(cloth); $18.95 (paper).
Readers expecting a history of nineteenth-century pathology are in for a surprise. They will
find instead a self-conscious example of cultural
studies, critical of some assumptions made in
this field and of some feminist writing, but containing some alarming sentences like “My goal
has been to give shape to the accidental palimpsests of an inveterately verbal, and increasingly
visual, culture; to assemble a particular series of
hermeneutic loose ends into a coherent account
of how an extraordinarily bizarre system of signification came into being” (p. 18). With learned
English like that, who needs Latin? But once we
get into the main part of the book, things get
much better. We are confronted with a study of
the fringes of science, in popular writings, in literature, and in raree-shows, one working from
sources that the more austere scientifics of the
Victorian period despised and that historians of
science are prone to ignore. Metaphor and analogy are everywhere, and sensitive stomachs will
be churned by vivid accounts of disease, deformity, and surgery.
The first chapter is concerned with the cholera
morbus, the plague of the nineteenth century,
and with the way it could be perceived as an
indicator of social ills. John Ruskin’s word
“illth” as an opposite of health is revived, and
the terrible blackness of the shriveled and dehydrated victims of this disease imported from
the East is linked with colonial and racist notions. The theme that a healthy body is like a
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well-run state leads into the next chapter, on
breast cancer. Surgery was not only agonizing
but ineffective in the first half of the nineteenth
century, but then the survival rate after three
years rose gradually from 4.7 percent to 45 percent by 1900. O’Connor asks whether this saga,
with cancer seen as cellular overproduction, reveals close connections with gender construction
and the symbolic importance of breasts, concluding that it does not and that the language
used really was neutral rather than sexual.
She then looks at amputations and artificial
limbs, seeing amputation as a threat to the whole
masculine body (there appear to be no women
involved here) that could be countered by prostheses almost undetectable to the observer. This
allows reflection on illustration, where curiously
disembodied hands are shown carrying out amputations; on dissembling and artificiality; on
materialism; and on metaphors of wholeness and
replacement and of extending senses and capacities. We see some extraordinary advertisements
where men with artificial legs climb ladders
(back into ordinary life) and skate, perhaps on
thin ice. The final chapter examines deformity,
with monsters and freaks (a word that took on
its current sense in this period). P. T. Barnum is
prominent here, but interesting links are also
made to the Great Exhibition at the Crystal Palace (1851) and its successors and the numerous
museums that were such a feature of the Victorian period. They are strikingly placed in a continuum, rather than opposed, in a discussion of
chaos and order, capitalism and health, deformity and degeneration. Wonder is presented as
the key to modern sensibility, and there is a nice
quotation on page 152: “If Beauty and the Beast
should be brought into competition in London at
the present day, Beauty would stand no chance
against the Beast in the race for popularity.”
Readers will have been led into a fascinating
world at the periphery of the respectable science
that most of us study and will rejoice in the extraordinary sights they see.
DAVID KNIGHT
Malcolm Macmillan. An Odd Kind of Fame:
Stories of Phineas Gage. xiv Ⳮ 562 pp., frontis.,
illus., figs., apps., bibl., index. Cambridge,
Mass./London: MIT Press, 2000. $39.95.
In the neurosciences, and indeed beyond, Phineas Gage is an icon. It is impossible to see reproductions of his life mask, his skull, and above
all the tamping iron driven into his head by an
explosion without wanting to know more about
the man and his reason for fame. Malcolm Mac-

millan’s extraordinary book An Odd Kind of
Fame: Stories of Phineas Gage is the definitive
word on this fascinating subject and a labor of
love. The book’s appearance is extraordinary,
because on page 1 Macmillan quotes David Ferrier writing to Henry Pickering Bowditch about
Gage (12 October 1877): “In investigating the
reports on diseases and injuries of the brain I am
constantly being amazed at the inexactitude and
distortion to which they are subject by men who
have some pet theory to support.” Macmillan has
been scathing over the years in his attacks on
previous authors who have been imprecise in
their treatment of the facts in relation to Phineas
Gage’s story. He has been vigilant in pointing
out confabulatory accounts and has repeatedly
steered the interested reader to the original reports of Dr. John Martyn Harlow (Passage of an
Iron Rod Through the Head [1848] and Passage
of an Iron Bar Through the Head [1868]). He
cites these reports as containing the only true
account of what happened on 13 September 1848
and the consequences. As if to reinforce this
message, he crucially reproduces a facsimile of
these source papers in an appendix to the text.
The reader has the story at first hand. It is also
interesting to note that on the very last page of
his book Macmillan summarizes the importance
of Phineas Gage one hundred fifty years on: “his
was the first case to point to a relation between
brain and personality functions.”
Having discharged his duty in relation to the
sparse facts known about Phineas Gage and the
lasting importance of the event, Macmillan could
have left it there. We are fortunate that he didn’t.
In what began as part of a set of historically
based lectures to introduce students to various
problems in psychology, Macmillan has, from
painstaking research, taken us on a fascinating
journey through nearly two hundred years of
neuroscientific thinking on the functions of the
frontal lobes of the brain. I would strongly recommend this book to those interested in the history of medicine, to the clinical neuroscientist,
and to the nonspecialist with an interest in the
bizarre.
KIERAN O’DRISCOLL
Julyan G. Peard. Race, Place, and Medicine:
The Idea of the Tropics in Nineteenth-Century
Brazilian Medicine. x Ⳮ 315 pp., bibl., index.
Durham, N.C./London: Duke University Press,
1999. $54.95 (cloth); $17.95 (paper).
This timely, well-written book illuminates an aspect of Brazilian science that has long been neglected, for two major reasons. The first is that
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it is only in the past two decades that the scientific past of Latin America, including Brazil,
seemed to merit systematic academic investigation, and only with this change have scholars
discovered, or rediscovered, several important,
but forgotten, developments, such as the one Julyan Peard analyzes in this study. The second
reason is that, although there is a substantial literature on late nineteenth- to early twentiethcentury colonial science and medicine—which
is considered almost synonymous with tropical
medicine—none of it treats Brazil or any of the
other Latin American countries because, even
though they fall within the tropical zone, they
were formally independent nations from the
early 1800s onward.
Peard rejects this adherence to the old criterion for defining “tropical.” Drawing on a respectable collection of both primary and secondary sources, she tells the story of the Escola
Tropicalista Bahiana (the Tropical School of
Bahia), which was founded before the revolution in bacteriological knowledge and the great
European colonial expansion. The idea for the
school originated, Peard says, with “a group of
nineteenth-century doctors in Brazil who, in attempting to adapt Western medicine to more
fully engage with the problems of their tropical
country, sought novel answers to the age-old
question of whether diseases of warm climates
were distinct from those of temperate Europe. In
their search, they used the tools of Western medicine to confront European ideas about the fatalism of the tropics and its people, and to argue in
favor of Brazilian expertise.”
The text is organized into five chapters, whose
titles clearly describe both the structure of the
narrative and Peard’s main points, as well as part
of her conclusions: “The Escola Tropicalista
Bahiana: A Creative Response in Adversity”;
“The Politics of Disease”; “Race, Climate, Medicine: Framing Tropical Disorders”; “Physicians
and Women in Bahia”; and “Moving into Mainstream.” In her introduction Peard presents a useful discussion of the earlier literature on her
topic, pointing out her (original) contribution to
several relevant fields. Throughout, the text is
structured to highlight the tension between the
Tropicalistas and European science: “although
they [the Tropicalistas] resisted aspects of European cultural authority that harped on Brazilian, and Latin American, inferiority, they wanted
to gain the mantle of legitimacy that they believed only European science, as the leader in
universal science, could bestow on them.” Peard
shows, chapter by chapter, the Tropicalistas’
sometimes conscious, sometimes intuitive strat-
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egies to build up an innovative scientific field, a
project that entailed issues of national identity
and the regional (Bahian) response to the centralized imperial authority of Rio de Janeiro. Almost half the volume is devoted to supplementary material: three useful appendixes, notes to
all the chapters, a list of primary sources, the
bibliography, and a well-elaborated index—all
of which testify to the quality of both Peard’s
research and her book as a whole.
It is important to stress here that Peard relies
on what one could call the “new” Brazilian history and sociology of science, particularly in the
fields of medicine and public health. Despite its
vigorous growth, both quantitatively and qualitatively, this historiography still remains more or
less confined to Latin America, its wider dissemination impeded by language barriers. In using
and commenting on the bibliography of this new
historiography, Peard respects the local intellectual production while helping to enrich the traditional set of references. Nevertheless, and although I warmly recommend the book, I regret
that she did not fully incorporate the conclusions
reached by this recent historiography, preferring
instead to present essentially the same picture
drawn in previous works, a picture based on the
view that “in the few instances of research work
being carried out in Brazil before 1900 such
work was sporadic, isolated . . . or incapable of
being self-sustaining.”
SILVIA FIGUEIRÔA
Michael Dunnill. The Plato of Praed Street: The
Life and Times of Almroth Wright. xiv Ⳮ 269
pp., illus., tables, index. London: Royal Society
of Medicine Press, 2001. £17.50.
If ever a prize is to be given for the most cantankerous figure in the history of science and
medicine, Almroth Wright will surely be on the
short list. With the exception of himself, Wright
was a man who did not tolerate fools lightly.
Even the author of this biography, who tries very
hard to see Wright’s point of view, becomes exasperated with him at times. More commonly
known today as Sir Colenso Ridgeon in George
Bernard Shaw’s The Doctor’s Dilemma, Wright
was born of stern, fanatical Irish Protestant parents in 1861. Extremely gifted, Wright graduated
first in modern languages at Trinity College,
Dublin. After switching to and qualifying in
medicine, a gadfly postgraduate career followed.
His first permanent job was as pathologist at the
army’s medical headquarters at Netley near
Southampton, where Wright developed the agent
for which his name remains inscribed on the bac-
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teriologists’ roll of honor: prophylactic typhoid
vaccine. Its passage into common use, however,
was far from easy. Statisticians, clinicians, and
military authorities lined up against him.
Wright’s belief in the vaccine’s value was vindicated in World War I. The controversy over its
efficacy has been analyzed by J. Rosser Matthews in his Quantification and the Quest for
Medical Certainty (Princeton University Press,
1995). Dunnill does not refer to this, but, there
again, scarcely any modern secondary source is
recognized in this book. This is not that sort of
a biography, which is not to decry its great merits. Dunnill is a pathologist who sticks very close
to the primary sources, including large amounts
of hitherto-unpublished manuscript material. His
approach is very evaluative of what Wright got
scientifically right and wrong by today’s criteria,
but the judgments are made in a subdued and
relatively unobtrusive way. This is a great virtue
in dealing with any aspect of the volatile Wright.
His views on woman’s place in the world and
her claim for the right to vote would drive any
intolerant feminist historian to apoplexy. Dunnill, however, takes great pains to situate
Wright’s views in context.
A man like Wright was never going to be
happy at Netley since the military hierarchy
weighed on him, crushing his individualism.
Only the dictatorial control of an autonomous
empire would suit him, and this is what he eventually got. Wright became the head of the pathology department at St. Mary’s Hospital, London, and there he was effectively responsible to
nobody. This was possible because he turned his
laboratory into a vaccine-producing factory and
used the drug company Parke Davies to market
his products. These included not only prophylactic agents but now-discredited ones for the
treatment of the then-common bacterial diseases
such as pneumonia. The Great War saw Wright
in France struggling to introduce another innovation that was finally accepted. “Listerian antisepsis” was a hallowed phrase among surgeons,
and the more infected war wounds became the
more intense became their antiseptic applications—sadly, to little effect. Wright campaigned
for simple saline washing of wounds, a practice
eventually adopted with much better results. After the war, separated from his wife, at odds with
the Medical Research Council, and estranged
from some of his colleagues (although Alexander Fleming stuck it out), Wright turned to the
consolations of philosophy—unfortunately writing rather than just reading it. His otiose productions solving the riddle of the universe now
lie unread. This conventional but highly readable

biography offers no new insights into the science
of the period, but it does merit attention as a
study of the relations of personality and empire
building.
CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE
Michael Worboys. Spreading Germs: Disease
Theories and Medical Practice in Britain, 1865–
1900. (Cambridge History of Medicine.) xvi Ⳮ
327 pp., illus., tables, bibl., index. Cambridge/
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
$59.95.
While visiting relatives in northern England in
October 1865 the London chemist William
Crookes witnessed firsthand the economic devastation of farming communities blighted by the
cattle plague (rinderpest) that had been sweeping
Britain since June. Crookes delayed his return to
London for several months and obtained official
permission to begin experimenting on eradicating the disease with a new disinfectant, carbolic
acid. In his report to the British government in
1866, Crookes was explicit that his experiments
had been based on a germ or contagion theory
of the disease. Germs were considered to be airborne particles that might either be “living” material that “germinated” in the soil of animal
flesh and blood or (as Justus von Liebig had
taught) chemical poisons that decomposed flesh
and blood.
In the opening chapter of this fine study of the
construction of British germ theories between
the 1860s and 1900, Michael Worboys makes it
clear that the cattle plague was a keystone in the
long process of germ theory construction. Rinderpest was readily accepted by veterinary surgeons as a contagious disease to be controlled
by wholesale culling with the poleax. On the
other hand, they ignored or actively opposed the
practical implications of a germ theory—disinfection (as Crookes recommended), vaccination,
and laboratory research—because these procedures posed a threat to the power and control of
the veterinary profession. Plus ça change? In
Britain, we are currently witnessing a similar example of party interest as a powerful Farmers’
Union culls millions of cattle and sheep but prevents the use of vaccination in fighting a foot
(hoof) and mouth epidemic.
Although a number of studies have celebrated
the germ theory as the key development in producing scientific medicine in the late nineteenth
century, this is the first critical book-length study
of its diffusion. The separate professional communities of veterinary practitioners, surgeons,
and sanitarians are disarmingly shown to have

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 93 : 1 (2002)

developed different germ theories and differed
over the practical consequences of their commitments. The closed subcultures inhabited by
these groups meant that it took several decades
before the germs of sanitarians were linked with
those of surgeons and with the bacteria of microbiologists. Anyone who made a connection,
such as the physicist John Tyndall, was dismissed as an inexpert interloper. Clearly, the singular specific disease germ theory (as it eventually became) was evolutionary in construction,
not revolutionary.
Worboys’s ambitious monograph offers many
fresh insights, including a finely tuned account
of Joseph Lister’s vacillating ideas and practices
concerning wound management, and a splendid
analysis of the problematic identification of specific germs causing cholera, smallpox, tuberculosis, diphtheria, typhoid fever, and scarlet fever.
His meticulous survey of the contemporary literature (both periodicals and textbooks) unravels
the deep uncertainty over whether “germs” were
living organisms or chemicals, spontaneously
generated or ancestral, causes or concomitants of
disease. The fact that unpleasant wounds and the
sick sometimes recovered spontaneously made
sense only if patients constitutionally differed as
an appropriate or inappropriate “soil” for “germ
seeds” to blossom or perish. In this way ontological germ theories complemented the traditional medical concepts of constitutional
strength and weakness and the healing power of
nature. This insight underlines one of the
strengths of the book, namely, its recognition of
continuities in the construction of disease concepts and practices.
Worboys successfully challenges the view
that the British medical communities (who were
often “part-timers”) acted largely as onlookers
while French and German practitioners honed a
laboratory-based medicine for the twentieth century. Overall, Worboys’s monograph is a challenging and extremely readable medical history
of germs. It will be essential reading for students
taking history of medicine programs.
WILLIAM H. BROCK
Bert Theunissen. “Nut en nog eens nut”: Wetenschapsbeelden van Nederlandse natuuronderzoekers, 1800–1900. 220 pp., illus., bibl., index. Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2000. Dfl
49.70.
The central theme of this book is the question,
Why do scientists pursue scientific investigation? Of course, Bert Theunissen begins by
pointing out that the answers scientists offer will
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be socially acceptable answers. Even so, Theunissen asserts, the historian may infer from the
answers what motivated the persons questioned.
Moreover, insights may be gleaned concerning
science, society, and the relations between the
two in the period the scientists lived.
In this book the author discusses the notions
of the objective of science endorsed, respectively, by Jan Hendrik van Swinden (physics,
Utrecht University), Jan van der Hoeven (zoology, Leiden University), Pieter Harting (zoology, Utrecht University), Gerrit Jan Moll (chemistry, Utrecht University), Franciscus C. Donders
(ophthalmology, Utrecht University), Hugo de
Vries (botany, Amsterdam University), Martinus
W. Beijerinck (microbiology, Delft Technical
University), and Hendrik Antoon Lorentz (physics, Leiden University).
From this list of names it appears that Theunissen has focused his study on the nineteenth
century. That period is especially interesting
with respect to the changing images of science,
as the ideas of the main goal of the university
altered completely during that period. At the beginning of the century providing an academic
education was seen as the prime task. Research
was not seen as part of the duties of a professor
at all. Those that did any experimentation chose
to do so for their own sake, not because it was
an element of the curriculum. That had changed
completely by the end of the century. By then
scientific investigation was considered a regular—in fact the most important—task of the university. This change in focus went hand in hand
with the establishment of a number of new laboratories for most Dutch universities.
In the accounts of the above-mentioned men
the content and development of their ideas about
the pursuit of science are examined. From this
analysis the common element that emerges in
their images of science is gain for society, as
expressed in the title, which translates into English as something like “Profit and more profit.”
In the view of these men the pursuit of science
is profitable for society; it is not pursued just for
its own sake, let alone for the pleasure of the
pursuer. In the beginning of the century the welltrained minds of an intellectual elite that had
completed academic training was regarded as the
prime benefit for society. By the end of the century the profit was understood to come from scientific investigation of nature: science was seen
as an instrument to further human welfare.
Initially, I found it surprising that each and
every one of the leading persons confidently asserts that the pursuit of science is for the benefit
of society at large. Yet, on closer inspection, that
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was not so surprising, as Theunissen has studied
and quotes almost exclusively from published
sources, from treatises written for fellow scholars, for administrators, and for the lay public.
The author seems not to have studied correspondence or other private papers in which a man
may have voiced less elevated purposes for the
pursuit of science.
One thing amazed me: in the whole of this
work, covering over a hundred years of discussion and the ideas of some 300 Dutch scholars
on the subject at hand, there is not one woman
(apart from present-day scholars) mentioned.
Admittedly, by the time the present story finishes, in the early twentieth century, only a few
women had been appointed to academic positions in Dutch universities, so there is presumably not much material to draw on. However,
one argument in the debate raging in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century about the admission of women to the universities was the
view that women, like men, should have the benefit of a higher education so as to fully develop
their minds.
Most of the contents of this book have appeared in print already in the form of separate
articles in various journals, some in English but
mostly in the Dutch language. Presumably that
explains why the author has chosen to publish
his treatise in Dutch rather than English. Even
though the author has stressed the national character of his exposé by discussing at length some
controversies among Dutch historians of science
on points he addresses, the issues considered in
this book and the scope of the inquiry warrant
international notice and discussion.
This book has a pleasantly unpretentious layout and typography and is, moreover, very carefully produced: I have seen but one printing error—which I leave it to you to discover.
MARIAN FOURNIER
John Bellamy Foster. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. x Ⳮ 310 pp., index. New
York: Monthly Review Press, 2000. $48 (cloth);
$18 (paper).
Karl Marx has often been described as anti-ecological, concerned about the exploitation of humanity, not of nature. But, conducting a careful
review of Marx’s writings and a survey of the
intellectual context in which Marx lived and
worked, John Bellamy Foster argues that, in fact,
Marx had a deeply and systematically ecological
view of the world.
To make this argument, Foster traces the development of Marx’s ideas. He finds in the ma-

terialist, antiteleological philosophy of Epicurus
(the subject of Marx’s doctoral thesis) the partial
origins of an ecological perspective. Other elements of Marx’s ecology emerged from his critique of Thomas Malthus’s view that population
would inevitably outstrip agricultural production—a conclusion that could justify social inequality. From this subject, Marx turned to a
study of the agricultural chemist Justus von Liebig, drawing from him to formulate the notion
of a “metabolic rift” in the human relation with
nature. Armed with such ideas, Marx contributed
to debates over soil “exhaustion,” the problems
of agriculture, and the division between town
and country. Ultimately, under Liebig’s influence, Marx arrived at an ecological critique of
capitalist agriculture and what he saw as its inevitable depletion of the natural fertility of the
soil. Both he and Friedrich Engels would argue
that ecological problems could be addressed
only if human beings regarded nature rationally,
through an understanding of nature’s laws, and
then organized production accordingly.
Thus, engaged in nineteenth-century discussions about science and nature, including those
relating to Darwinism, Marx linked social transformation with the transformation of the human
relation with nature: the alienation of human labor paralleled the alienation of human beings
from nature. In other words, the domination of
nature resulting from unequal ownership of land
paralleled the domination of humans through
economic power. Foster traces these ideas across
each stage in the development of Marx’s
thought: in relation to agriculture, Darwinism,
and, in his last years, ethnology, geology, and
paleontology. Foster follows the course of
Marx’s ecological views even after Marx’s
death. For a time, Marx and Engel’s ecological
critiques influenced Marxist thought in the Soviet Union. Nikolai Bukharin, August Bebel, and
other Marxist scholars built on the original foundation, and by the 1920s Soviet ecology was
highly advanced—only to be crushed, in the
1930s, by Stalin.
Seeking to place Marx within his context, Foster ranges widely, from Epicurus to the influence
of Epicureanism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to Julien Offray de La Mettrie,
Baron d’Holbach, Denis Diderot, and Darwin,
and on to Hegel, political economy, and French
socialism. He covers thinkers who influenced
Marx as well as those whom Marx reacted
against, including William Paley and, especially,
Malthus, who represented for Marx the intrusion
of natural theology into political economy. In
attempting to reconstruct Marx’s world, Foster
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largely follows the methods of traditional intellectual history, often interpreting ideas apart
from their contexts. In his analysis of Darwin’s
ideas, for example, he considers Marx’s debts to
other scholars but not Marx’s own research and
observations of nature. Foster, however, does review in some detail society and politics in
Marx’s day, remarking on the social discontent
and the perception of materialism as a threat to
the established order, associated with both atheism and revolutionary France.
Foster’s ambition goes beyond illuminating
Marx’s thought to situating ecology within materialism and science. Foster thus takes issue,
persuasively, with the idea, often encountered in
Green thought, that modern science justifies exploitative attitudes toward nature. This view, according to Foster, is a misinterpretation of modern science and reflects a reduction of ecological
questions to questions of values, obscuring the
material interrelations (Marx’s “metabolic relations”) between humans and nature. In fact, he
finds no necessary contradiction between sustainability and the mastery of nature, noting that
in the seventeenth century John Evelyn, among
others, remained an advocate of modern science
even as he defended trees and criticized London’s air pollution. And he notes that in the nineteenth century ecological thought, in the work of
Darwin and others, was grounded in materialist
conceptions of nature.
Foster’s analysis is valuable both as a critique
of the conventional wisdom about Marx’s views
of nature and as a thorough effort to place Marx
within the context of his time. Scholars and readers interested in nineteenth-century intellectual
history will find Foster’s acccount of an ecological revolutionary worth the study.
STEPHEN BOCKING
Charles Boewe. Mantissa: A Supplement to
Fitzpatrick’s Rafinesque. xii Ⳮ 105 pp., bibls.
Providence, R.I.: M&S Press, 2001. $15 (paper).
This addition—hence the title Mantissa—to the
rich vein of information about Constantine Samuel Rafinesque (1783–1840) is in fact a supplement to Charles Boewe’s own revised and enlarged edition (1982) of Thomas J. Fitzpatrick’s
book Rafinesque (1911).
The details of the peripatetic life of Rafinesque, one of America’s most original yet undisciplined naturalists, are too well known to
bear repeating here. Suffice it to say that because
of the vicissitudes of his life—his perpetual
wandering between and within Europe and frontier America, his impecunious circumstances
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that forced him to find different ways of making
a living—finding and identifying his publications is a bibliographer’s nightmare. Even now,
more than 160 years after his death and with the
benefit of serious studies by Fitzpatrick and
Boewe, as well as by Richard E. Call and Elmer
D. Merrill, among others, we can only approximate the number of his publications, including
both original titles and republications. Probably
we will never have a complete list of Rafinesque’s publications because he published regularly in newspapers, broadsides, sales catalogues, privately printed journals, and other
ephemera that are infrequently archived. Even
his own references to “published” works cannot
be trusted as, to him, this term included papers
that he sent to journals but were never published.
On the other hand, Rafinesque complained to
one correspondent that he never knew whether
some of these manuscripts were ever published
or he learned only years later that they had been.
The total number has been estimated at about a
thousand, but, as Boewe points out, this number
is based on Fitzpatrick’s faulty numbering system in which each version of a paper or volume
of a multivolume work was given a number.
Thus Fitzpatrick’s system, continued by Boewe,
represents serial numbers, not individual titles.
Rafinesque’s own estimate was 220, a number
Boewe now thinks is a reasonable guess.
The Mantissa is an important addition to Rafinesquiana. It lists twenty hitherto-unrecorded
publications by Rafinesque, thirty-three new
translations or reprints, and more than two hundred newly listed secondary references. For the
first time we have a list of every manuscript letter
written by Rafinesque that is known to exist, and
Boewe provides a documented discussion of Rafinesque publications still remaining to be discovered. Several titles known to me, however,
are missing from Mantissa, but Boewe’s book
represents a learned guide for the next scholar
willing to take up the challenge and carry on the
search. The newly listed manuscript letters will
doubtless be particularly helpful in providing
leads to undiscovered publications and other facets of Rafinesque’s still not completely understood life. Among his correspondents were fellow naturalists such as John James Audubon,
Joseph Banks, Benjamin Barton, Charles Bonaparte, Alexandre Brongniart, Augustin de Candolle, Georges Cuvier, Amos Eaton, Asa Gray,
William Jackson Hooker, Muhlenberg, Ord, Paolo Savi, James Edward Smith, William Swainson, and John Torrey, as well as prominent leaders of the day, including John Adams, De Witt
Clinton, Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, George IV,
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Thomas Jefferson, and Joel Roberts Poinsett. A
total of 346 letters are listed.
More important, Boewe has given us the benefit of his many years of scholarly searching and
thinking about Rafinesque in his discussions entitled “Hints about Unlisted Titles,” “Letters as
a Source of Leads,” and “Hints in Publications.”
We learn, for example, that Rafinesque signed
some of his papers simply as “Constantine” or
“Linneus.” The Mantissa makes it abundantly
clear why arriving at a complete account of Rafinesque’s writings is an elusive goal, but Boewe
shows us that the attempt still offers an exciting
trail to follow.
KRAIG ADLER
Bettina von Briskorn. Zur Sammlungsgeschichte afrikanischer Ethnographica im ÜberseeMuseum Bremen 1841–1945. (Tendenzen,
Suppl. 2000.) 336 pp., illus., figs. Bremen: Übersee-Museum Bremen, 2000. (Paper.)
Bettina von Briskorn’s book on Bremen’s Übersee-Museum (or overseas museum) takes on the
fascinating topic of the history of ethnographic
collections. Briskorn follows recent scholarship
on the topic in regarding the museum’s collections as artifacts not only of the societies from
which they were gathered but also of the societies that gathered them. Briskorn thus proposes
using the ethnographic collections of the Bremen
Übersee-Museum to shed light on the history of
ethnology itself.
Briskorn finds that the directors of the Bremen
museum pursued a “mimetic” exhibition style in
their African sections, in which they sought to
reproduce the scenes of daily life in Africa.
Many displays included groups of life-sized figures to show the artifacts as they were used, because the curators believed such a display would
better instruct the general public. Briskorn points
out that this sort of display differed sharply from
that of the larger Berlin museum of ethnology
and had more in common with popular ethnographic displays of the period. While this mimetic strategy in the museum gave directors a
preference for groups of objects that would give
a sense of the daily life of a group, it is unclear,
Briskorn asserts, to what extent this preference
shaped the actual collections. More than a third
of the book is devoted to short entries on the
individuals and institutions who donated or sold
ethnographic objects to the Bremen museum.
The entries also include serial numbers of each
object given by an individual or institution. Briskorn has used these data to provide statistical
tables related to the collection of ethnographic

artifacts, including the total number of objects
entering the museum, the proportion that were
gifts, and the proportion that were purchased.
Perhaps the most significant statistics are those
relating to the profession of the donor: whether
colonial military personnel, professional scientists, colonial merchants, or missionaries. Briskorn suggests that the predilections and range of
expertise of these various groups affected the
quality and reliability of their collections. Given
the painstaking work of processing this information for a statistical database program, I
would have liked to see further interpretation of
the statistics, which are surely a rich source of
wider historical correlations.
Briskorn illustrates suggestively the practical
role played by colonialism in the Bremen museum. She finds that 33 percent of the museum’s
pre-1945 holdings—and 20 percent of its current
holdings—were acquired directly in the course
of colonial rule and that colonial interests shaped
the museum’s presentations, especially its interest in the Herero during Germany’s genocidal
war against that group. Briskorn hauntingly juxtaposes two 1905 photographs: one of a group
of starving and emaciated Herero taken during
the war and a second depicting an idyllic museum diorama of Herero. Ironically, the very
genocidal war that stimulated Bremen’s interest
in the Herero also severely reduced the availability of artifacts that might satisfy this interest.
The topic of anthropological collecting is of
utmost interest to the history of anthropology
and to the history of science generally. I would
have been delighted had Briskorn more thoroughly assisted the reader in drawing connections between her very detailed account and the
wider intellectual and political world in which
the Bremen Übersee-Museum accumulated its
collections. As it is, the book will be primarily
of interest to scholars interested in the history of
anthropological collecting in the Bremen museum and, indeed, to those scholars using the
collections themselves.
ANDREW ZIMMERMAN
Lynda Nead. Victorian Babylon: People,
Streets, and Images in Nineteenth-Century London. x Ⳮ 251 pp., frontis., illus., bibl., index.
New Haven, Conn./London: Yale University
Press, 2000. $35.
In examining the visual culture of Victorian London during the years 1855–1870, Lynda Nead
in her book Victorian Babylon explores the difficult and restless narrative of modernization that
any of us who have read D. G. Rossetti’s “The
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“Effects of the Gas Strike in London,” Illustrated London News, 1872 (from Nead, Victorian Babylon,
p. 91).
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Burden of Nineveh” will recognize as crucial to
the Victorian imagination. As Nead promptly establishes, Babylon for the Victorians was a trope
evoking gain and loss, triumph and hubris, future
and past ruination. Taking this ancient city as her
titular image, then, Nead aims to rearticulate urbanism and modernity, indeed challenging us to
reconceive what we mean by “modernity.” Positioning her own arguments against the influential architectonics of Marshall Berman’s All
That Is Solid Melts into Air (London: Verso,
1983) and favoring instead the writings of
Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, and Michel
de Certeau, Nead recasts modernity as an “untidy
experience,” a “constant struggle with history”
(p. 10). Near her book’s end, Nead provocatively
claims: “Ruin is the resolution of the contradictory impulses of modernity” (p. 214).
Victorian Babylon explores the spaces of midVictorian London and, more important, the experience of inhabiting those very spaces. This
textual tour is divided tidily into three sections:
a first on mapping and water, a second devoted
to gas and light, and a third on obscenity, which
Nead calls “improvement’s other” (p. 8). As
Nead herself claims about the metropolitan
travel literature she examines, her book speaks
well to the eye. Victorian Babylon is a vicarious
tour of London thanks to Nead’s deft and abundant use of fresh images, which she has culled
assiduously from private collections, archives,
and especially illustrated nineteenth-century periodicals. Her study thus takes us to fascinating
places: readers travel along with John Hollingshead on his journey down to London’s sewers;
we are invited into Joseph Paxton’s dreamscape
of the Great Victorian Way; and we play for a
night at Cremorne Pleasure Gardens, witnessing
Madame Poitevin’s balloon ride. We hesitantly
enter the haunted and obscene Holywell Street.
The catalogic abundance of Victorian Babylon
works both to Nead’s advantage and disadvantage. Surely the sheer range of Nead’s material
proves her points about the frenzy and incomprehensibility of modernity and the promiscuity
of Victorian commercial culture. But invariably
the variety of topics results in too much cursory
analysis—a paragraph on photography followed
by a paragraph on the International Health Exhibition; brief excursions into the realms of advertising, illustrated sheet music, and music
halls. Subsequently, a reader might grow eager
instead for book-length studies of these issues.
Yet the most egregious omission of an adequate
treatment is the two-page cursory overview of
the picturesque. Here, Nead misses an opportunity to offer a more extended, theoretical treat-

ment of the “metropolitan picturesque” and how
this aesthetic category relates—or not—to the
other psycho-aesthetic touchstones for her work,
which are the sublime and the urban uncanny.
One might also rue the absence of an extended
treatment of the relic versus the ruin at the
book’s close.
The analysis of the book does grow stronger
as it unfolds. The Cremorne Gardens in the second section make for interesting reading, and
Nead is best at discussing London at night, the
uncanny, and what she calls a poetics of gas. The
final section on obscenity is most promising, for
here the Babylonic polyphony of Victorian London—what Nead calls the twin mission, to build
and destroy—hits the reader with full force. One
might wish that Nead had spent a bit more time
on obscenity (Where is Soho? Or Henry Mayhew’s prostitutes?) before extending her treatment to the more symbolic, architectural expression of obscenity-cum-obsolescence, the Temple
Bar. However, the fate of the Temple Bar is
nicely evocative of the ruin and, thus, takes the
reader full circle back to the ambiguities of modernity.
BARBARA J. BLACK
Cherry Lewis. The Dating Game: One Man’s
Search for the Age of the Earth. x Ⳮ 253 pp.,
illus., figs., bibl. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. $24.95.
Arthur Holmes was the founder of the modern
geological timescale. His slim book, The Age of
the Earth, first published in 1913 when he was
twenty-three, is a minor classic in the history of
geology. In it Holmes succinctly summed up the
state of geochronological knowledge at the beginning of the twentieth century, the problems
involved in the various methods previously proposed for quantitatively measuring geological
time, and the promise of the newly developed
methods of radioactive dating. For the next three
decades, he was the foremost advocate for developing the techniques for radioactive dating
and using them to determine the age of the earth
and to establish an accurate quantitative geological timescale. He was also an early proponent
of Wegener’s theory of continental drift, and his
text Principles of Physical Geology, published
in 1944, set a new standard for geological textbooks. But for much of his life Holmes was
something of an outsider in the British geological establishment, not from choice but from circumstance.
Cherry Lewis’s book is an episodic account of
Holmes’s life and contribution to geochronology
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intended more for the general reader than for historians or geologists. Her approach alternates
biographical narrative with nontechnical accounts of scientific issues, but at times her
stream-of-consciousness presentation leaves the
connection between the two unclear—at least to
me. Nearly one-fourth of the book, for example,
is devoted to accounts of Holmes’s ill-fated excursions to Mozambique in 1911–1912 and
Burma in 1920–1923. While these and other
biographical episodes illustrate the financial circumstances and personal decisions that kept
Holmes on the fringe of the geological community, they are rarely balanced by biographical information that might illuminate his development
as a scientist or explain what drove his passionate and, at times, almost solitary commitment to
formulating a quantitative geochronology based
on radioactive dating. Lewis’s discussion of the
scientific issues involved in geochronology are
generally as clear and accurate as the constraints
of simplification permit, but her choice of the
contexts in which these problems are discussed
strikes me as again highly selective. We are
given little indication, for example, as to why the
majority of geologists were so unreceptive to radioactive dating even as late as 1930. Even more
to the point, we are given only brief glimpses of
Holmes’s own researches.
Lewis writes fluently and with great enthusiasm for her subject. General readers will find this
enthusiasm appealing and the book a quick and
pleasant introduction to a fascinating geological
problem and to an important twentieth-century
geologist. Historians interested in a more sophisticated analysis of this important episode in
the history of geology and the complex scientist
who was its major protagonist will have to wait
a while longer.
The book contains a short selective bibliography but neither notes nor an index.
JOE D. BURCHFIELD
Paula Rebert. La Gran Linea: Mapping the
United States–Mexico Boundary, 1849–1857.
xx Ⳮ 259 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index. Austin:
University of Texas Press, 2001. $45 (cloth);
$22.95 (paper).
The boundary between the United States and
Mexico extends over almost two thousand miles
of challenging terrain between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. About 1,300 miles of
the border follow the Rio Grande and nearly
seven hundred miles run overland from the river
near El Paso westward across New Mexico, Arizona, and California to the sea. The cartographic

147

historian Paula Rebert relates the progress of the
survey of this boundary in meticulous detail,
covering the field work between 1849 and 1855
and the office work from 1850 to completion in
1857.
The need for the survey originated with the
war between Mexico and the United States in
1846–1848 and the subsequent treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. Mexico ceded huge parcels of
territory to the United States, and the boundary
survey defined the extent of the transfer. The survey was designed to be carried out independently
by two national commissions in ways that were
agreeable to both. Generally, the two sides met
to compare data, consult, and form agreements.
They usually managed to cooperate, with each
side showing enough flexibility to reach consensus.
The commissions used different methodologies. The Mexicans tended to favor triangulation
while the Americans emphasized actual measurement. There were other differences. American instruments were better and more plentiful,
and the map-drawing techniques of the commissions diverged. Other problems included the political pressures under which both worked, frequent turnover of commissioners, harsh field
conditions along the borderlands, and changes in
the course of the Rio Grande. The main point of
contention involved the location of the point at
which the boundary went west from the river
above El Paso, an issue that soured overall relations between members of the commissions.
Given these difficulties, precise agreement was
impossible.
Despite the many problems, the resultant
maps, consisting of two separate series of fiftyfour sheets, were very similar in content. They
each showed part of the boundary and the surrounding country, physical and cultural features
of the area, boundary monuments, and annotations. Rebert’s book includes photographs of
many of these maps. As she notes, “The final
maps were a great accomplishment” (p. 58).
Nevertheless, imperfections remained. The
shifting of the Rio Grande, unaddressed in the
treaty and impossible to anticipate, forced a resurvey in 1891–1896. The issue was not completely resolved until the treaty of 1970, which
codified the reality of the fluid boundary and
placed it in the middle of the channel that in
normal flow had the greatest average width. Despite the lingering problems that took more than
a century to resolve, Rebert views the survey,
which set a good precedent of engineers working
together in an environment of mutual respect, to
have been a success.
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The boundary survey was a complex enterprise. The commissioners, surveyors, and assistants included fascinating and distinguished figures, most notably, on the American side,
William H. Emory, a seasoned officer of the
Army’s Corps of Topographical Engineers whom
Rebert identifies as the dominant personality on
the survey. In addition to making maps, Emory
and his colleagues collected data on natural resources, made many drawings, amassed valuable
collections of plants and animals for the Smithsonian Institution, and studied the lives of borderlands peoples. His fellow Army topographer
Amiel W. Whipple even compiled a vocabulary
of the Yuma Indian language while surveying
the mouth of the Gila River. Rebert does not
devote much attention to these aspects of the enterprise. Her primary contribution is in her detailed narration of the surveys and the cartography, a story she covers well. This book will
interest all who specialize in the history of cartography and the boundary between the United
States and Mexico.
FRANK N. SCHUBERT
Randal S. Beeman; James A. Pritchard. A
Green and Permanent Land: Ecology and Agriculture in the Twentieth Century. (Development of Western Resources.) x Ⳮ 219 pp.,
bibls., index. Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2001. $29.95.
Randal Beeman and James Pritchard offer us
three reasons why we should care deeply about
agriculture: we all require food and even in the
seeming cornucopia of American farmland we
have the ever-present danger of food shortages,
the health of our families is intimately tied to the
quality of our food supply, and farming and farm
families are an important and inspirational part
of American society. This book attempts to “foster a better understanding of the centrality of
food production in the history of American civilization” (p. 6) by exploring the intersection of
ecology and agriculture. The premise of this
book is that ecological ideas have provided the
scientific guidelines and philosophical animus
for a different kind of farming that is gentler on
the land and people than is traditional agriculture. Accounts of the intersection of ecology and
agriculture have been scarce, and so the premise
is appealing.
Beeman and Pritchard support their thesis by
exploring the development of two extraordinary
agrarian reform movements in American history.
The short-lived permanent agriculture movement starting in the late nineteenth century

gained momentum with the crises of the Great
Depression and Dust Bowl. It promoted soil conservation and planning as an alternative to traditional farming practices. Similarly, the sustainable agriculture movement today, though
subdivided into agroecology, organic farming,
permaculture, and polyculture, can share underlying ethical principles that recognize the fragility and interconnectedness of living systems. It
was spurred in part by rapidly expanding pesticide use and economic upheaval. Agrarian reform, promoted by charismatic individuals such
as Edward Faulkner, Hugh Bennett, Louis
Bromfield, Paul Sears, and Wes Jackson, called
for nothing short of revolution in farming. Proponents were just as much concerned with preserving social resources as with natural resources
because a crisis of human spirit mirrored the crisis of the soil. The authors argue that both permanent and sustainable agriculture were founded
on ecological principles and a reaction to what
was perceived as a failure of traditional farming
practices to provide quality farm products,
healthy soils, and desirable livelihoods.
Beeman and Pritchard subtitle their book
“Ecology and Agriculture” in part because for
Sears and Faulkner “permanent agriculture was
far more than conservation, requiring an ecological worldview that required reverence for life
and respect for nature” (p. 75). Nevertheless, this
book would be better subtitled “Conservation
and Agriculture” because little of the intellectual
content of the science of ecology appears in it
and even less of its application to agriculture.
The work of Alfred Lotka, Vito Volterra, Georgii Gause, G. Evelyn Hutchinson, Robert MacArthur, and Carl Huffaker certainly influenced
traditional agriculture, but their connection to alternative agriculture is unclear. Although Beeman and Pritchard describe some early ecological models of vegetation change in both
theoretical and philosophical terms, they provide
little evidence of farmers actually using the science of ecology as it was used in range science.
They write of agrarian reformers using ecological holism and techniques to create a new environmental ethics and a “new devotion to ecological stewardship and responsibility” (p. 101). In
effect they conflate environmental and ecological tenets, equating ecology with ethical and
spiritual outlooks on nature because “ecology
based itself on then-prevailing currents such as
interdependence, balance, and harmony” (p. 35).
They suggest that the eclipse of permanent agriculture was due in part to “divisions within the
guiding force of ecology” (p. 77), though they
do not say what that guiding force was or who

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 93 : 1 (2002)

149

represented it. Because they never clearly lay out
when they are using “ecology” to refer to a budding science or when they are borrowing a layman’s use of “ecology” that refers to the interconnectedness of all organisms and a sense of
holism, they obscure their very important treatment of agrarian reform movements.
This book is less a history of the impact of
ecological science on agriculture and agrarian reform than it is an analysis of the role of environmental philosophy in spurring changes in farming practices. Nevertheless, it is a valuable
account of extraordinary events in the history of
American farming. Beeman and Pritchard present fascinating stories of agricultural visionaries
striving to better the world around them. This
combination of environmental history and prescriptive remedy for our agricultural ills provides
thought-provoking reading.
SARA TJOSSEM
Donald MacMillan. Smoke Wars: Anaconda
Copper, Montana Air Pollution, and the Courts,
1890–1924. xviii Ⳮ 296 pp., illus., index. Helena: Montana Historical Press, 2000. $40
(cloth); $18.95 (paper).

L. O. Evans, counsel for the Amalgamated
Copper Company in the Bliss case (from
MacMillan, Smoke Wars, p. 121).

Butte, Montana, lies at the headwaters of the nation’s largest Superfund site. Donald MacMillan’s book is a morality tale about this environmental travesty—a story of damaged health and
environment, futile efforts by citizens and government to halt that damage, and demoralization
resulting from those failed efforts.
MacMillan’s story covers the period from the
1880s to the 1930s. In the first phase, he describes the struggle between the young city of
Butte and negligent smelter owners. In the second, the smelter owners shifted the problem to a
nearby town and surrounding farmers. In the
third, the federal government attempted to enforce conservation policy.
When miners first settled Butte in the 1860s,
they found a lush valley high amid the peaks of
the Continental Divide. By 1890 Butte was a major source of copper for a growing nation. Ore
was roasted in open heaps a city block long. Sulfur and arsenic fumes killed vegetation for miles
around. When winter inversions trapped smoke,
residents suffered nosebleeds and vomited in the
streets. Up to eighty people a month died in this
town of just 40,000.
The city sent abatement notices. Mine owners
ignored them, arguing, “No smoke, no wages for
workingmen.” Though open heap roasting ended
because it was inefficient, new roasting furnaces
did little to ease the problem. The growth of the

Anaconda Copper Mining Company (ACM) did
end the problem—at least for Butte residents. By
1906 nearly all of Butte’s ore was shipped
twenty-six miles down the valley to ACM’s Anaconda smelter. Each day it belched thirty tons
of arsenic and 2,500 tons of sulfur into the air.
Whole herds of horses, cattle, and sheep lay
wasted in the fields. ACM paid $330,000 for
damages within five miles of the Washoe but
refused compensation to more distant farmers.
Afflicted farmers filed a lawsuit, offering to
settle for a $1,175,000 buyout of their 60,525
acres. ACM declared their land not worth
$500,000 and then spent nearly $1 million to
prove it. Farmers lost when the judge—who socialized with ACM executives—found against
the farmers in 1909. ACM had utilized “best
known methods” and therefore should not be liable for any damages.
Smoke poisoned national forest lands as well
as farmers’ fields. Trees within twenty-five miles
of Anaconda were dead or damaged. President
Theodore Roosevelt and Chief Forester Gifford
Pinchot initiated an investigation through the
U.S. attorney general’s office that eventually
sought $4 million in damages from ACM. The
company stalled, hoping for a more tolerant administration following the elections of 1908. In
1911 President William Howard Taft, trusting
industry to do the right thing, created the “An-
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aconda smoke commission”—a group of industry and government advisors—to oversee
ACM’s implementation of pollution controls. In
1916 ACM’s smelter still emitted sixty-two tons
of arsenic and 1,700 tons of sulfur each day.
In 1924 ACM finally took effective steps to
remove most of the arsenic from its emissions.
Because of high demand for arsenic insecticides
to fight boll weevils, ACM made considerable
profit on arsenic recovery. Problems with farmers ended when the farmers, financially bankrupt
from their lawsuit, sold “smoke rights” or easements to ACM. Problems with the federal
government ended after 1928 when President
Herbert Hoover, who promoted governmentindustrial partnership, approved the swap of
healthy ACM timberlands for damaged national
forest.
As a resident of Butte, it is hard for me to keep
in mind that this is a historical account. Although
ACM’s smelting operations ended in 1974, the
legacy of cultural and environmental damage
lingers on. The morning newspaper reported
forty-six homes in Butte contaminated with lead
and arsenic: “The federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is conducting an
investigation, and encourages all children to be
tested.”
PAT MUNDAY
George S. Levit. Biogeochemistry–Biosphere–
Noosphere: The Growth of the Theoretical System of Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky. (Studien
zur Theorie der Biologie, 4.) 116 pp., bibl. Berlin: Verlag für Wissenschaft und Bildung, 2001.
DM 28.
V. I. Vernadsky (1863–1945) was a star of Soviet science. Applying a mineralogist’s perspective to the phenomena of life, he founded the
sciences of geochemistry and biogeochemistry
and developed the concepts of “living matter,”
“biosphere,” and “noosphere.” George Levit
claims that Vernadsky’s work has not been thoroughly organized or interpreted even by Russians. Accordingly, he devotes over half of this
book to a “reconstruction and analysis” of Vernadsky’s theoretical system, beginning with his
notions of space and time as they apply to organisms. Vernadsky observed that living bodies
escape entropy, that they are “dissymmetrical,”
and that all their processes, including evolution,
are irreversible.
Levit contends that Vernadsky’s views on the
logic and methodology of science are vague and
sporadic. He declares his philosophy of science
to be a version of “radical empiricism,” which

holds that scientific theories are merely forms of
the description of one’s sensations. He was a
phenomenalist and a positivist. However, his notion of the noosphere was metaphysical and not
empirical.
Most significantly, Vernadsky claimed that
the biosphere is a geological envelope that has
determined the geochemical history of almost all
of the elements of the earth’s crust. Levit shows
that Vernadsky viewed life as one of the general
manifestations of reality alongside matter, energy, space, and time. Its properties are determined by such cosmic phenomena as gravitation
and solar radiation. And so, Vernadsky believed,
it must be cosmic in its scope. Once it comes
into existence, it cannot die out.
In the 1920s Vernadsky became convinced
that the development of thought similarly was a
natural phenomenon rooted in the very structure
of the biosphere. He developed the notion of the
noosphere in Paris in the company of Henri
Bergson, Edouard Le Roy, and Teilhard de Chardin. Since the seventeenth century, he argued,
the growth of scientific knowledge has been the
main force influencing the geochemistry of the
earth.
In the latter third of his book, Levit compares
Vernadsky’s theoretical system to three related
ones. With Teilhard, Vernadsky shared a basic
terminology, methodological principles, and an
implicit teleology. Unlike Vernadsky, however,
Teilhard believed that eventually the noosphere
would be replaced by a super-mind that would
release thought from its material matrix. In the
1960s James Lovelock introduced the Gaia hypothesis, which holds that the earth itself is a
kind of homeostatic self-regulating organism.
Although Vernadsky would likely have been dubious, Levit discerns no fundamental differences
between his biosphere and Gaia.
Finally, V. N. Beklemishev, a Russian zoologist, also concluded that life controls the processing of matter in the biosphere. However,
while Vernadsky interpreted the phenomena biogeochemically, as a flow of chemical elements,
Beklemishev viewed it morphologically. There
is, he argued, neither life nor death, simply more
or less material organization. Most approaches to
the biosphere, writes Levit, are located within the
Beklemishev–Vernadsky spectrum of opinion.
Levit admires Vernadsky’s attempt to include
biological, geological, social, and cultural processes as parts of a single planetary process.
Nevertheless, he concludes that Vernadsky
failed to show convincingly that the empirical
basis of his biosphere theory supports his claims
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about the inevitable transition from biosphere to
noosphere.
This terse and dense book reads like a reworked thesis. It badly needs editing by someone
whose first language is English. There is a substantial bibliography but no index. Instead of
endnotes or footnotes, there are maddening references in parentheses. At least twice, I found
that a reference had no corresponding bibliographic entry. It all makes for an ineffably tedious treatment of what is potentially a truly intriguing subject.
ELIZABETH HAIGH
Brian Black. Petrolia: The Landscape of America’s First Oil Boom. xiv Ⳮ 236 pp., illus., tables, app., index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. $42.50.
The history of the modern oil industry begins
along Oil Creek in August 1859 when Edwin
Drake and Billy Smith found petroleum at the
bottom of their well. Over the next decade and
a half, Petrolia, the name given to this region in
northwest Pennsylvania, produced more oil than
anywhere else on earth. In the process, Petrolia
became a massive industrial site and a vivid cultural image. Understanding this profound dual
transformation is the object of Brian Black’s sensitively drawn portrait of the landscape of America’s first oil boom.
A landscape, according to Black, is a place
where culture and nature meet, and in the 1860s
a devastating crash occurred when the natural oil
of Oil Creek met the commercial demand for
lamp and machine oil. Oil Creek had been a
quiet, lightly populated agricultural region
whose sense of place was entirely self-constructed by the local farmers. After Drake’s discovery, the area became a place of unprecedented exploitation whose identity was hastily
assembled by the thousands of outsiders that
flooded the area looking for work, riches, or an
exciting newspaper story. Petrolia soon became
a mythic boom, a mania, a craze. Distant capitalists and recently arrived entrepreneurs painted
fantastic pictures of endless and easy wealth. Oil
became a prized commodity, and everything
else—animals, plants, people, and even the
creek itself—became expendable in a singleminded market designed to pump as much oil as
fast as possible. There seemed no legal, economic, or natural limitation to the exploitation—
or to the boom mentality. Petrolia became the
very embodiment of greed and speculation, instantaneous wealth and sudden failure. Its mores
were as ephemeral as its transient population.
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All this is grist for Black’s ethical mill, and
he grinds it well, perhaps too relentlessly. There
is no doubt that looking at the exploitation of oil
from the obliteration of the wooded valleys, or
the filth of boomtown streets, or the emptiness
of ghost towns (as Black does with startling effect when studying contemporary photographs
of Petrolia) reveals a sacrificial landscape—an
environment abused, wasted, ruined, and despoiled in pursuit of profit. Certainly Black is on
firm ground when he ties what happened in Petrolia to what happened in Gilded Age America
as a whole, but he may overstate the case when
he argues that “industrial rationalization would
never allow . . . humanitarianism to penetrate the
utilitarian logic of Petrolia” (p. 167).
Was the logic of oil so ruthless and the motives of the Petrolians so shortsighted as to miss
what was happening around them and what they
were doing to themselves? They took photographs, after all. They criticized and complained
endlessly about the mud, the floods, and the fires.
Certain towns curbed land speculation, restricted
development, and preserved a sense of community. And capitalists, by definition investors who
try to reduce risk, worked to bring stability to
petroleum production and prices. Black describes (but nevertheless discounts) these valiant
if sometimes vain efforts to restrain the oil rush.

Landscape of Petrolia (from Black, Petrolia,
p. 177).
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But taken together, they seem to suggest more
of a struggle—communities versus companies,
humanitarianism versus utilitarianism—than
Black acknowledges.
Many of those involved in the seeming chaos
that was Petrolia wanted the oil industry to become a permanent, predictable branch of mining.
This was especially true for the engineers, scientists, and other petroleum experts. To this end,
Black provides a useful sketch of the technology
of oil production (how to sink a well) along with
a brief explanation of petroleum geology. He
concludes, however, that none of these experts
had much effect on the problems. “Science and
technology were clearly tools of industry in Petrolia” (p. 72).
To an extent. In Black’s account, the oil “industry” was a collective evil. Equal parts cultural
and economic, it acts like a numberless, faceless
mob, gripped by “oil on the brain” and motivated
by an all-pervasive ethic of progress and an insatiable drive to make money. It reduces to the
sharp end of a rod used to bore through the earth
for oil—environmentally insensitive and destructive. As an analytical device, however, “industry” is a blunt tool. Not all wells struck oil,
not all companies manipulated knowledge and
technique to their own purpose. Experts (independent and trustworthy) learned quite a bit and
quite quickly about the habits of oil. The divining rod was not the most acceptable method of
exploration (cf. p. 46). Again, there was more of
a struggle—sci-tech versus random wildcatting—than Black allows.
The suggestion of situated struggles, however,
does not detract from Black’s larger theme. Petrolia was environmental hell. Black has rendered this nightmarish landscape into a powerful
and at times passionate story about the physical
changes to the land and its meaning (how Americans then and now view, value, and understand
the place). If there is a lesson to be found in
Petrolia, it is that the modern oil industry is truly
an American creation.
PAUL LUCIER
Harry Von Kroge. Gema: Birthplace of German Radar and Sonar. Translated by Louis
Brown. Foreword by Louis Brown. x Ⳮ 206
pp., illus., bibl., index. Bristol/Philadelphia:
Institute of Physics Publishing, 2000. $73,
£45.
This book by Harry Von Kroge provides a short
yet detailed technical and business history of
Gema, the firm most prominent in the development of radar and sonar in Germany during

World War II. Along with the technical detail,
this case study is valuable because of the light it
shines on the ambivalent relationships between
armament contractors and the various branches of
the German armed forces, the difficulties inherent
in developing, testing, and manufacturing new
technology in Germany during World War II, and
the cooperation and competition between different firms.
This book has limitations for the historian.
References to sources are minimal and sometimes incomplete—no location for the documents is given. No attempt is made to compare
the German work with its Allied counterpart,
with the result that the reader cannot really judge
Gema’s achievement. Finally, with very few exceptions, this book reads as if national socialism
did not exist and Gema was merely a firm located
in a country at war.
MARK WALKER
Hugh R. Slotten. Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in the United
States, 1920–1960. xviii Ⳮ 308 pp., illus., bibl.,
index. Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. $45.
This well-researched book will be of immense
value to the person who will someday write the
full story of broadcast regulation in the United
States. That story still needs to be written; although in this book the facts are all presented,
the story behind the facts is not.
Well, actually, not quite all the facts are here
either. For example, similar problems tackled in
other countries such as Canada, even before the
United States began looking into them, aren’t
even mentioned. (The Canadian government began regulating radio in 1905, fifteen years before
the U.S. regulations considered here.) True, the
title of the book specifies that it is limited to the
United States, but to understand the regulations
presented we should certainly have some knowledge of how others had attacked the same problem.
More important, Hugh Slotten totally ignores
the personalities of the people involved. This is
a tremendously important consideration, for to
understand what happened we must know something about the motives of the people who made
the decisions, and since many of the motives
were hidden under layers of varying complexity
and political beliefs we would like to know
something about the personalities of the players.
(This would also make the book easier to read,
which was clearly not the main concern of the
author, but it couldn’t hurt.) Someone at the
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Johns Hopkins Press evidently noticed the problem, but the only attempt at fixing it was to lie
blatantly on the bookjacket: “His [Slotten’s] discussion of the early years of radio examines
powerful personalities—including navy secretary Josephus Daniels and commerce secretary
Herbert Hoover.” But there is no discussion at
all of the personalities of these men. Daniels is
mentioned in only two sentences, neither of
which touches on him as a person, and although
Hoover occurs in several more, nothing of his
“personality” is thrown in.
Lee De Forest is another example. On page 4
he is identified as the inventor of the audion (or
triode vacuum tube). On page 61 we read of his
“invention” [sic] of that device. Why the quotation marks around “invention”? Did he or
didn’t he invent it? Actually, there is a good
story to be told about that, but you won’t read it
here. De Forest played an active role in the regulation controversies, and this role is made clear
in the book. But precisely because of this,
wouldn’t it be interesting to know that De Forest
was arrested and went to trial for crooked stock
manipulation in connection with the audion? The
only hint at such activities is Slotten’s statement
that De Forest was a “maverick.” Wouldn’t that
one word make you want to know more about
him, if only to evaluate his quoted remarks on
governmental interference and regulations?
Other matters of interest are passed by, as
when on page 48 we read: “Decisions about who
should receive licenses . . . could . . . be based
on such qualitative issues as the character of
broadcasts . . . and the educational benefits.”
What a can of worms this opens up! Or should
open up. Is the government going to censor
broadcasting by denying licenses to stations that
publicize alternative methods of government,
such as communism? How about religious or
ethnic controversies: will these be deemed “educational” or subversive? Is the government,
through its licensing powers, going to let the
public hear only what it wants it to hear, à la
Goebbels and Germany? Well, we’ll never
know, for this particular can is not opened by the
author; after this one mention, the subject is
never broached again.
In summary, if you are actively researching
this field, Slotten’s book is a must for you. But
the full story of radio and television regulation
in the United States is still to be written.
DAVID E. FISHER
David A. Kirsch. The Electric Vehicle and the
Burden of History. xiv Ⳮ 291 pp., illus., figs.,
tables, bibl., index. New Brunswick, N.J./Lon-
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don: Rutgers University Press, 2000. $52 (cloth);
$20 (paper).
Recent energy problems in California, combined
with gyrating U.S. gasoline prices, have brought
renewed attention to the energy efficiency of
American automobiles. But this timely study by
David Kirsch examines a set of historical questions related to electric vehicles. A century ago
electric-powered vehicles seriously contended in
the emerging market for automobiles. The internal combustion engine soon won out, but Kirsch
shows that the explanation does not lie in common assumptions about a supposed technical superiority of gasoline engines. In line with the
best recent scholarship in the history of technology, this volume demonstrates the complicated
web of social, business, and environmental issues that, interwoven with technical factors, produce a more nuanced story of technical change,
namely, the market failure of the electric vehicle.
Specifically, Kirsch demolishes as simplistic the
efforts to pin the failure of the electric car on its
battery.
Kirsch’s history begins with the formation and
activities of the Electric Vehicle Company
(EVC), the leading maker of electric cars. In
1897, EVC emerged in the context of early experiments with electric cars and grew into a large
enterprise pursuing a marketing strategy of providing taxi services in large cities. Most automobile pioneers assumed that each power plant
would prove best suited for certain activities.
Electric-vehicle promoters embraced this logic
of separate spheres, envisioning electric cars as
best suited for short urban trips (taxis and electric delivery trucks) and for women drivers. Unfortunately, drivers of gasoline cars did not respect these boundaries. So even as EVC
pioneered ideas such as interchangeable battery
racks for cabs, their vehicles slowly lost in the
competition. The demise of the company in 1912
was as much organizational as technical, however, for the various branches of the company’s
operations failed to follow standard practices designed to produce good service, not to mention
profits.
Kirsch tells similar stories about other efforts
to promote and sell electric vehicles. Thus attempts to link electric cars and central power
generating stations went nowhere, despite a
seemingly obvious fit. Utilities were attempting
to build load, and battery charging at night promised to smooth load curves. Once again, however, Kirsch traces a pattern of missed business
opportunities and organizational failures that
amplified the technical challenges posed by bat-
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tery power. In the end, utilities and electric vehicles never developed a suitable working relationship. A similar fate befell electric delivery
trucks, even though they survived in a few East
Coast cities for a longer time. Finally, efforts to
develop an infrastructural base analogous to gasoline filling stations also went nowhere. Taken
together, these sections of Kirsch’s book are designed to show “might have been” elements to
this complicated story.
Kirsch offers a number of original ideas as
he follows this story along the path of history.
He devotes a chapter to the idea, for example,
that the electric vehicle actually survives within
the internal combustion car, which he sees as a
gasoline-electric hybrid. Beginning with the
adoption of the electric starter as a standard element of the “normal” automobile, this hybrid nature was reinforced by the introduction of electric
lighting, radios, and other electrically powered accessories. Kirsch also discusses the environmental
impact of automobiles and closes with a chapter
suggesting that the approaches of industrial ecology offer a promising way of thinking about the
technology/environment interface. Overall, he
makes an important contribution to the scholarly
literature on technical failures, a topic that several
historians have recently examined in order to
highlight the importance of attention to alternative
pathways—successful and otherwise. As has
been the case in other such studies, the result is a
much more complex, but also much more compelling and plausible, historical account. Kirsch’s
study is a model of the current work in the history
of technology.
BRUCE E. SEELY
Ann Hibner Koblitz. Science, Women, and Revolution in Russia. xv Ⳮ 211 pp., glossary, bibl.,
index. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000. $45.
The 1860s—the epoch of great reforms—
brought to Russia a remarkable assortment of
official actions that emancipated the serfs, liberalized the judicial system, created zemstva as
experiments in limited local self-government,
granted universities an unprecedented scope of
academic autonomy, and dramatically enlarged
the number of young Russians enrolled in the
leading Western universities in search of higher
degrees in the sciences. These and similar reforms created an atmosphere favoring women’s
access to professional positions and contributing
to the removal of the harshest aspects of the lingering patriarchal system.
Ann Hibner Koblitz’s book offers a richly

documented and judiciously analyzed portrayal
of the widening scope of Russian women’s active participation in the professional life of the
nation. The book’s analysis operates on two levels: the general dynamics of the rising social
pressure to expand the range of professions open
to women, and the personal experiences of individual women selected for special analysis.
Koblitz is fully aware that the process of the
emancipation and professional advancement of
women was occasionally disrupted by adverse
shifts in government policies. Concentrating primarily on the 1860s, this book makes many references to subsequent developments and provides enough documented information to create
an adequate picture of the state of women’s
emancipation and professional employment during the waning decades of the nineteenth century.
As might have been expected, Koblitz devotes
the most interesting and penetrating analysis to
the life and work of the mathematician Sofia Kovalevskaia, the brightest star in the emancipation
movement and a most respected model of high
professional aspiration and achievement. Inspired by the philosophy and ideology of the Nihilist movement of the 1860s, Kovalevskaia decided to enter the challenging world of science,
specializing in mathematics, the queen in the
world of scientific thought. The Nihilists made
the idea of close interdependence of science and
democracy a pivotal point of their ideology. Encouraged and guided by the well-known German
mathematician Karl Weierstrass of Göttingen
University, Kovalevskaia published a series of
mathematical papers that attracted wide professional attention. Henri Poincaré, a leading mathematical physicist, referred to the paper that
brought her the Prix Bordin from the Paris Academy of Sciences as a “celebrated memoir.” The
Petersburg Academy of Sciences elected Kovalevskaia an honorary member, the first woman to
receive such a high honor—she was not, however, allowed to work for a magisterial degree in
Russia, a requirement for university employment.
Koblitz shows that despite compounded obstructions on the path to professional achievement, women’s gains in Russia were equal to
those in the West. Her study provides solid information and cogent comments on the historical
background and the educational role of the
higher courses for women established in all major cities. Women, however, had less difficulty
in acquiring higher education than in finding employment commensurate with their professional
qualifications. Their employment by institutions
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devoted to scientific research was almost always
at the level of auxiliary personnel. I. P. Pavlov’s
main laboratory showed that even at this level
there were women who not only manifested originality in experimental work but also published
advanced scientific papers. In his classic volume
on the development of the theory of conditioned
reflexes, Pavlov referred to the publications of
eleven women.
This book is welcome as the first solid effort
to draw a general picture of the multiple ramifications of the ascent of Russian women to professional positions in science. It also contributes
to a better understanding of the growing movement in favor of broader participation by women
in the full spectrum of professional activities.
This book is a rich source of topics for special
studies.
ALEXANDER VUCINICH
C. Wright Mills. Letters and Autobiographical
Writings. Edited by Kathryn Mills and Pamela
Mills. Introduction by Dan Wakefield. xxviii Ⳮ
378 pp., illus., apps., bibl., index. Berkeley/Los
Angeles/London: University of California Press,
2000. $34.95.
C. Wright Mills’s daughters have selected 150
of 600 of their father’s letters to family, friends,
and colleagues covering successive phases of his
career: student rebellion in the Texas years, collaboration with the Wisconsin sociologist Hans
Gerth on the translations in From Max Weber
(1946), his major sociological works, foreign
travel, and the antinuclear and pro-Castro advocacy that made him a New Left icon even before his death from a heart attack in 1962. The
editors delete references to “purely private” (p.
xiv) matters, omit comments that might offend
the living, and note that the record is less than
complete since much of Mills’s correspondence
did not survive. The result is nonetheless an interesting if skewed portrait of America’s most
famous academic radical, supplementing but not
replacing Irving Louis Horowitz’s masterful C.
Wright Mills: An American Utopian (Free Press,
1983).
Silences and omissions, although sometimes
revealing, leave many questions unanswered. The
letters tell more about professional quarrels and
the politics of publishing than cross-fertilization
within Mills’s intellectual circle. Only one letter
represents his longtime friendship with the historian Richard Hofstadter—already soured by
the time Mills commented on a draft of the Age
of Reform (1955): “god it is thin stuff” (p. 189).
Numerous letters chronicle Mills’s troubled part-
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nership with Gerth, although less harshly than in
Guy Oakes and Arthur Vidich’s Collaboration,
Reputation, and Ethics in American Academic
Life: Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (University of Illinois Press, 1999). Useful editorial
notes describe Mills’s habit of breaking with former allies, notably Daniel Bell, Irving Howe,
and Dwight MacDonald. But the letters shed little additional light on these relationships. No letters represent his colleague Robert Lynd, one of
several Columbia influences on the anti-Columbia manifesto The Sociological Imagination
(1959). All in all, Mills appears to have suffered
little from the 1950s Red Scare. He condemns
McCarthyism retrospectively but dismisses early
reports that the FBI is watching him (a story detailed in Mike Forrest Keen’s Stalking the Sociological Imagination: J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI
Surveillance of American Sociology [Greenwood
Press, 1999]). A product of his time, Mills ignored issues of gender and race. “A woman, any
woman, looks best at her prayers,” he noted during his first trip to Europe in 1956 (p. 211). Although women figure in the letters as wives
(three), lovers (two), and sociological collaborators, the correspondence is essentially silent regarding what he termed “my women and all of
that . . . a tale of monstrous tragedies” (p. 254).
He also was not much interested in the “Negro
problem,” even though he personally condemned racism.
On balance, these letters present a more complex and conflicted figure than the Mills of legend, New Left or otherwise. An academic bad
boy, he nonetheless played the professor game
with consummate skill, creating alliances, outflanking rivals, and cultivating references for
foundation grants and visiting lectureships. Although a critic of capitalism, he was increasingly
both creature and captive of the literary marketplace, measuring success in terms of sales and
publishers’ advances. Denouncing the rich, he
talked constantly of money and things, planned
his country homes and their furnishings down to
the smallest detail, loved foreign travel, and worshiped his BMW motorcycle (the “roar of an
R-69 being bench-tested,” he wrote, was preferable to the world’s “finest cathedral” [p. 197]).
Despite a surface bravado, he was also deeply
sensitive to criticism.
As “Charlie” of Texas becomes “C. Wright”
of New York, it is tempting to view Mills as a
self-invented, self-promoting outsider in the tradition of the Great Gatsby, a likeness noted by
friends and critics. But the deeper truth is that
Mills apparently saw the tragedy of this role
even as he played it. “[It] saddened me horribly,”
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he wrote Gerth after reading Fitzgerald’s novel,
adding that his “personal reaction” made it impossible to discuss the book in a letter (p. 64).
Mills’s turbulent, too-short life deserves attention not only for what he taught about society
and sociology but what he teaches about ourselves.
ROBERT C. BANNISTER
䡲 Recent (1950– )
C. J. Mozzochi. The Fermat Diary. xii Ⳮ 196
pp., frontis., illus., apps., bibl., index. Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society,
2000. $29.
This is the diary of an observant mathematician
who documented the drama of the resolution of
Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT) as it unfolded
around him from 1993 to 1995. Pierre Fermat
claimed around 1637, in the most famous marginalia in the history of mathematics, to have a
proof of the theorem that xn Ⳮ yn ⳱ zn has no
whole number solutions for n greater than 2. The
other principal figure is the British mathematician Andrew Wiles, who emigrated to Princeton
University in the 1980s and who in 1993, at what
for mathematicians is the relatively advanced
age of forty, announced a proof of FLT. In the
course of Wiles’s initial exposition to mathematicians, before a full-fledged proof could be
published, a gap was discovered. This was too
late to forestall announcements in the world
press of an imminent proof. What had been an
almost secretive devotion to the task by Wiles
now became a rather more public and pressurized effort over the course of nearly a year. Wiles
wondered at times if success could be achieved,
but with the help of other mathematicians the
gap was filled in and the full formal proof published in 1995.
The statement of the theorem is likely to be
the only part of the 1990s story that a nonspecialist can immediately appreciate, and the author has not especially addressed his book to the
nonspecialist. Rather, this account is analogous
to a well-illustrated exhibition guidebook that
serves as a memento and record to those who
visited in person but that is not intended fully to
inform those who did not experience it. For a
broader account of the historical and mathematical background a reader can consult the three
principal books published previously on the
same topic by Amir Aczel, Simon Singh, and
Alfred J. van der Poorten. The author knew
many of the main players, attended most of the
key talks, took notes, made recordings, and pho-

tographed. A major part of the book is a selection
of sixty-two photographs from the total of three
thousand made by the author. He asked questions of Wiles and others and recorded both formal and informal reactions that he observed
around him during the many public and nonpublic presentations that were made. Also, in
keeping with the journal nature of his work, he
has recorded his own reactions. Appendixes include an excerpt from Wiles’s 1995 Annals of
Mathematics publication and a synopsis by Ram
Murty of the key results by Gerhard Frey, JeanPierre Serre, and Kenneth Ribet that formed a
basis for Wiles’s work.
It may interest historians and archivists to
learn of the extent to which the primary sources
for this story include e-mail, web pages, photographs, and newspaper and television interviews.
Though we recognize this reality of contemporary science, a diary account probably brings the
issue home more directly than would studies by
professional historians, who might feel obligated
to do more of their own interviews, for example,
rather than rely on the media. Mathematics has
rarely had such a public spotlight turned on it—
the proof of the four-color theorem in 1976 is
the only comparable event that comes to mind.
Consequently, it has opened an unusual window
into how mathematicians do mathematics.
ALBERT C. LEWIS
David H. Levy. Shoemaker by Levy: The Man
Who Made an Impact. xvi Ⳮ 303 pp., illus., tables, bibl., index. Princeton, N.J./Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2000. $27.50,
£15.95.
This book, written by a close friend, recounts
episodes in the life and career of Eugene M.
Shoemaker (1928–1997), an ever-youthful geologist with a passionate interest in applying
geological principles to the moon and planets. In
the early 1960s Shoemaker persuaded the U.S.
Geological Survey to found an Astrogeology
Branch, of which he served as the first director,
to search for impact scars on the earth and to
map the moon and other planetary bodies. He
also played a leadership role in persuading
NASA to include scientific investigations in its
plans for the Apollo missions. In the 1970s,
when images from spacecraft revealed the presence of impact craters on all the rocky planets
and satellites, he declared that the impact of solid
bodies was the most fundamental process to have
taken place on the terrestrial planets. Acting on
this insight, he helped to transform geology from
an earth-centered to a planetary science. Eugene
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Shoemaker was, indeed, a man who made an impact.
Details of Shoemaker’s career and his many
accomplishments have been documented elsewhere, including the numerous citations for honors bestowed upon him and, sadly, his recent
obituaries. In this book David Levy, an amateur
astronomer and a collaborator with Gene Shoemaker and his wife, Carolyn, gives us personal
reminiscences that are available nowhere else.
Levy writes in a relaxed, anecdotal style that
adds new information and a great sense of fun
to this story.
Levy tells us, for example, that as a young
member of the U.S. Geological Survey, Gene
broke with a stern tradition by bringing his wife
and children to live with him in his field camps,
arguing that their presence made him more rather
than less efficient in conducting his work. It was
perfectly natural, then, for Gene and Carolyn,
decades later, to work together in the Australian
outback, where they discovered ten previously
unknown impact scars and confirmed several
more suspected ones.
From 1948 onward Gene harbored a fervent
desire to go to the moon, a wish Levy ascribes
to his view of a spectacular moonrise over the
Colorado Plateau. Back then, such ideas were
pure science fiction; but years later, when a real
possibility arose, Gene was overcome by a mystifying loss of energy. When his doctor found
nothing wrong, Gene and Carolyn took a river
trip, hoping to restore his strength and spirits.
But his condition worsened until he found a doctor who recognized, on sight, that Gene was a
victim of Addison’s disease, a formerly fatal illness that could be controlled by cortisone. On
taking his second dose, Gene felt his energy returning, but he—like his contemporary President John Kennedy—was obliged to take cortisone every day for the rest of his life. This
dashed Gene’s hopes of going to the moon himself, but he redoubled his efforts to provide geological training to the fighter-pilot astronauts
who did go there.
Beginning in the 1970s, Gene and Carolyn
performed systematic searches of the night skies
for comets and Near Earth Objects—bodies in
orbits that might cause collisions with the earth.
Levy joined in many of their searches, and the
three of them shared the ultimate triumph of discovering their ninth comet together—Shoemaker-Levy 9—and watching more than twenty
luminous fragments of it plunge one by one into
the atmosphere of Jupiter. Several of the pieces
sent up dark plumes that lasted more than a year
and would have been large enough to envelope
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the entire earth. No doubt remained that impacts
could cause global damage to earth’s lithosphere
and biosphere were such impactors to strike our
own planet. Levy tells us that as the last few
pieces disappeared Carolyn lamented the loss of
“her string of pearls”; as a consolation, Gene surprised her with the gift of a string of pearls.
This book is not, nor was it intended to be, a
serious biography based on extensive interviews
and archival research. Regrettably, its excellence
as a personal account is somewhat marred by the
lack of attention from a good fact checker and
editor, who would have fixed the slips that appear here and there. For example, on page 41
Levy describes Meteor Crater as being 1.2 kilometers across, and on page 43 as being 1.3
kilometers across—a small but needless discrepancy (the “official” diameter is 1.18 km). On
page 144 we read that when Gene brought a carload of students to the Grand Canyon, “a steady
snow was falling as they made their way into the
canyon. Gene showed a lot of enthusiasm—after
all it was his crater!” Clearly, several sentences
are missing from between these two sentences.
Such lapses are minor, but they are sufficiently
common to make the book unreliable as a source
of facts. Nevertheless, it is a delightful book that
can be strongly recommended to general readers
and also to specialists, both for their enjoyment
and for the personal details it will add to their
knowledge of Eugene Shoemaker’s contributions to science.
URSULA B. MARVIN
Tony Jones. Splitting the Second: The Story of
Atomic Time. x Ⳮ 199 pp., illus., figs., tables,
app., index. Bristol/Philadelphia: Institute of
Physics Publishing, 2000. $19.99, £14.99 (paper).
Science writer Tony Jones, a research astronomer by training, has given us a lucid history of
timekeeping and time distribution, one that emphasizes the last fifty years of developments.
These five decades are among the most significant in the long history of advances in the accuracy of time measurement. Indeed, during the
period our fundamental unit of time—the second—was redefined in terms of an invariant
property of the cesium atom, thereby abandoning
its longtime astronomical basis.
Writing in a popular style, Jones begins at an
elementary level, describing how time was based
on the rotation of the Earth. He details the nature
of the corrections that were applied to the passage of the Sun’s center over the observer’s meridian in order to produce a uniform time system,
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one in which all days had the same duration,
within small fractions of a second. He highlights
improvements in the precision of timekeepers
and how they led to a better understanding of the
Earth’s motion and, eventually, to the need for
a more uniform time scale. Jones provides easyto-understand examples of various phenomena
affecting modern timekeeping, giving readers an
appreciation of the technologies as well as the
exciting physics associated with the myriad advances. In addition, he describes a number of
uses of precise time to demonstrate the linkage
between laboratory devices and the complementary distribution of very precise time signals. The
most important application today is probably the
global positioning system (GPS) of satellites,
whose onboard atomic clocks have revolutionized air and sea navigation and which give us the
means to know time accurately anywhere in the
world.
An author writing a summary history necessarily draws upon the works of others, and apparently Jones used the late Derek Howse’s history of nineteenth-century timekeeping as given
in Greenwich Time and the Discovery of the
Longitude, published in 1980 and revised in
1997. The later edition is more properly a reissue, for its text does not reflect current understanding of the history of timekeeping and astronomy—despite the fact that the sources are
listed in Howse’s bibliography and notes. Thus
we have Jones repeating Howse’s erroneous
statement that the Greenwich time ball was the
“world’s first regular public time signal” and
writing that “in 1884 an international conference
in Washington set up a system of time zones for
the whole world”—common misstatements, but
a bit disheartening to see them once more. Moreover, because of the focus on astronomy at
Greenwich, studies of timekeeping and time distribution by the Astronomer Royal for Scotland
Robert A. Sampson have been slighted: Sampson’s results were critical in the subsequent selection of technical work undertaken by the time
committees of the International Astronomical
Union after World War I. Of course, the historical errors do not detract from the central thrust
of the work.
Jones’s book is a most welcome addition to the
literature. With the exception of James Jesperson
and Jane Fitz-Randolph’s From Sundials to
Atomic Clocks, now in its second edition, there is
nothing available for technically oriented nonspecialists who need an introduction to current
practices in timekeeping. Specialists also will
find Splitting the Second a useful resource. Both
groups will look forward to the next edition,

whose appearance will serve to document further
advances in the science and technology of time.
Considering that standards working groups are already studying the ramifications of dropping the
Leap Second, another correction that Jones describes, we will not have long to wait.
IAN R. BARTKY
Alfred K. Mann. For Better or for Worse: The
Marriage of Science and Government in the
United States. xviii Ⳮ 240 pp., illus., bibl., index. New York/Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2000.
In the preface to For Better or for Worse, Alfred
Mann cautions, “This book is not a scholarly history with any claim to completeness.” This is fair
warning. The book is a somewhat idiosyncratic
discussion of the development of what Mann
terms “the science establishment” in the United
States from World War II to the present. The
establishment is defined rather loosely as the
complex of federal agencies, universities, industrial firms, and researchers that support and conduct the nation’s basic and applied research.
Within this “establishment,” the book’s focus
is almost exclusively on the four agencies that
fund most of federal research: the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Institutes
of Health (NIH), the Department of Energy
(DOE) and its organizational antecedents,
mainly the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC),
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Defense is treated very briefly.
Industry (except the nuclear industry) is virtually
absent. The universities are seen mainly in relation to the funding agencies. And Congress,
with only a couple of exceptions, is a black box.
Mann, an emeritus professor of physics at the
University of Pennsylvania, has had a distinguished research career in elementary particle
physics and astrophysics. He was associate director of the Princeton-Penn Accelerator in the
1960s, served on the boards of trustees of two
university consortia that manage major scientific
facilities, and was a member of the Department
of Energy’s High Energy Physics Advisory
Panel (HEPAP).
His treatment of government-science relations
reflects this background. Physics and atomic energy and their patron agencies (first AEC, more
recently DOE) receive the most attention. Events
and personalities in the nuclear power industry,
for example, are discussed in detail, while NSF,
NIH, and NASA affairs are painted with a
broader brush. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and other presiden-
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tial advisory bodies appear only at the periphery.
Chapter 7 does include a table listing presidential
science advisors from 1939 to 1999, but, oddly,
it is not cited in the text. Indeed, the chapter
makes no reference at all to presidential science
advice.
There are many errors in the book, some serious: NIH is said to have grown to seven institutes by 1995 (p. 198). In fact, it had seventen
(twenty-one if one counts the National Library
of Medicine, the Fogarty International Center,
and similar bodies). Discretionary funding
makes up about 34 percent of the federal budget,
not 16 percent as stated on page 206. The Supersonic Transport (SST) program did not produce a Mach 3 airliner (p. 148). It was killed by
Congress in 1971. NASA’s aeronautics program
did produce the XB-70, an experimental bomber
that flew at Mach 3. The book’s most significant
shortcoming, however, from the standpoint of
history of science, is its lack of documentation.
Mann provides only forty-four footnotes, citing
a total of ten sources. A more extensive set of
references is included, but without specific citations.
Despite these limitations, patient readers will
find some reward in the book. Researchers who
have heard NIH described as “the crown jewel of
the federal research enterprise” and seen it
granted huge budget increases in recent years will
find it sobering to read about how the agency
struggled through bureaucratic battles over its
management and peer review procedures as well
as the political hostility of the Nixon administration in the 1960s and 1970s. And Mann’s descriptions of NSF’s travails over Project Mohole and
its social science curriculum project, “Man: A
Course of Study” (MACOS), though welldocumented elsewhere, are useful reminders that
NSF’s congressional honeymoon is also a relatively recent phenomenon. In all, however, the
book’s contributions to the literature on postwar
science-government relations are modest.
ALBERT H. TEICH
Gordon R. Mitchell. Strategic Deception:
Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy. (Rhetoric and Public Affairs Series.) xx Ⳮ 390 Ⳮ [9] pp., illus., fig., bibl., index. East Lansing: Michigan State University
Press, 2000. $55.
Gordon Mitchell mixes scholarship and polemics in a deliberate attempt to intevene “in present-day missile defense controversies” (p. 21).
His book operates on three levels. First, he presents three case studies of recent missile defense
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activities in which the United States government
has misled the American public. The failed
promise of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense
Initiative, or “Star Wars,” has lured countless industry representatives and government officials
into rigging tests, falsifying results, and withholding information. The government used secrecy and intimidation, trying to suppress the assertion of MIT professor Ted Postol that claims
for the Patriot missile’s success rate in the Gulf
War vastly exceeded the evidence. Similar techniques were employed in the mid 1990s to discredit a study done by Postol and other colleagues suggesting that the government’s
proposed Theater High Altitude Air Defense
(THAAD) might violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Mitchell relies primarily on secondary sources to document these accounts; readers
familiar with the issues will find little that is new
in his treatment.
The second level at which his book operates
is more original. He subjects statements by government officials to rhetorical analysis. He
hopes, thereby, both to reveal the misinformation and to create something of a taxonomy of
dissimulation. He notes, for example, that President Reagan’s rhetoric in proposing strategic
defense was to equate it with disarmament. Volume 7 of the so-called Fletcher report on ballistic
missile defense revealed the system’s vulnerability to countermeasures; the volume was withheld from publication. The Rumsfeld report,
which purported to establish that rogue states
posed a ballistic-missile threat to the United
States, was used instead to validate the claim that
existing missile defense technology could work.
When Ted Postol succeeded in demonstrating
that a government-sponsored rebuttal of the
study he coauthored on THAAD was fatally
flawed, the head of Ballistic Missile Defense,
who sponsored the study, chose to represent the
difference as a “healthy scholarly debate.” When
the government is on the rhetorical offensive, it
polarizes debate: to oppose Star Wars was to oppose disarmament. When the government is on
the rhetorical defensive, it obfuscates: refutation
of evidence is simply scholarly disagreement. In
the end, Mitchell’s exploration of rhetorical
techniques provides some illuminating insights,
though it does not seem to add up to a model
that one might apply in other cases. Nor is it
clear that these rhetorical strategies are anything
more than ad hoc responses to the politics of the
issue at hand.
On the third level, epistemology, the inherent
conflict between scholarship and polemics becomes manifest. Though Mitchell promises to fo-
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cus on “the interpretation of controversy” (p. 22),
in practice he places “strategic deception at the
center of attention” (p. 11). He is less interested
in locating “the stages of the dispute” than in
demonstrating that the critics were right and the
government was lying. Even his title, Strategic
Deception, confuses his focus. This term usually refers to counterintelligence designed to
deceive the enemy, not polemics designed to
persuade the public. Most of the deceit he describes is ad hoc and banal; only the special
claims of secrecy and national security distinguish it from the practices of other government
agencies and programs. One can see most of
them, for example, in the controversy surrounding the creation of energy policy within the current Bush administration.
Those who do not know the details of his case
studies will find this a useful, if somewhat wordy
and redundant, introduction. Those who want to
understand how government officials and contractors cross over the line from rhetorical flourish to abuse of power and blatant misrepresentation will be disappointed. The value that might
have been added to this familiar material by a
scholarly analysis is compromised by the polemics.
ALEX ROLAND
Raymond G. Stokes. Constructing Socialism:
Technology and Change in East Germany,
1945–1990. (John Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology.) xii Ⳮ 260 pp., illus., bibl.,
index. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2000. $42.50.
This book outlines the evolution of some fields
of technology and science in East Germany that
were significant for industrial production during
the existence of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). A description of political and economic conditions creates a lively picture of efforts, achievements, and misadventures on the
basis of a particularly large number of newly exploited sources.
During the last decade numerous papers on the
history of the GDR have appeared in print. Constructing Socialism has distinctive features,
however. Giving some examples of high technology, Raymond Stokes follows up documented successes, their causes and their fates, as
well their dependency on the entire political and
economic milieu. There are no glorifications or
nostalgic excuses for the social system of the
GDR, but there is a remarkable approximation
of realistically historical conditions in the country.

Originally the economy in East Germany was
very industrialized and technologically highly
developed in crucial areas such as mechanical
engineering, machine tools, office machinery,
chemistry, optics, and precision mechanics,
along with the camera industry and motor industry. Immediately after the war, this capacity
was weakened by dismantling, reparations, and
the evacuation or internment of experts by the
victorious powers. In the 1950s, every effort was
made to develop modern technologies in the
GDR. This is verified in full detail by the analysis of the transition from coal-based to petroleum-based technology for production of organic
chemicals (pp. 80–93) and the evolution of
semiconductor technology (pp. 93–109).
Although the GDR with its efforts wasn’t far
behind other industrialized countries at that time,
the East German evolution of technology fell
back in the early years of the GDR’s existence.
The causes were the weak research and development work in the GDR, the limited support of
Soviet help, especially on semiconductor technology, the chronic lack of foreign currency reserves, the COCOM restrictions, and the migration of scientists and engineers to the West.
Despite these serious defects, work on a digital
computer began at the Technical University of
Dresden under the direction of Nicolaus Joachim
Lehmann in 1950. In 1953–1954 Herbert Kortum and Wilhelm Kämmerer in the VEB Carl
Zeiss began work on an optical calculating machine, a working model of which was available
in December 1954.
From the viewpoint of technology development in the GDR, different elements of socialism
are introduced and analyzed, such as the role of
group technology developed by the Soviet inventor Sergei Mitrafanow, the problem of standards in industrial production, and the new economic system. In 1961 the construction of the
Berlin Wall was a deep break in the realization
of all these political, economic, and technological initiatives and plans. Actually there was a
relative stabilization of conditions in the GDR,
but relations with the West became more complicated and the Sovietization increased perceptibly.
For the 1970s and 1980s the author introduces
the program of secondary raw materials system
(Sero) and the Stasi’s (governmental security)
role in GDR technological development. During
these two decades the GDR was incapable of
producing world-class technology without the
Stasi and outside the area of the recycling system. With supreme effort, the government tried
to develop the electronics and computing indus-
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try, in terms of both research and development
and production. Notably, the efforts for the development and production of the one-mega chip
as well as the ambitious project of the 32-bit microprocessor are described in this section. Although huge sums were invested in these fields,
leading to distortion in the entire development
of the country, the results remained unsatisfactory and the gap relative to other industrialized
countries increased (pp. 177–194). Even grandiose targets weren’t able to hide the fact that by
the end of the 1980s the system of the GDR was
in the throes of political death and the GDR
lacked the economic power to carry out such
technical peak performance.
Unfortunately, the author takes less notice of
the developments and products that were effective in the GDR, such as Mikroelektronik Erfurt,
Carl Zeiss Jena, or Robotron Dresden Computers
from the ROBOTRON 300 (circa 325 were built
by 1972) to the EC 1056 (1985–1989) or the
personal computer PC 1715. These devices did
play a noticeable part in the economy and science of the country and expressed a high competitiveness of the GDR in the framework of
COMECON as well.
The book presents a convincing outline of the
development of some fields of high technology
in the GDR based on essential and numerous researches; it is clearly laid out and will stimulate
further studies. The explanatory statements are
founded on fact and convincing, especially because of the close integration of technological,
economic, and political arguments. Moreover,
the bibliographic essay on the evolution of technology in the GDR (pp. 243–251) is of great
value. Taken as a whole, this book is a benefit,
and everybody who deals with the history of
technology in East Germany during the second
part of the twentieth century will gain a great
deal from it.
MARTIN GUNTAU
J. Samuel Walker. Permissible Dose: A History
of Radiation Protection in the Twentieth Century. xii Ⳮ 168 pp., illus., index. Berkeley/Los
Angeles/London: University of California Press,
2000. $35, £22.
J. Samuel Walker, in his first two volumes on
the setting of radiation limits, set the standard
for writing about federal radiation protection
policies. His Controlling the Atom: The Beginnings of Nuclear Regulation, 1946–62 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), written with George Mazuzan, and Containing the
Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing Envi-
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ronment (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992) contain a wealth of information
about policies of the Atomic Energy Commission and its successor agencies the Department
of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Walker, although a federal employee, always has been evenhanded in his treatment of
radiation controversies, and no one writing in the
field would be without his works as a reference.
Walker’s new book is billed in the introduction as more than simply the final volume of the
Controlling and Containing trilogy. Instead, its
title and subtitle point to a larger story of radiation in the twentieth century, rather than just
picking up in the 1970s where Containing left
off. The book, however, falls short of that goal.
The first sixty years of the century are summarized in the first 28 pages, with the remaining
128 pages covering the period from 1960 to the
present. This editorial decision does not serve
the book well, as Walker’s descriptions of policy
debates of the 1960s and 1970s are simply not
gripping enough to justify the space allotted,
while his sections on earlier history are so compact as to be lifeless.
What this book does well is summarize the
major policy debates surrounding the “permissible” dose for radiation in the twentieth century,
mostly from the perspective of federal agencies
and scientists in charge of setting those standards. Walker takes pains to point out the problems surrounding the setting of radiation standards, including lack of knowledge of long-term
and genetic effects, the difficulty of creating
standards for medical personnel, workers, patients and the general public, and the difficulties
of reconciling the American environmental
movement and the need for nuclear power.
Despite its strengths, however, Permissible
Dose sometimes reads more like an executive
summary than a book. Controversies and political conflicts are disposed of in a paragraph or
two, with little in-depth description of why nuclear issues received so much attention in the
1970s–1990s. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl,
and the human radiation experiments scandal are
all summarized in a few pages, if not paragraphs,
without tying them to a larger argument or narrative. Significant events are decontextualized or
simply left out. For example, the “Green run,”
Hanford’s 1949 radiation releases, is mentioned
in the section on the federal government’s publicity problems in the 1980s, not in its proper
cold war context. Another problem with the
book is the lack of attention to occupational exposure to radiation—Karen Silkwood goes unmentioned, as does treatment of controversies
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over radiation standards for workers in the Oak
Ridge, Hanford, and Paducah atomic production
facilities. Readers looking for historical background on the federal program to compensate
workers at these facilities for their occupational
diseases will find next to nothing of relevance.
While this book will prove a handy one-volume reference on complex debates involving the
number of rems per year that were considered
the permissible dose for radiation exposure, it
does little to shed light on the human lives behind that number—either the lives of those who
set radiation exposure standards or those who
suffered the consequences of working under
those standards.
RUSSELL OLWELL
Evelyn Fox Keller. The Century of the Gene. ii
Ⳮ 186 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index. Cambridge,
Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2000.
$22.95.
“Evolvability,” writes Evelyn Fox Keller, “refers
to the capacity to generate any kind of heritable
phenotypic variation upon which selection can
act” (p. 39). Whether one considers genes or organisms, the potential to adapt and evolve, to
respond flexibly to a changing environment, is
now recognized by many biologists as itself a
trait actively favored by natural selection. Keller
correctly presents this idea as an antidote to an
old notion of genetic stability. She seems not to
appreciate how well it applies to her own subject.
The Century of the Gene is Keller’s latest collection of linked essays, six tidy, intelligent
shovelfuls from her ongoing effort to undermine
the claims of mainstream molecular biology and
to substitute from the scientific margins an alternative interpretation. This project stems from
her philosophical biography of the geneticist
Barbara McClintock, published in 1983. In her
Nobel speech, also from 1983, McClintock
wrote of the genome as a dynamic “sensitive organ of the cell,” responsive, flexible, and interacting with the environment. For half a century,
McClintock had railed at biologists that genes
must be studied not as autonomous, independently acting units but rather as parts of an exquisite whole, acting in concert. Keller celebrated this in McClintock’s work, though many
have read Keller as applying to this view of nature a gloss of feminism that McClintock rejected. More recently, among other projects,
Keller has criticized the “master molecule” concept in biology, examined the use of metaphor
in science, and celebrated Christiane NüssleinVollhard’s studies in developmental biology.

Through it all, she maintains a fascination with
gender and with language as shapers of scientific
thought.
Here Keller explores what she sees as the divergent histories of studies of genes and use of
the term “gene.” While scientists continue to talk
of genes much as they have done for a century
now—as stable, discrete units directing the activities of the cell and the development of the
organism—the molecular biology of the last
forty years has seen a breaking down of the
boundaries of the gene, physically, chemically,
and physiologically. Keller begins by attacking
the notion of genetic stability—whence the introductory quotation about evolvability. Next
she explores the idea of genetic regulation, the
fact that genes do not make anything, nor do they
literally control anything. The molecular biologist’s version of the chicken-and-egg problem is:
Which comes first—proteins or genes? Proteins
read the DNA that provides the instructions to
make more proteins. Keller argues for chickens.
The most important idea in the book is Keller’s distinction between a developmental program and a genetic program. The former is a
sequence of ontological steps in the life of an
organism; it does not presuppose that all steps in
the program are encoded in genes or that all steps
are determined prior to the beginning of development. Developmental programs may be derived empirically, independently of genetic analysis. In contrast, the genetic program is a more
recent idea that does locate the program instructions in the nucleus in the fertilized egg. For Keller, genetic programs carry implications of determinism, a restriction of vision in our attempts
to understand nature.
The term “gene,” Keller concludes, has outlived its utility. Molecular biologists no longer
work with anything so discrete as genes. Their
own data, she argues, show that genes and genomes are flexible, modular, and interactive.
Keller wishes for, but does not offer, a new term
or set of terms that would better reflect current
understanding of genetics and development.
If biologists have shown that the gene concept
is outmoded, why don’t they know it? Keller’s
answer is that the biologists have not yet recognized the implications of their own results;
their language lags behind their knowledge.
Eventually, she believes, either they will drop
the term “gene” or biology must suffocate in its
shell. Yet the changes she describes have been
under way for decades and biology shows no
signs of slowing. Keller recognizes this, and in
the conclusion she briefly acknowledges the obvious solution to the conundrum: that biology
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continues to grow because of, not despite, this
linguistic flexibility. This important idea deserves fuller treatment.
As with the gene in nature, so with the word
“gene” in the scientific lexicon: its very evolvability is selected for, a crucial trait that ensures
its survival.
NATHANIEL C. COMFORT
Christopher Wills; Jeffrey Bada. The Spark of
Life: Darwin and the Primeval Soup. xx Ⳮ 291
pp., illus., figs., index. Cambridge, Mass.: Perseus Publishing, 2000. $17 (paper).
Where is the line between successful popular science writing informed by scientists’ own recollections and truly reliable history? This is a book
of the first kind that dallies with history but
clearly remains a problematic source. As popular
science writing about work since 1953 The Spark
of Life is very successful and conveys a great
deal of information about origin of life research
and exobiology in highly readable form. Christopher Wills and Jeffrey Bada are, respectively,
an evolutionary biologist and an organic chemist/biochemist oriented toward origin of life
studies. Their strength lies in clear, simple writing about sometimes complex research. Their
chief weakness as historians is that they have
strong opinions about the field of research they
are describing. They are friends and admirers of
Stanley Miller (Miller was Bada’s Ph.D. advisor), and they fundamentally share his research
orientation. They thus also share his enemies.
Approached with this in view, the book can be
a very useful source about the Miller “school”
and its point of view in origin of life debates
since 1953. But it certainly should not be mistaken for a neutral source just because it appears
to be an introductory text.
Let us choose a single example to see how this
plays out: the case of Sidney Fox, the protein
chemist and longstanding Miller antagonist.
While the development of Miller’s ideas is laid
out in much fascinating detail and sympathetically given many pages of text, Fox’s equally
long career is summed up in less than five pages
as a “false start” in understanding evolution of
the first organic molecules into more complex
proto–living systems. Fox’s career did indeed
take some odd turns, and his publicity seeking
became something quite out of the norm after he
was marginalized in the research community.
But the initial differences in approach between
Fox and Miller are here passed over quickly,
leaving the impression that Fox never really had
any answers to Miller’s criticisms of his work
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on proteinoid microspheres (though Fox did).
And Fox’s ability to carry on research at all is
attributed to his character as “an excellent selfpromoter,” with the veiled implication that he
was thus able to dupe early NASA Life Sciences
administrators into giving him funding. Whether
one thinks that Fox’s research program actually
brought out any useful, important insights or not
(and some think so), this is surely an oversimplification of a complex story of the institutional
environment that exobiology operated in during
its early years. NASA administrators saw genuinely promising things in Fox’s work, and even
if most of those have not panned out, there is
surely a story here worth telling about changing
ideas within the research community and within
the NASA patronage system. The competition
from the mid 1950s until at least the late 1970s
between Fox’s “school” and the opponents, including Miller and Norman Horowitz, is a story
full of historical interest, both in research journals and behind the scenes.
Regarding historical material before 1953, the
first forty pages of the book, this work is whiggish to the point of being completely unreliable.
Again, a single example will have to suffice.
John Tyndall is credited with coining the term
“panspermia.” Then William Thomson is touted
as a proponent in 1871 of the altered meaning,
that life could be present throughout space—for
example, carried on meteors yet still remaining
viable. We are left with a sense that both Tyndall
and Thomson, being “scientific giants” of the
time (i.e., heroes of the authors and “forerunners” of views they advocate), both basically
agreed on this subject and that only the popular
press ridiculed Thomson for this idea. But Tyndall and the Darwinians all ridiculed Thomson’s
idea at the time. And Thomson himself proposed
the idea as part of a unified campaign against
Darwinian evolution and against modern ideas
on the origin of life supported by Tyndall and
Huxley, a covert way of holding out against the
banishing of a divine Creator by abiogenesis.
But we learn none of this: the ideas are bereft of
their historical context, and even their scientific
context, in the same old way that the simplistic
“historical sections” of science textbooks have
long distorted the stories they tell. Wills and
Bada’s treatment of Pasteur, Pouchet, and Bastian similarly repeat many misstatements from
past internalist histories. This is the case despite
the fact that the authors show in their footnotes
that they are aware of much of the recent work
of professional historians on these subjects.
This book, then, is a source to be handled with
some caution but useful on the period from 1953
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to the present. On the period before 1953 it
should not be considered useful history.
JAMES STRICK

Haraway. x Ⳮ 197 pp., index. New York/London: Routledge, 1999. $17.95, Can $26.95 (paper).

Brian J. Ford (Editor). Institute of Biology: The
First Fifty Years. iv Ⳮ 135 pp., illus., apps. London: Institute of Biology, 2000. £10.

Donna Haraway, one of the premier feminist science theorists of our generation, is a trained biologist who has used a menagerie of creatures—
the cyborg, the vampire, OncoMouse娂, and primates—as markers to analyze the intersections
among nature, culture, gender, and science. Her
writing about these creatures is unique: dense,
circling around, doubling back to move forward.
This book, a conversation with Thyrza Nichols
Goodeve, uses a more informal voice to discuss
the intellectual, professional, geographical, and
personal influences that shaped Haraway’s singular vision.
A most surprising influence is the Catholicism
of her upbringing—she was schooled by nuns
and considered becoming a medical missionary.
Although she no longer adheres to the tenets of
the religion, Haraway attributes her linking of
the figurative and the material to an indelible impression of the Eucharist. Place has also been
defining: Denver, where she grew up, as a borderland; California, as a blend of agriculture and
technology, populated by “Californios” (p. 42),
as the location of the history of consciousness
program of the University of California at Santa
Cruz, where she was appointed to the first position in feminist theory in the United States and
where she has trained multitudes of students,
both graduates and undergraduates.
Haraway’s background in the life sciences
permeates this conversation. Architecture and its
emergence in embryonic development stimulated her initial interest in biology, and the title
How Like a Leaf stems from Haraway’s attempt
to compare her own structure to that of a leaf.
Biology, with all of its subdisciplines, is the
foundation for her analysis of nature-culture, using one to inform the other. “We live intimately
‘as’ and ‘in’ a biological world” (p. 25, italics in
original), but it is a world that is historically contingent on and tied to culture. Her theory is relational, seeking to challenge boundaries, requiring responsibility for their construction, and
taking in all views, simultaneously. The multiple
perspectives occur horizontally and vertically,
from miniatures to aggregates, zooming between
them.
A large portion of this slim book discusses
Haraway’s adult personal ties, which, like her
writing, also are unique. Goodeve claims that
these relationships show how Haraway “lives the
theory she writes and teaches” (p. 63), but Haraway does not explicitly endorse this idea, say-

After five years of consultation, the Institute of
Biology formally organized in early 1950. Its
goals were twofold: first, to watch relevant legislation and provide the voice of British biologists on international issues; second, to serve the
labor and community needs of British biology in
both academic and industrial sectors. Years later
the institute expanded to incorporate other roles:
consultant accreditation, biology education, degree regulation, and history of biology.
This anthology celebrates the institute’s fiftieth
anniversary. Short papers written by members of
the institute’s history of biology network focus on
particular decades. These are interspersed with
brief recollections from select participants in institute activities. Appendixes list institute officers,
symposia titles, publications, and details on the
organization and events of institute branches.
These authors practice history as chronology
and fact-collecting. They ask limited questions
of past events. No effort is made to connect institute activities to larger issues. No effort is
made to understand why these events took place,
what enabled them, or how their character came
to be defined. No effort is made to compare what
happened here with what happened along similar
lines elsewhere in British science, British labor,
or the life sciences abroad. No effort is made to
justify claims of impact and influence. This book
is simply a celebration of activity written for insiders who are celebrating their own achievements. Although they can be proud of their accomplishments, this book fails to offer much
meaningful explanation.
Edited by Brian J. Ford, this book has two
values for analytical historians. First, some reminiscences offer interesting suggestions for future study, such as Sam Berry’s tale about proposing a Royal Society of Biology. Second, the
simple collecting of facts makes this book useful
for reference, though an index would have been
helpful. For more than this, historians must look
elsewhere.
JOE CAIN
䡲 Sociology & Philosophy of Science
Donna J. Haraway; Thyrza Nichols Goodeve.
How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Donna J.
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ing that the relationships were only possible at a
particular point in time. Without linking them to
the body of work, the assertions run the risk of
resembling gossip. The conversation is stilted at
times, the flow interrupted when Goodeve quotes
material from other writers (e.g., Martin Heidegger) whom Haraway does not immediately acknowledge as influential. A complete bibliography of Haraway’s writings, easily accessible
citations for works discussed during the talks,
and more careful copyediting (e.g., WennerGren Institute, not Wenner Grey Institute) would
have been helpful. Readers of this book will also
find worthwhile dialogue between Haraway and
Constance Penley and Andrew Ross (Constance
Penley and Andrew Ross, “Cyborgs at Large:
Interview with Donna Haraway,” in Technoculture, ed. Penley and Ross. [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991]).
Those who come to this book looking for the
canvas on which Haraway has painted an uncommon picture of our world will be enlightened. Those who come looking for clues to unravel the density of the words in her texts may
be disappointed. But who would want directions
for reading Haraway? Part of the joy is finding
something new each time we read an essay “with
passion and irony, where passion is as important
as irony” (p. 172).
MURIEL LEDERMAN
David Turnbull. Masons, Tricksters, and Cartographers: Comparative Studies in the Sociology of Scientific and Indigenous Knowledge.
x Ⳮ 263 pp., illus., bibl., index. Amsterdam:
Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000. $24,
£14.99.
Although these essays derive from much previously published material, the whole is greater
than its parts. The collection allows a comparative view of a variety of local knowledge systems, from that of the medieval masons who
built the cathedral of Chartres to early modern
cartography, and from the complex navigation
system of Micronesia to present-day research on
malaria and on turbulence. David Turnbull marshals local systems of knowledge to substantiate
his thesis that “there is not just one universal
form of knowledge (Western science) but a variety of knowledge” (p. 1).
Turnbull aims to show that knowledge is motley—that it is assembled out of heterogeneous
components. It is a product of social labor. Its
contents are pertinent to the locality in which it
was produced. As such, contrary to the claims of
modernist Western science, it is not rational, au-
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tonomous, and objective. Knowledge is performative and historically contingent. It is both
various and able to be compared across diverse
cultures. Against the claim of science to represent universal, objective knowledge, Turnbull
points to the conclusions of philosophers such as
Richard Rorty who have examined the indeterminacies of modern scientific and technical ways
of knowing. Using an eclectic variety of studies
in philosophy and the sociology of knowledge,
Turnbull reiterates Wittgenstein’s point that
meaning consists of embodied performance and
usage.
For me the most illuminating part of this book
is its comparison of the development of Western
cartographic techniques in the “age of discovery” with the profoundly different navigational
system that was developed in the Pacific by
Polynesians. Turnbull shows the difficulties that
early Europeans had in assembling the multitude
of local knowledges about place and distance
into a systematic cartographic knowledge in the
interest of the state. He then discusses the profoundly different but also highly sophisticated
navigational system of the Polynesians. They developed what he calls “a dynamic cognitive
map,” a map based on a star compass and etak,
a system of mental representation in which the
canoe was conceived as stationary and a reference island as moving backward against the rising and setting points of the stars. It was a complex system of navigation that Polynesian
navigators learned by long years of study from
childhood; it allowed an accurate estimation of
the distance traveled. Pacific oceanic navigation
was based on this system of mapping and on a
key, highly sophisticated technology, the sea-

Late fifteenth-century local estate map, Yorkshire
(from Turnball, Masons, Tricksters, and
Cartographers, p. 102).

166

BOOK REVIEWS—ISIS, 93 : 1 (2002)

worthy canoe. Turnbull here undermines the
“great divide” between so-called traditional
knowledge systems and modern scientific ones.
He effectively questions assumptions such as the
one that contrasts deliberate European discoveries of the Americas with accidental Polynesian
discoveries of the Pacific islands.
He takes a similar approach in his discussion
of the building of Gothic cathedrals, which he
conceives as sites of experimental practice, as
“laboratories.” He describes the cathedrals as
sites of local knowledge, built with talk, tradition, and templates (patterns that the stonemason
uses to cut the stone). Pointing to the evolution
of the master mason into the architect in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, he suggests that
thereby “theory became divorced from practice
and skill became expertise” (p. 79). Here Turnbull oversimplifies the later development. History itself becomes a template cut for the purposes of his own theoretical structure, rather than
the complex, locally contingent, messy, and inherently interpretive entity that it is. Calling cathedrals “laboratories” and the process of their
construction “technoscience” places modern
categories onto the past in a procedure that can
only create a distorting lens.
This criticism can be directed at many social
studies of science that use historical examples
and is not meant to detract from the great value
of this collection of interrelated studies. For
modern science, Turnbull emphasizes both the
motley assemblage and indeterminacy of scientific practices (his case studies of malaria research and turbulence provide concrete evidence). Rather than modern science being
superior to other knowledge systems, both are
based on local practices. The question then becomes not how scientific methodology achieves
universal, objective truth, but how technoscientific knowledge spaces achieves apparent universality and connectedness. Turnbull’s answer
includes technical devices and social strategies
that treat various instances of knowledge/practice as equivalent and that make connections
through ordering. He also shows the legitimacy
and sophistication of knowledge systems that developed before or outside of modern technoscientific knowledge, and he creates a legitimizing space for both kinds, emphasizing the value
of comparison and reciprocity. Rejecting the extremes of both the modern and the postmodern,
he aims to create a middle ground that he calls
the transmodern, a ground in that reciprocal dialogue between scientific and other kinds of
knowledge systems can create both new insights

and concrete human progress. This book is a
valuable contribution toward such a goal.
PAMELA O. LONG
Fritz Ringer. Toward a Social History of
Knowledge: Collected Essays. 239 pp., frontis.,
figs., tables, index. New York/Oxford: Berghahn
Books, 2001. $49.95.
Fritz Ringer is best known to historians of science for his book The Decline of the German
Mandarins: The German Academic Community,
1890–1933 (Harvard, 1969), a work that has informed so much scholarship on the history of
German science. But Ringer has also written major books on the social history of European education systems in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, as well as on French academic culture
in the decades around 1900. This volume of collected essays makes available in English a number of pieces he published during the 1980s and
1990s, often in journals or volumes unfamiliar
to most historians of science.
The essays fall into three categories. Some illustrate Ringer’s long-standing interest in the
historical sociology of the German academic
community. One of them locates the origins of
Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge in the
context of the social crisis of 1920s Germany.
“Bildung and Its Implications in the German
Tradition, 1890–1930” traces the impact of this
educational concept on the political behavior
(and to some extent the scholarly predilections)
of academics. And “A Sociography of German
Academics, 1863–1938” is a preliminary analysis of what can be learned from survey data
collected in the 1950s by Helmut Plessner and
his colleagues at Göttingen (now available,
thanks to Ringer and collaborators, as an electronic database).
A second group of essays is concerned with
the social history of European secondary and
higher education systems. “Education, Economy, and Society in Germany, 1800–1960”
summarizes parts of Ringer’s Education and Society in Modern Europe (Indiana, 1979). For historians of science its most important finding is
probably the “segmentation” of secondary education from the late nineteenth century on: that
is, pupils from different class backgrounds and
social statuses tended to go to schools with different curricula (“classical” versus “modern”).
Having internalized different kinds of educational, and more generally cognitive, values, the
different “segments” then tended to opt for different kinds of higher education and even to
study different disciplines. “Education and the
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Middle Classes in Modern France” is actually a
comparative analysis of French and German systems of secondary and higher education, ca.
1800 to the 1960s. In neither France nor Germany, Ringer argues, was the structure of the
educational system primarily driven by the needs
of the economy. Moreover, throughout this period both national systems tended to reinforce
existing hierarchies of social status rather than
to promote social mobility or open the doors of
higher education to more people.
Finally, two essays illustrate Ringer’s comparative and sociological approach to intellectual
history (and would be useful for teaching). “The
Intellectual field, Intellectual History, and the
Sociology of Knowledge” draws on Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus, and capital and
outlines the analytical framework that Ringer
used in Fields of Knowledge: French Academic
Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890–
1920 (Cambridge, 1992). “Ideas of Education
and of Systematic Knowledge” is a comparative
analysis of ideologies of secondary education in
France and Germany that gave rise to particular
intellectual orientations and conceptual preferences. As such it provides a nice example of the
concept of habitus.
Historians of French and German science
around 1900 will obviously find these essays of
value, as will anyone interested in styles of science (or medicine or technology), whether these
are conceived as national traditions or much
more local ones associated with particular institutions or schools. Ringer’s work demonstrates
how the basic cognitive predispositions that
characterize such styles often originate in the
structure of schooling and higher education.
JONATHAN HARWOOD
Michael Ruse. Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? The Relationship between Science and Religion. xii Ⳮ 242 pp., illus., figs., bibl., index.
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2001. $24.95.
Who was it, when asked whether or not he believed in infant baptism, that replied, “Believe in
it? Hell, I’ve seen it done!”? One might anticipate a kindred reply to the question “Can a Darwinian be a Christian?” from the irreverent pen
of the philosopher Michael Ruse: “Can one be
both a Darwinian and Christian? Well, one ought
not be,” we might imagine his reply, “but I’ve
actually encountered them . . . so evidently a
Darwinian CAN be a Christian.”
The rationale behind Ruse’s affirmative answer is not so simple, although affirmative it
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most certainly is. Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? provides an energetic, balanced, and
thoughtful consideration of the issues populating
contemporary discussion about Darwinian evolution and the Christian religion. Historians of
“The Evolution Wars”—the title, by the way, of
Ruse’s second-most-recent book (ABC-CLIO,
2000)—will remember Richard Dawkins’s 1986
boast that “Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist” (The Blind Watchmaker [Norton, 1986], p. 6). Can a Darwinian
Be a Christian? stands as the most objective objection to Dawkins’s claim from one who, like
Dawkins, insists that “Darwinism rules triumphant” (p. ix). This is the first way in which the
book is praiseworthy: Ruse takes both Darwinism and Christianity seriously. While writing
with zeal, good humor, and punch, Ruse, for the
most part, eschews caricature, condescension,
and patronizing remarks about the Christianity
that he personally rejects.
The result is a very rewarding book, especially
for those seeking a survey of the issues and points
for fruitful conversation. Following two very
nicely done introductory chapters on “Darwinism” and “Christianity,” respectively, the book
ambitiously (but successfully) devotes a chapter
to each of ten subjects—every one a fitting book
topic in its own right—relevant to assessing the
compatibility of Christianity with Darwinian
evolution: “Origins,” “Humans,” “Naturalism,”
“Design,” “Pain,” “Extraterrestrials,” “Christian
Ethics,” “Social Darwinism,” “Sociobiology,”
and “Freedom and Determinism.” Following
each focused investigation of the hurdles Christianity and Darwinism present to each other, Ruse
offers some variety of this conclusion: “There is
no reason now to cast aside your Christian faith”
(p. 156). In some cases his appreciation of Christianity is especially keen: “If you are a Darwinian
looking for religious meaning, then Christianity
is a religion which speaks to you. Right at its center there is a suffering god, Jesus on the Cross.
This is not some contingent part of the faith, but
the very core of everything. . . . Darwinism, a science which so stresses physical suffering, looks
to Christianity, a religion which so stresses
physical suffering and the divine urge to master
it” (p. 134).
Ruse’s unwillingness to cast Christianity and
Darwinism into the roles of embattled irreconcilable foes requires him to oppose both Christians and Darwinists who believe their views are
mutually exclusive. By insisting that Darwinism
need not be embraced as “a secular religion for
a new age” (p. 186), Ruse places himself in opposition to such Darwinists as E. O. Wilson,
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Julian Huxley, Richard Dawkins, and Richard
Lewontin, folks with whom he also shares much
common ground. Of course Christian antiDarwinians, from the philosopher Alvin Plantinga to the adherents of the new Intelligent Design movement, like Phillip Johnson, Michael
Behe, and William Dembski, come in for a good
thrashing. In short, by suggesting the compatibility of Christianity with Darwinism, Ruse will
irritate his vigorous opponents who see such
peacemaking efforts as a mistaken compromise.
Whether or not it is a mistaken compromise,
Ruse’s conclusion still stands: “If there is a unifying conclusion to this book it is that while the
comparison of Darwinism and Christianity may
be challenging and difficult, it is also stimulating
and fruitful. . . . Time and again what might
seem to be firm barriers to the Darwinian and the
Christian existing in one and the same person
prove, on examination, to be precisely the points
where advances can be made and understandings
can be achieved” (p. 218).
This book would be very difficult for a young
scholar to write. It successfully covers much
ground quickly. This is a testimony to Ruse’s
writing ability and his devotion of decades to
studying and writing about the history and philosophy of evolution. Even so not all the details
are on mark. For example, Ruse misidentifies the
Seventh-Day Adventist prophetess Ellen G.
White as “Mary Ellen White” (p. 57) and overstates the case for hopefulness in origin-of-life
studies (pp. 62–64). These problems and others
of Ruse’s debatable contentions, however, do
not detract from the book’s value within its most
promising venue: the college classroom. It succeeded most admirably for a course I taught in
science and Christianity this past academic year.
Students read it, engaged with it, even claimed
that it challenged them as they enjoyed it. For
anyone seeking a guide to the issues upon which
further study and conversation can be fruitfully
built, Ruse has provided a valuable source.
MARK A. KALTHOFF
Shirley C. Strum; Linda M. Fedigan (Editors).
Primate Encounters: Models of Science, Gender,
and Society. xvi Ⳮ 635 pp., figs., tables, apps.,
bibl., index. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2000. $35.
Primates have been studied by more people,
from more angles, for longer periods of time than
any other vertebrates. Primate studies have existed for over fifty years and have attracted
leagues of students from diverse backgrounds to
studies of primate behavior, ecology, and evo-

lution. The nature of the primates and their students has insured that the field has enjoyed considerable public exposure. Most people with
access to a television have watched programs in
which the lives of baboons, chimps, or gorillas
have been interpreted by a primatologist, either
on screen or behind the scenes. Shirley Strum
and Linda Fedigan’s marvelous edited volume
examines the totality of this phenomenon—the
motivation behind the studies, the students, the
media, and the practitioners of science studies
who provide contemporary commentary on the
whole mess.
In the Wenner-Gren Foundation–sponsored
conference that led to their book, Strum and
Fedigan’s goal was to investigate how and why
ideas about primate society have changed in the
short lifespan of the discipline. The book does
this and more. It is an all-encompassing examination of the adaptations and survival of a discipline through fifty years of changing intellectual fashions, increasing publicity, and an
ever-changing backdrop of “general knowledge”
and public expectations about science. The
book’s four major sections deal, in turn, with the
perspectives of the pioneers of primatology, the
diversity of national traditions involved in primate studies, intellectual currents in the related
fields of cultural anthropology, archaeology, and
psychology, and models of science and society
through the lens of primate studies. Thanks to
this well-conceived framework, the reader steps
through an experiential history of primate studies that is vivid, lively, and filled with significant
scientific and social insights. Each section is
concluded with a printed exchange of e-mails
among the contributors, modern versions of the
texts of discussions featured in symposium volumes from decades past. These exchanges are
the soul of the book, for it is in these that the
personal motivations, grudges, and agendas of
the participants emerge.
One of the most important themes explored in
the book is that of gender and, specifically, to
what extent the gender of primatologists has influenced their science and the way it is portrayed.
Not only does this involve a complete exploration of Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey hagiography but also examinations of the impact that
women have had in elucidating the roles of female primates in their societies and, thereby, in
achieving comprehensive views of primate social dynamics. This theme, in turn, is closely tied
to the most interesting set of interactions played
out in the book, between the primatologists and
the practitioners of science studies. One doesn’t
quite know here who is watching whom, but the
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result is a balanced examination of what science
in general means to people who don’t identify
themselves as scientists and how scientific
knowledge is translated into public knowledge.
In this age of growing “antiscience” sensibilities
in the humanities and the public sphere, this contribution alone makes the book essential reading.
The shortcomings of the book are few: the
chapters providing commentary on related disciplines do not make consistent comparisons
with primatology, and at least a few of the authors don’t seem to know or care about the entire
premise of the book. But this is a very small
problem in a book that is otherwise outstanding.
The editors have produced a multifaceted, retrospective volume that is neither self-congratulatory nor self-pitying. It is an insightful treatment of how science really works, how it is
portrayed, and how it becomes the fodder for its
own science. I don’t know any biologist or historian of science who would not benefit immensely from reading this book.
NINA JABLONSKI
Andrew Abbott. Department and Discipline:
Chicago Sociology at One Hundred. xii Ⳮ 249
pp., tables, apps., bibl., index. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. $45, £31.50 (cloth);
$17, £12 (paper).
Andrew Abbott’s Department and Discipline
calls to mind an exchange I once had with an
economist—prompted by my characterization of
a recent work of urban sociology as part of the
“Chicago-school tradition”—who reminded me
that in his profession “Chicago school” was associated with Milton Friedman, free market ideology, and a world made up of rational, selfinterest-maximizing actors. What I had in mind
could hardly be further from that: the highly contextual, neighborhood-based mode of analysis
that became a hallmark of the University of Chicago Department of Sociology from the late
1910s through the 1930s and that explained such
phenomena as juvenile delinquency, race relations, poverty, and urban ennui as the products
of complex, historically rooted social processes,
ecologies, and group interactions.
The essays that make up Department and Discipline ask that we rethink “conventional” notions of “Chicago-school” sociology as a body
of work produced by a particular group of faculty and students in a bygone era. Instead, in an
engaging, unapologetically polemical, and ultimately prescriptive blend of historical analysis
and disciplinary critique, Abbott conceptualizes
the Chicago school as a tradition that was in-
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vented and reinvented over time, and within the
ever-changing relationship between the department and the broader discipline over the first half
of the twentieth century. With this as his central
theme, Abbott contemplates the—highly contested—meaning of the Chicago school in historiography and departmental history; the historical transformation of the Chicago-based
American Journal of Sociology (AJS) from early,
shaping influence to a mere organ of an increasingly narrow, professionalized discipline; and
the capacity of the discipline to transcend what
Abbott believes to be its contemporary state of
professional and intellectual exhaustion.
Even within sociology, “Chicago school” has
had varying connotations over the years. Some
associate it with Robert Park and his cyclical,
assimilationist vision of race relations; others
with the organic, ecological view of urban
growth and mobility patterns captured in such
still-ubiquitous concepts as ethnic “succession”;
still others with symbolic interactionism, the social psychological study of how people engage
with, give meaning to, and ultimately act within
the object world around them. More recently
there has been talk of a “second Chicago
school,” a post–World War II generation of
qualitative and interactionist scholars who kept
those traditions alive even as the discipline was
headed in more quantitative, grand theoretical
directions. Complicating matters still further,
members of the initial, now-legendary founding
generation did not think of themselves as engaged in a single intellectual project or “school”
of thought. Indeed, Abbott tells us that it was not
until the 1970s, decades after Chicago lost its
dominance in the discipline, that “the loose
tangle of maxims and practices that had sustained the department in its glory years” was actually presented as “the Chicago school” (pp. 63,
18, emphasis in original).
So does it make sense to talk about a or the
Chicago school of sociology? Abbott argues that
it does, albeit not as something that exists in the
ideas, the body of research, or the considerable
institutional apparatus that characterized the department during its interwar “glory years.”
Rather, it existed in the interactions among a
methodologically diverse, often deeply conflicted department faculty, out of which emerged
an eclectic tradition of inquiry dedicated to understanding social processes in the context of
time and place. Ironically, it took a moment of
crisis—a year-long self-study in 1951–1952
prompted by administrative pressure and foundation efforts to define sociology as a bona fide
science—to bring this vision of the Chicago-
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school tradition into full view. By then, the tradition was on the way out: its practitioners retiring or moving elsewhere; its sensibilities
displaced by a type of analysis C. Wright Mills
would scornfully refer to as abstracted empiricism, dedicated to the construction and manipulation of variables outside of time and place.
Though not a book for the uninitiated—Abbott’s detailed rendering of behind-the-scenes
personalities and squabbles requires some
knowledge of the department and its landmark
works—Department and Discipline makes an
important contribution to social science history
as well as to the literature on the Chicago school.
Informed by extensive archival research, the
book is animated by a powerful argument that is
likely to resonate with historians, if not with the
AJS editors who declined to publish the essay
they had commissioned from Abbott for the
journal’s centenary: that sociology must reconnect with and reinvigorate the tradition of contextual analysis. While intriguing, Abbott’s argument that the Chicago (or any) “school” exists
in departmental processes and faculty relationships is less fully realized—occasional references to the Chicago-school tradition in its
1920–1930s “heyday” sound awfully like the
conventional view. It also makes for a book that
gives short shrift to the actual ideas and body of
research associated with Chicago sociology—
and to their extraordinarily enduring influence
among social practitioners and analysts alike.
Still, when Abbott does turn to the work, the
discussion is, like the rest of the book, original,
thought provoking, and rewarding to read.
ALICE O’CONNOR
䡲 Reference Tools
Marilyn Ogilvie; Joy Harvey (Editors). The
Biographical Dictionary of Women in Science:
Pioneering Lives from Ancient Times to the MidTwentieth Century. Foreword by Margaret W.
Rossiter. 2 volumes. xxxviii Ⳮ xxvii Ⳮ 1,499
pp., indexes. New York/London: Routledge,
2000. $250, Can $375.
Throughout the years, books on the history of
science have featured only scattered references
to the contributions of women in scientific fields.
Published biographical dictionaries of scientists
have contained relatively few entries devoted to
women. Within the last century, sparked by the
emerging interest in the feminist movement, isolated volumes have appeared dealing with
women in medicine, in mathematics, in chemistry and physics, and in the biological sciences.

Marilyn Ogilvie and Joy Harvey, with the aid
of over twenty contributors, have amassed a twovolume collection of essays on women who have
worked in the sciences. No other work of such
massive scope has been published; it contains
information on the works and lives of approximately 2,500 women scientists culled from many
sources. The fields of science covered include
astronomy, biology, chemistry, engineering,
mathematics, medicine, and psychology. The
women cited are from around the world and are
either deceased or were born before 1910.
Individual entries vary in length, not necessarily reflecting the importance of the individual’s achievements. In cases where sources and
detailed biographies are readily available, the entry included may be briefer. Each entry consists
of a data section summarizing personal information, a biographical essay, and a bibliography
containing selected works by and works about
each woman.
Also included are various summary lists. Using these, the reader can derive perspectives on
such questions as: What disciplines have attracted women through the ages? What time periods were most conducive to women’s work?
What countries and cultures encouraged women
achievers?
Greater care could have been taken in proofreading and editing the manuscript to minimize
various technical flaws in the presentation. For
instance, the ordering of entries in the “Alphabetical List of Entries” in the main body of entries and in the subject index is not always consistent.
With any work of this nature and magnitude,
questions can always be raised as to omissions.
There is no entry, for instance, for the mathematician and computer scientist Gertrude Blanch
(1897–1996), who received the Federal Woman’s
Award from President Lyndon Johnson in 1964.
Given today’s widespread use of the computer,
it is also surprising that no mention is given to
pertinent reference sources available on the Internet.
This work is extremely valuable as a reference
tool. It provides a springboard for further study
on specific women as well as on the past, present,
and future role of women in the sciences. It can
also serve as a source of inspiration and encouragement to young women to seek careers in the
sciences.
LOUISE S. GRINSTEIN
Sophie Riché; Sylvain Riquier. Des hôpitaux à
Paris: Etat des fonds des Archives de I’AP-HP
XIIème–XXème siècles. 864 pp., illus., tables.
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Paris: Assistance Publique-Hôpitaux de Paris,
2000.
Sophie Riché, directed by Sylvain Riquier, the
former conservateur, has inventoried every document in the Public Health Archives of Paris at
7 rue des Minimes to create an impressive, comprehensive guidebook. This volume of almost
900 pages now takes its place among the Etats
des fonds that have long guided researchers
through the thousands of boxes and bundles deposited in the Archives de France.
The authors confronted five idiosyncratic reference systems that, in the end, they decided to
maintain. These inventory Léon Brièle’s lists of
old regime documents; hospital registers covering hundreds of years; the archives’ library and
rich card catalogues; recent acquisitions; and,
most important, the so-called Fosseyeux catalogue, a “marvellous grab bag” according to a
former conservateur, Valérie Poinsotte. It lists
136 items, many of them bundles held together
by a piece of string (liasses). Untying a liasse
initiates a treasure hunt—the researcher’s delight, the bibliographer’s nightmare.
To use this guide, one must understand the
editorial decisions fundamental to its layout. The
Assistance Publique de Paris was created in
1849. This leads the editors to focus on the past
150 years. A “policy of collecting and publishing” has replaced a “policy of documentation”
(p. 3). The editors created an alphabetic list of
144 “hospital structures” (two-thirds of the
book) since they wish to “privilege the producer”
(p. 7). Each entry consists of most of the following (Bicêtre is here used as an example): a brief
historic description, a bibliography, and a guide
to archival documents with sections on administration, personnel, finances, architecture, gifts,
inmates, inquiries, medical archives, plans, and
images. An up-to-date supplement (Suivi des
hôpitaux) is forthcoming. Footnotes act as links
and dispense good advice. Researchers who are
curious about a contemporary institution will be
well served.
Less favored are scholars interested in historic
developments. Events corresponding to the old
regime are inserted into the alphabetical list of
contemporary institutions. A glance backward
reveals their past activities. Thus under CharitéGifts we find “List of donors, 1601–1797” and
under Charité-Inmates (administrés), “Register
of admissions, 1702–1935”—two of the rare
lists that extend far into the past. As for tables
of information regarding patients at Bicêtre, the
Hôtel-Dieu, or Salpêtrière, they begin in 1810
(pp. 318, 543, 776)!
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The other epoch that falls victim to this inventory’s present-mindedness is the Revolution
and Empire, when the French government attempted to transform Christian charity into secular welfare (bienfaisance), the citizen-patient’s
entitlement. Three reports document this momentous effort: those of the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt to the Poverty Committee of
the Constituent Assembly in 1791 and those of
the Hospital and Public Health Councils of the
Seine Department in 1803 and 1816. These reports appear only as bibliographic snippets for
each concerned institution. This approach contravenes the spirit in which the treasures of this
archive were collected by past conservateurs
such as Marcel Fosseyeux (1903–1919) and
Marcel Candille (1950–1973). A future inventory of the Assistance Publique before 1849
should also heed the legacy of that great scholar
and friend of our field, the late dean Jean Imbert,
whose work underlines the interrelationships of
past, present, and future.
The authors freely acknowledge the lacunae
with a list of “topics not dealt with” (pp. 861–
862). Here we find groups such as the mentally
ill and the blind, but also topics such as secularization. One looks in vain for information about
the Sisters of Charity, the Brothers of Charity, or
the Augustinians of the Hôtel-Dieu. Only one
page deals with modern nursing (p. 106). “Pharmacy” is more explicit (pp. 146–151). A general
index would be helpful. The main desideratum,
in my opinion, is a complementary guide to public assistance from the perspective of the old regime and the Revolution and Empire. It is regrettable that an editorial decision appears to
have excluded foreign-language works (that the
archives own) from the secondary literature of
this inventory.
These archives are open Monday to Friday
from 9:00 to 5:30 without the usual annual closing. Photocopying is by permission, and some
documents must be requested 48 hours before
they can be viewed. Researchers have long been
welcomed and guided here in an exceptionally
friendly and helpful manner, and the new conservateur, Agnès Masson, and her staff continue
this tradition.
DORA B. WEINER
Paul Dijstelberge; Leo Noordegraaf (Compilers). Plague and Print in the Netherlands: A
Short-Title Catalogue of Publications in the University Library of Amsterdam. 360 pp., illus.,
bibl., indexes. Rotterdam: Erasmus, 1997. Dfl
120 (cloth).
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This catalogue arose from a project to document
material concerning the plague and the history
of disease in the Netherlands. Rather than serving as a comprehensive bibliography, it is limited to texts held by the University of Amsterdam Library and published from 1512 through
1796. It contains over eight hundred entries and
is augmented by twenty-two plates of illustrations. The catalogue itself also contains two indexes. The first links the entries to the authors’
last names, and the second ties them to printers,
publishers, and places.
The preface outlines the intended scope of the
catalogue—a partial listing of the primary
source material from the compilers’ research into
the plague in the Netherlands. This outline is
complicated by the restrictions they place on
what is entered into the catalogue. It “is confined
to the works held in the Library of the University
of Amsterdam, in particular to works in the collection of the Koninklijke Nederlandse Maatschappij tot Bevordering der Geneeskunst
(KNMG).” The intent in assembling the catalogue was not to prepare a list of every work
containing a passing mention of or paragraph referring to the plague; rather, it is limited to works
that devote a substantial amount of attention to
the plague. It is further restricted to authors and
printers from the Low Countries, as well as
works written by Dutch authors but produced in
other countries.
This unfortunately prevents the catalogue
from serving as a complete listing of the pertinent subject work contained in the KNMG collection. One looks forward to what the editors
describe as their intention to expand the catalogue into a full-fledged bibliography without
geographic restrictions—an effort that will potentially render this work obsolete.
Following the introduction is a detailed explanation of the structure and contents of each bibliographic entry. The entries are arranged in
chronological order, then alphabetically by the
author’s last name within each year. When available, the main heading includes the author’s
birth and death dates. The elements of description contained in each entry include a short title
(which adheres to the rules of the Short-title Catalogue—Netherlands [STCN] and uses modern
Dutch spelling); the bibliographical format and
collational formula; the STCN fingerprint; a
brief statement of contents; the shelf mark; references, which correspond to the catalogues and
bibliographies listed; and a list of all of the editions of the same text contained in the catalogue.
The editors make allowances for those new to
the study of analytical bibliography and make an

effort to educate readers in this area. The volume’s format is identified, as is its collational
formula, which details the number of gatherings
within the work and the presence or absence of
introductory material. The STCN fingerprint further describes each entry and gives readers a
chance to compare their holdings to this standard. The editors take readers step-by-step
through the production of the fingerprint, which
is based on the positioning of letters over the
signature and is intended to distinguish between
different editions of a text. As the editors conclude, “the usefulness of the STCN fingerprint
lies in the unambiguous identification of any
given edition.”
The supplemental bibliography covers the period from 1800 to 1993 (but is not limited to the
University of Amsterdam Collection). It is not
comprehensive, containing only those items included at the compilers’ discretion. They have
chosen to omit modern publications unless they
deal exclusively with the plague.
In general, the editors met their goal of creating a bibliography that would be useful and of
interest to medical historians, bibliographers,
and historians of the book. One can look forward
to the next phase of this project with confident
expectation.
LOIS FISCHER BLACK
Robert E. Krebs. Scientific Laws, Principles,
and Theories: A Reference Guide. [viii] Ⳮ 403
pp., illus., figs., bibl., index. Westport, Conn./
London: Greenwood Press, 2001. $65.
This book is intended as a reference source of
“universal scientific laws, physical principles,
viable theories, and testable hypotheses” from
ancient times to the present. Robert Krebs states
that he includes only the physical and biological
sciences, including geology, but in fact there are
also several mathematical and logical entries
ranging from the Greeks to Gödel. The book
contains over four hundred entries, in alphabetical order, averaging less than a page each, plus
a glossary of nearly four hundred technical
terms. Evidently, it is intended as a library reference for a general audience. It does not seem
to be directed toward professional historians of
science. The author is a retired university science
administrator in the health sciences field.
Opening the book at random, I find four entries on the facing pages: “Carnot’s Theories of
Thermodynamics,” “Caspersson’s Theory of
Protein Synthesis,” “Cassini’s Hypothesis for
Size of the Solar System,” and “Cavendish’s
Theories and Hypothesis.” It is hard to know
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what the principle of selection is, other than
comprehensive coverage. But although it is impressive, the coverage is spotty. The famous
story of Adams, Leverrier, and Neptune is not
included, for example—perhaps because no new
law is involved.
To a historical scholar, such a project has obvious pitfalls; I will list some of them. First, it
is whiggish in selecting and evaluating the entries from our standpoint and in often omitting
now-discredited content. For example, the entry
on Carnot does not mention caloric, although it
does mention the model of water flowing over a
waterwheel. The book encourages the idea that
discoveries and other major results are more or
less punctiform, the achievements of particular
individuals at particular times. To be fair, in his
introduction Krebs does describe science as an
ongoing, self-correcting process in which “laws”
sometimes turn out to be false or to need correction. The book is historically uncritical, since it
accepts at face value that eponymous results (a
category that includes most of the entries) were
actually achieved by the person celebrated in the
name. The entries are necessarily too brief to indicate much of the wider historical context, or
even the technical context, in which the law or
theory under discussion was developed. Krebs’s
statement of his intent, in the introduction to the
volume, is theory centered and seems to take
physics (indeed, Stephen Weinberg’s conception
of physics) as a model, although in fact there are
many entries from the biomedical sciences that
do not neatly fit this model. The author’s attempt
to characterize his subject matter—scientific
laws—is philosophically naı̈ve. Finally, even if
we leave aside the difficulty of making complex
technical results accessible to a general audience
in a very limited space, no single author can be
expert enough to maintain a high standard
throughout a volume of such scope. Krebs identifies no panel of expert consultants enlisted to
check his entries.
The entries that I sampled sometimes contained less-than-sharp formulations, inaccuracies, and even contradictions. For example,
Krebs describes Aristotle, in cliché fashion, as a
“philosopher” rather than as a “scientist concerned with observations and evidence” (p. 23),
but two paragraphs later it turns out that Aristotle
based his account of spontaneous generation on
observations! Krebs says that motion was selfexplanatory for Aristotle because things strive to
reach their natural places. The entry on Euler
mislabels his work on bodies moving with multiple degrees of freedom as the three-body problem. Fermat’s last theorem is said to remain un-
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solved, yet Krebs obviously prides himself on
being up to date. The entry on Planck is historically inaccurate and physically misleading. And
so on.
For all that, I found the book rather interesting
and useful. No reader leafing through it will fail
to find this entry or that intriguing. (“Ah. I always wondered what that was!”) Since the entries are short and discrete, the book makes good
bedtime reading. And, given that the laws, principles, and effects are commonly called by these
names, the book can serve as a source of general
knowledge—but only as a starting point. Given
the uneven quality, caveat lector!
THOMAS NICKLES
䡲 Collections
Peter Becker; William Clark (Editors). Little
Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2001.
Peter Becker and William Clark: Introduction. Martin Gierl: “The Triumph of Truth and Innocence”: The
Rules & Practice of Theological Polemics. David
Warren Sabean: Peasant Voices and Bureaucratic
Texts: Narrative Structure in Early Modern German
Protocols. William Clark: On the Ministerial Registers of Academic Visitations. Wolf Feuerhahn: A
Theologian’s List and an Anthropologist’s Prose: Michaelis, Niebuhr, and the Expedition to Flex Arabia.
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